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THE BILINGUAL AS A PERSON—LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION WITH STATUS*

JAMES H. S. BOSSARD
University of Pennsylvania

ALTHOUGH almost one out of every five white persons living in the United States was reared in a home in which some language other than English was the principal one spoken during the years of early childhood,¹ only the psychologists and educators have concerned themselves with the study of bilingualism, and their interest has been mainly in its relation to the child's learning progress.² This article seeks to emphasize the bilingual as a person, and the relation of bilingualism to personality development. What does the experience of being reared in a home in which one language is spoken, and living subsequently in a society which utilizes another language, do to a person? How do the vestiges of the earlier or "other" language enter the processes of personality development? What factors condition their role? Does the bilingual have "problems" *per se*, and what is their nature?

Here, in other words, is an area for sociological analysis, in which the sociologist should do the definitive work.

Methodological Note. This study is based upon 17 case documents. Some of them are self studies, furnished by bilinguals. These are highly intelligent persons, with some training in personal and social observation, and selected because they seemed to show evidence of a certain objectivity of insight into their own personality development. A second group of documents was obtained from members of the subjects' families, such as wife, niece, or cousin, who had opportunity for continued close association with the subjects and who have had some training in the obtaining and recording of social data. A third group of documents was obtained and recorded on the basis of repeated interviews in which, once the project had been explained, the subjects were encouraged to talk along the lines of the nondirective method.³ Finally, several personal documents already published, lending themselves to the purposes of this study, were utilized. This case material has been gathered during the past four years.

Reference should be made to the relative difficulties encountered in obtaining valid

*I am indebted to my colleague, Donald R. Young, for a critical reading of earlier drafts of this paper and for suggestions which have been incorporated in its final form.

¹For statistics on the extent and distribution of bilingualism in the United States, the reader is referred to the publication of the federal census on *Mother Tongue* for 1940.

²Cf. Seth Arsenian, "Bilingualism in the Post-War World," *The Psychological Bulletin*, February 1945, pp. 65-86. This is an excellent summary article, with a bibliography of 46 selected references.

³Carl R. Rogers, "The Nondirective Method as a Technique for Social Research," *The American Journal of Sociology*, January, 1945, pp. 279-284.

case material. There were three groups of adult bilinguals with whom the study was discussed and from whom no satisfactory case material was secured. One group appeared reluctant to give information, at least with any degree of frankness. Feelings of shame or embarrassment were manifest, or a certain degree of impatience as though the earlier linguistic experience was now forgotten and that it had better remain so. A second group, quite willing to discuss the study and to give information, seemed to reflect an almost aggressive pride in their linguistic background. These were persons who have utilized their bilingual equipment in an occupational way, and were given to emphasize only the educational and cultural values of facility in more than one language. They showed little or no interest in the personality problems involved. The third group, equally willing to offer testimony, reflected an attitude which can only be understood when viewed in terms of a life span. These are adults who, early in life, either as immigrants or their descendants, experienced the immigrant sense of inferiority about many things including his language, but who now, after becoming established in life, again become conscious, and perhaps proud, of their mother tongue. None of these persons is included in the 17 studies utilized in this study, but their distinguishing attitudes serve to suggest some personality patterns found among bilinguals.

The total number of cases (17) is not large enough to make any statistical summary, nor to draw any definite conclusions. This study is meant only to be suggestive, with the possible hope of stimulating further research studies within the general area of investigation.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL ROLE OF LANGUAGE

To understand the problems of the bilingual, it is necessary to appreciate the sociological role of language. Two facts are of prime importance here. First, language is a part of the cultural achievement of a people, comparable to its family system, its economic life, or its religious life. Second, it is also a mechanism which transmits the

rest of the culture system. Because of this latter function, it comes to be peculiarly interrelated with the details and spirit of the culture. Language is therefore, in a peculiar sense, both part and symbol of a culture, reflecting its essence in such a way that another language cannot serve as a substitute. Just as many aspects of a culture cannot be expressed in another language because no words exist to do so, similarly many words can be understood only by explaining them in their cultural setting. Words represent, not things, but our behavior with regard to things. It is through words that we organize our thoughts about things.

Speech, which may be thought of as the active, individual expression of language, is the vocal aspect of personality. It is particularly revealing, first because it is vocal, and second because, being formed so early in life, and so thoroughly ingrained from constant use, it betrays, as almost nothing else does, the origin and background of the person. The linguistic culture is, then, a peculiarly pervasive aspect of the entire cultural background of the personality, and the true bilingual is a person, who participates intimately in two cultural systems.

TWO IMPORTANT VARIABLES

From the material gathered, it is obvious that the nature and importance of the problems identified, as well as of the factors involved, vary from place to place and from group to group. Two basic variables are easily apparent. First is the ecological setting of the bilingual. This has to do principally with the area in which the bilingual is considered, and with reference mainly to the normalcy or unusualness of his bilingualism. For example, to be bilingual in the heart of the Pennsylvania German belt is to be what the great bulk of the people are. The bilingual is the normal person, operating with persons who are also bilingual. The same is true in the French Acadian settlements in Louisiana or in Spanish settlements in New Mexico. It is the vogue to be bilingual. This is quite different from being bilingual in an area which is largely, or almost wholly, unilingual.

A special phase of the ecological setting

of the individual, particularly significant in this connection, obtains in our large urban centers with their heterogeneous populations. Here there exist, not only large and populous areas in which one language predominates, but also the inevitable mixture of linguistic groups results in areas in which the particular linguistic situation creates its own norms of expression. There are, for example, areas in our large cities where the young people deliberately refrain from speaking an "unmixed" English lest their "crowd" accuse them of being "highhat."

The second basic variable is the social attitude toward the other language. This grows out of the first variable but has in it elements of difference. The attitude toward a language cannot be separated from the attitude toward the people whose language it is. The upper classes develop the socially accepted medium of speech so that deviations from it appear also as deviations from upper class status. What is the social status of the non-English tongue? How are the linguistic differences related to class distinctions? Also, the language of minority groups, when they have their own distinctive language, becomes an index of minority group status. In a rapidly status-changing society different phases of the problem become very important.

IMPACT UPON FAMILY RELATIONS

In all of our cases, there are references to the differences that developed within the family in the acquisition and use of English. The basic facts are that different members learned to utilize the second language at differing times and with unequal skills. The pattern of sequence is similar in most cases; the children learning it first, then the father, and last, and at times least, the mother. In some families, there were important differences between the siblings, and in at least one case, this proved rather troublesome in sibling relationships. Two of our cases, typical of many others, reveal situations where English speaking parents of foreign stock, taught the "family language" to the child first, following this with large doses of English before the school years arrived.

Several of our cases refer to the habit of bilingual conversations in the home, with the parent utilizing the non-English language and the child answering in English. At times this seems to have happened with no manifestation of tension, as a concession to the parents, but others emphasize that these two-way conversations involved differences of attitudes toward the languages used, and were attended by feelings of tension, embarrassment, or bitterness.

The significance of these linguistic differences for relationships within the family seems to be much influenced by the parental reaction to them. Where the acquisition of the new language is hailed as a new educational experience in which all members are sharing, there is far less possibility of tension. Where, on the other hand, the parents forbid, discourage or frown upon the children's efforts, the results are quite different. Mangione speaks of the maternal reaction to his interest in the non-use of Italian.

My mother took no notice of such childish snobbery. As long as I remained under her jurisdiction she continued to cling to her policy of restricting the family language to Italian. "I might as well not have my children if I can't talk with them," she argued. She considered it sinful for relatives to permit their children to speak a language which the entire family could not speak fluently, and claimed that if she were to cast aside Italian, the language of her forbears, it would be like renouncing her own flesh and blood.⁴

The attitude of the mother is particularly significant because of her role as the pivotal center of the home, and her constant and continuing contacts with the children.

A careful reading of our case material would seem to warrant the following conclusions. (a) In all cases, there is an awareness of the problem of language by all members of the family, and a certain preoccupation with it. This is particularly obvious during the stage when the children are growing up. (b) Under the most fortunate circumstances, the bilingual situation appears to involve a nervous strain, a certain

⁴J. Mangione, *Mount Allegro*, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1942, p. 53.

added effort to shift gears, as it were, from one linguistic level to another. It adds another dimension to family relationships. (c) Children sense that their parents are different from other parents. This precipitates early a certain objectivity in the attitude toward the parent, a comparative appraisal, as it were. This was rather clearly revealed in some of our interviews. (d) The effect of the linguistic difference appears to be more marked when family relationships are otherwise intimate and limited and continuing. The size of the family is of significance: the smaller the family the more significant the linguistic difference. (e) In most cases, the children early developed definite feelings of resentment against the parents because of the latter's inability or unwillingness to keep pace with them in the use of English. At times this takes the form of contempt for the parents' seeming inability; or there is impatience with the slow rate of progress and the parents' lack of interest. Often what seems most marked is a general irritation over the situation as a whole. In two of the cases studied, strong feelings of hatred against the parents developed. (f) Several of the cases emphasize that early in life the subjects came to practice an avoidance technique, avoiding conversation with parents within the home and/or avoiding their parents away from home. The child who rejects the parental language rejects, as it were, the parent who speaks it.

I remember I used to cross the street to avoid meeting up with my father or mother. Neither had good eyesight, and I would be on the alert whenever I got anywhere near to places where I might see them. Once mother came to school, I saw her in the hallway between classes and ducked out the back door. I had rather a hard time explaining my sudden absence on that day.

(g) Almost without exception, the parents and grandparents seem to have no appreciation of the importance of the foreign language problem to the children, other than its possible effects upon the rate of educational progress. Their own identification with their language is so close that they cannot understand their own child's rejection of it. Es-

pecially is this so in two of our cases where the other language is French. "What do you mean," shouted the regal grandmother, "Jack doesn't want to speak the language which is the standard of culture the world over?" But Jack's reply was: "The fellows say: 'That's a heck of a language.'"⁵

BILINGUALISM AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT

The acquisition of a language is referred to commonly as the child's outstanding intellectual achievement. The major part of this achievement occurs during the years of early childhood. This is also the period of primary personality development. It seems, then, both inevitable and obvious that the nature of the linguistic development should have meaning in the processes of personality formation. Three aspects of this appeared in the course of this study.

(a) First is the fact of the double linguistic task. The acquisition of two languages and facility in their use increases tremendously the task imposed upon the child. It is a double task, with the added strain of shifting from one to the other. This the child has to carry when other children with whom he competes face the simpler task of acquiring but one language. Only one of our cases refers explicitly to this, but one came to sense it in other cases in the constant references to their consciousness as children of the language problem; in the reiterated emphasis that it did not interfere with the learning process, "at least not much"; in the repeated allusions to the conscious determination to use one rather than the other language. In other words, the bilingual child has to face the double task, to make an extra effort, to place himself under a double strain, merely to gain the means of ordinary communication with his fellows. As a rule, this must be done without sympathetic help from his companions and his family; sometimes, without help from his teachers.

(b) Second is the role of bilingualism in

⁵ The conclusions presented here might be compared with the point of view presented by D. T. Spoerl, "Bilingualism and Emotional Development," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1943, 38, pp. 35-57.

the development of confidence in the self. The development of self confidence is a phase of the process of growing up. It has its time dimension, measured in terms of the years of the first two or three decades of life. In this process, the ability to express one's self adequately and acceptably is of very great importance. Here again the bilingual child and youth are apt to experience a handicap. The cases studied indicate this, both by direct statement and through inference. Especially is this the case when the "other" language is one that is not socially acceptable. Consciousness of a foreign accent is particularly serious in the adolescent stage, with its strong pull of loyalties to groups other than the family. The bilingual background marks the adolescent as different from other members in these groups.

The difference that pained me most was that of language, probably because I was aware of it most often. Child that I was, I would feel terribly embarrassed whenever my mother called to me in Italian while I was playing on the street, with all my playmates there to listen; or when she was buying clothes for me and would wrangle in broken English with the salesmen about the price.⁶

Awkwardness in expression due to bilingualism, or the audible identification of the accent, adds additional difficulties in the development of confidence in the self.

(c) Akin to this is the social ridicule which children center upon the linguistic variant. Children can be diabolically cruel to each other, and linguistic differences are often magnified by them to ridicule their companions.

W. Somerset Maugham was born and reared in France. "He knew French before he knew English, and when he went to England after the death of his father to live with a clergyman uncle, the vicar of Whitstable, he became something of a butt at school because of his frequent mispronunciation of English words. He still remembers the roar of laughter that greeted him when he read the phrase 'unstable as water' as though 'unstable' rhymed with 'Dunstable.'"

"He had a pronounced stammer, which per-

sists to this day, though in a far less severe form."⁷

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROTECTIVE DEVICES

Most of the persons included in this study refer, in one way or another, to the development of behavior patterns whose purpose it was to protect them from the consequences of their bilingualism. These are identified as *protective devices*. Four are selected for brief characterization:

(a) RESTRAINED MANNER OF SPEAKING.

Robert says that he sensed very early in his school career the social attitude toward his "other" language. He set himself consciously and persistently to overcome his accent. He would spend hours reading aloud to himself, and he would repeat passages, trying all the while to make his voice sound as much as possible like that of one of his teachers. As time went on, he came to learn that when he spoke slowly and softly, no or little accent was discernible. It was only when he became excited, spoke rapidly or angrily, that he betrayed himself. From his twelfth to his twenty-third year, Robert says that his conscious daily effort was to speak in a quiet, restrained manner. At that time, he was married. His wife seems to have been attracted to him in particular because of these traits.

(b) INCONSPICUOUS BEHAVIOR.

When Peter was a boy, there were constant references to his "other" language. Many of these were references of ridicule. Peter was much ashamed of his lapses into his family language and of his accent. He found that the more inconspicuous he made himself, the fewer the times when the unwelcome label was attached to him. Peter says he became quiet and meek, as a result. He remembers that he permitted other boys to impose upon him.

(c) HOME AVOIDANCE.

"Another thing I remember," writes John, "is that I brought none of my school friends to my home, because the few times I did, my parents seemed to go out of their way to display their native speech and mannerisms to my friends. What social life I had from my twelfth

⁷ Hamilton Basso, "Profiles," *The New Yorker*, January 6, 1945, p. 28.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 51.

to my twentieth year was away from home, and most of it was with boys, who were less prone to remind me of my background. During those years, how well do I remember that every friendly relationship I had was manipulated so that I need not bring my companions to my home. One way in which I managed this was to choose all my friends in another part of the city than where I lived."

(d) METICULOUS ENGLISH

All of our cases show a deep consciousness of the importance of language and of the manner of speech. All reveal a compensatory concern with correctness of expression.

Howard tells how, from his first year in school, he steadfastly refused to speak any language but English, even to his foreign-language-speaking family. This involved a series of battles with his family, but after winning out, he turned to the pursuit of perfecting his English. "I lived with a dictionary under my arm. I read avidly, wrote a good deal, and practiced speech when alone. For years, I never spoke without self consciousness, for fear that the ungrammaticalness of my parents and brothers would creep into my speech. I thought out every word carefully before speaking. At school, I was drawn to my English teachers, who encouraged me and helped me."

In other cases, this pursuit of "perfect English" dictated occupations, selected friendships, led to the withdrawal from kinship groups, and in various other ways influenced the organization of the life pattern, particularly during adolescence, all to the end that an acceptable speech, without foreign trace, might be perfected.

THE LINGUISTIC LABEL

The label is one of the most common devices which people use against each other. It is particularly effective as an instrument of oblique attack or of depreciation. Its constant use by politicians is the best proof of its devastating force. Careful students of social relations await a definite treatise on the sociology of the label.

Linguistic vestiges which identify one with some particular population group are constantly made the basis of labels. These labels serve to identify the stereotype. Examples

are "The Dutchman," "Hunkie," "Frenchy," "The Swede," etc. Eight of our cases refer to the fact that linguistic labels were attached frequently to them, and all but one indicate some resentment of it. In four of the cases the resentment apparently was pronounced.

BILINGUAL VESTIGES: THEIR OCCUPATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE

The ability to express one's self adequately and acceptably is of particular importance in the occupational world, and the higher the occupational level, the more important it seems to become. How university graduates in business rate it was revealed clearly in a study made by the author a number of years ago. A total of 1,636 graduates of the Wharton School of Finance and Commerce of the University of Pennsylvania were asked, in the light of their subsequent business experience, to make an appraisal of the importance of various fields of knowledge covered in their undergraduate days. The outstanding result of these appraisals was the marked emphasis given to "studies and practice in the oral and written use of the English language." More than three-quarters (75.9 per cent) of the total number of graduates believed that learning in the written and oral use of knowledge was of primary importance. No other field of knowledge was so emphasized.⁸

Four aspects of the occupational significance of bilingual vestiges appear in the case material. One of these emphasizes its professional utilization.

John Wojacks grew up in a foreign language home. By the time he was graduated from college, he had acquired a good command of the English language, although he spoke it with a pronounced accent, slowly, and occasionally at a loss for the proper word. By the time he acquired the doctorate, he spoke as slowly as ever, but gradually the hesitating and timid manner gave way to a seemingly deliberate ponderous manner, as though he were speaking *ex cathedra*. After the doctorate was awarded,

⁸ James H. S. Bossard, and J. Frederic Dewhurst, *University Education for Business*, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1931, chapter VIII.

John went into college teaching, where his progress has been rapid. He speaks today with an accent as pronounced as it was twenty years ago. He still speaks slowly, and with great show of assurance. He does not think a foreign accent is a handicap. He apes the mannerisms of the European scholar, and apparently these have impressed many persons on the staff of his institution. He is spoken of constantly as a great scholar, although his output of scholarly work has been rather meager.

Another case emphasizes the handicap in salesmanship that results from bilingual vestiges.

Benjamin Stern has been a travelling salesman. He was reared in a Yiddish speaking home, and he speaks English today with a remarked Yiddish accent. Benjamin says that this fact handicaps him in selling, particularly in certain areas of the country. He hopes that, when the war is over, his territory will be confined to New York, Philadelphia and Baltimore, where his accent will be less of a handicap.

A third case refers to repeated instances where the "other" language tended to confer professional prestige.

William's background is Graeco-Turkish. As a clergyman, he finds that in the eyes of some of his church members, this background adds color to his personality and his sermons, and lends authority and prestige to his exegetical study courses or sermons, based upon the Greek texts.

A fourth instance, involving professional discrimination, appears quite incidentally in the case material.

Harry was himself reared in a non-English speaking home, but has lost most traces of it. In speaking of his referral to a psychiatrist several years ago, he mentioned the fact that this psychiatrist spoke with a pronounced foreign accent. "Imagine sharing your innermost thoughts with a person who cannot talk your language. I did not go back to him again."

THE LANGUAGE OF ENEMY NATIONS

Falling within a special group are the cases where the "other" language is that of a nation with whom the United States was at war. Most important of these is the case of the German. Twice within a generation, per-

sons of German extraction, living within the United States, have had to face the reactions of their fellows to their own Germanic vestiges. Language and speech are the most "socially visible" of these. In other words, in these cases there are, in addition to all of the aspects of bilingualism *per se*, the complications resulting from emotional attitudes toward the enemy, at least from such attitudes as "carry over," consciously and unconsciously, to his language. The case study that follows will serve to indicate not only some of the problems already commented upon but also the implications of the enemy language extending over a life span.

John Rowley is now 52 years old, a rather intelligent man in a semi-professional occupation. Both of his parents were born in the United States of German stock. He grew up in a town of about 15,000, composed largely of persons of German ancestry. German was commonly spoken in the home and in the community, where it was the language of business and of social relations. Only official records were kept in English, which was also the language of the school, at least so far as the work of the classroom was concerned. John was an only child of lower middle class parents. His story follows:

"Until I was four years old, I spoke only German, which was the language of the home and of all our daily relationships. It was when I was about four that an aunt came to visit and told my parents that I ought to learn to speak English, since this was the language I would have to use when I went to school. I have no clear recollection of this visit or of the conversation, I am merely repeating here what I have been told. I can recall learning English words and having their meaning explained in German. Fortunately, an English speaking family moved next door to us when I was five years old. The daughter, aged eight, took me in hand, taught me some more English and saw to it that I was properly started in my school work.

"For my sixth to my thirteenth year, I was completely bilingual. At home, the language was German; in school, we spoke English; on the playground there was a mixture of both, with English slowly gaining the ascendancy. Although moving constantly from German to English and back again, I felt most at home with the German. German came naturally; English was the

result of thought, care and effort. During most of this time, I thought in German, although as I came to read more and more in English books, I began to think about the contents of these books—characters in novels, traits of persons in biographies, qualities of objects and scenes described—in English.

"Concerning the effect of this bilingualism upon my school work, I cannot say that it was any handicap to me during this period whatsoever. Almost all of the children in my class were in the same stage that I was, so that any resultant handicaps were common to all of us. In fact, my ability with the English language was greater than that of many of my classmates, some of whom were handicapped, I am sure, by their awkwardness in the use of English. I remember that the boy at the foot of the class also spoke English quite poorly. We called him that 'Deutscher dumkopf' (that German ignoramus).

"My early German language background was a serious problem in my life for many years, but I cannot say that it ever interfered with the learning process in my school work. The problems it created for me have been wholly social. From about my tenth year on, I began to see that working people and the common classes spoke German, while the educated, refined and wealthy persons spoke English. Furthermore, I slowly became conscious of something called accent; that some people spoke English as though they had spoken it all of their lives, while others spoke English with a German accent.

"My thoughts about all this came to a focus when, in my fourteenth year, we moved to another town. Here the population was chiefly English and Scotch, and with the Irish as the new immigrant group. My favorite teacher was an English woman who spoke an excellent English. I remember having a crush on a girl in my class with blue eyes, blonde hair, and broad A's.

"My 'dutch accent,' as it was called, must have been conspicuous. It was noticed and commented upon. Now began a period in my life of definite unhappiness which lasted for about twelve years. In my High School classes, I was ashamed to recite orally, often, when asked a question in class, I would not answer even though I knew what the answer was. I was fearful of comment about my accent. My written work, the teachers all said, was much better than my oral work, and I alone knew the real reason for it. It was because I was ashamed to get up and speak. I can remember, too, mak-

ing up many excuses to avoid oral recitations—a sore throat, an aching tooth, something in my eye, etc.

"Meanwhile, I was busy trying to do something about it. I began the practice of reading aloud, slowly and distinctly, repeating sentences and phrases to make them sound more English. I insisted that only English be spoken at home. My parents tried to do so, but the linguistic habits of a lifetime are not easy to break. Often they would forget, and then I would become sullen and refuse to answer them. The worst times for me came when my German speaking relatives arrived for a visit. It was at these times that I was in turn embarrassed, irritated and embittered. I would stay away from home at such times, or, if at home, would speak only when spoken to and then only in monosyllables. Naturally my relatives noticed this. Some were hurt by it, others resented it, while most of them told my parents that I was a badly mannered young man from whom no good could be expected. All of this was embarrassing to my parents, but it left me only the more bitter. I began to hate all Germans—my parents, relatives and friends—because they seemed to personify all my personal problems which grew out of my German ancestry.

"Another thing I remember is that I brought almost none of my school friends to my home, because the few times I did, my parents seemed to go out of their way to display their German speech and mannerisms to my friends. What social life I had was away from my home, and most of it was with boys, who were less prone to remind me of the fact that I was German.

"Just as I was graduating from High School my family moved to the city in which I had been born and where we had lived until I was thirteen. Naturally, my parents were overjoyed to return to their old friends with its preponderance of people of German stock. As for me, I hated it. I kept aloof from my boyhood friends, withdrawing more and more within myself. I found a job and pleaded that I was too busy or too tired to go out. Particularly did I avoid girls, for reasons which I remember today quite distinctly. A Germanized girl I did not want; a non-German, i.e., of English speaking ancestry, I would be unwilling to bring to my home to meet my German parents. It all seemed very clear to me then that the only safe thing to do was not to allow myself to become deeply interested in any woman. Thus arose my decision to remain unmarried, to which I ad-

hered for a number of years.

"Then came the first World War. The feeling against the Germans in this country was very strong. I was ashamed of my name, of my family and of my ancestry. More and more did I withdraw within myself. I think perhaps the chief effect of my German ancestry upon me during all these years was this—that I never acted naturally. I was always hesitant, afraid, insecure. Later on, I became more and more artificial, playing a part, I became very quiet and reserved. I kept away from my childhood friends and relatives. I was with German folk, lived with them, but was not willing to be of them and to converse freely with them.

"After a short and unexciting war service during which I did not leave this country, I was mustered out with a firm resolution in the back of my mind. I would leave home, go far away, and begin life anew. My continued reading aloud and studied care in speech had enabled me to speak a 'German-less' English. I also made a slight change in my name, much to my parents' disgust.

"All that happened twenty-five years ago. During this time I have not returned once to my boyhood home, save when my mother died. My father has re-married, but I never see him. I have had no contacts during these years with my relatives or my earlier friends. I married when I was thirty-five. My wife knows almost nothing of this earlier part of my life, and I have loved her because she has asked nothing and never speaks of our lives before we came together. A few times I have met persons from my former world, who knew me as a boy, but I have never been more than polite.

"Sometimes, especially now that I am getting older, I feel sad about this complete withdrawing from my earlier life. It is as if I had no real roots. I envy my friends who do have these things. But now that we are at war with Germany a second time, it is a great relief to live in a community which is not marked. My wife and I both are active in war work, and the happiness that is mine now more than repays me for all that I went through when I was a young man.

"I am 52 years old now and am able to look back over my life and see it in better perspective. It seems all very clear to me today that my German speech and my German ancestry have been the key to my whole life and the way in which it has developed. I cannot think about the first half of my life without remembering them. It seemed that they were always in my mind, influencing me, holding me back, embar-

assing me, and leading me to do many things to shield myself from the problems which they created. If I had been willing to grow up a German, marry a 'Germanized' girl, go around with German-American kinfolk and friends, all might have been well and happy for me. But this I was never willing to do."

It must be obvious that there are persons living in the United States who speak the language of the national enemy whose reactions are wholly different from the above.

THE REFUGEE AS A BILINGUAL

A phase of the enemy tongue problem, as well as a distinct aspect of the problem of the bilingual, is the case of the refugee who has come to the United States within recent years. The problems of recent refugees are numerous and highly complicated, and the reference here is solely to a specialized aspect of the linguistic factor in these problems. In the case of many current refugees in the United States English is acquired later in life, and as a phase of the larger adjustment to American ways of life. The acquisition of English comes usually in connection with the refugee's occupational readjustment. The result of this, as seen through the eyes of a refugee, is evident in the case of Karl.

Karl came to the United States when past the thirtieth year. For him this marked the beginning of a new occupational career, and in a new language. Karl is an exceedingly able person, with excellent academic training, and with insight into his own problems.

"Waiting in England for my immigration visa, I felt the first impact of the personality impairment which it means to live in a country where you know the language only unsatisfactorily. It seemed to me that I had lost the ability to make use of my personal and professional potentialities because I lacked any adequate facility of communication. I became convinced that I had to forge for myself a new tool of communication before I could start to participate again in the game of life. However, for a professional man such a tool has to be of high quality and I soon realized that it would take time to produce it.

"Shortly after my arrival in this country, it was my good fortune to receive guidance which led to my doing graduate work at a col-

lege of high standing where I regained control of my ability of communication, but the tool was a new language and this meant that since that time my thinking and living was divided into two different departments dependent on the language I used.

"At home with my wife, in my letters to my parents and European friends, I still expressed myself and—what is more important—thought in German, but when I closed the apartment door behind me in the morning I stepped into another life which was dominated by English thought and expression. I cannot say that I found it difficult to make this daily transition, but after some time I began to realize that it implied certain limitations for my functioning in either sphere. In the German language sphere it meant that the whole stock of new professional and life experience had to be retranslated or to be expressed in English which led to a mixed language usage which from the angle of language standards I felt to be regrettable. Similarly I had to translate my former life and professional experience into English if I wanted to use it on the outside in my new life; since here language mixture was unfeasible, this meant a certain handicap and particularly a slowing down of communication which I sometimes felt to be painful.

"At the present time I have enough language facility in English not to experience any handicap in expression, but I am still aware of my foreign accent when I am not carried away by my topic. This awareness again slows me down in speech and makes me appear more deliberate in behaviour than I think I would be on a spontaneity level.

"However, notwithstanding the fact that I am still aware of using a new language tool, I do not feel a professional handicap in this respect. As a matter of fact in my professional life bilingualism has become an asset because of the access which it permits to two spheres of communication complexes with bearing upon each other.

"In my private life, I still am under the impression that the fact that English came into my life so late, implies a certain limitation. In English I can only act as a person of my age, because I have no English child's talk nor adolescent's talk for that matter. If I want to revert to earlier periods in my life I am confined to German thought and expression. On the other hand, if I want to communicate present day experience to my relatives and friends it receives a somewhat second-hand character because my respective mental content is English and I have

to translate it into German.

"I have tried to check this analysis by an observation of my word associations and have found that my associations are bilingual along the lines indicated. To words or pictures of family life or such matters as food I associate German words, to professional words and visual impressions I associate in English. Looking up from the typewriter in the room where I am typing this report I associated 'books' this very minute, but thinking of going home in the evening I associated 'Nachtmal' the German word for dinner.

"If I had to bring the result of this analysis on a formula, I should say that bilingualism has decreased the parochialism of my personality which seems to me an asset in personality range but a liability in personality harmony. Bilingualism has formed two compartments in my personality structure, and although they are by no means watertight they are still quite distinct."

At first glance, Karl's case coincides with our concept of the marginal person, who lives in two worlds in part and in neither in entirety. This may be the traditional, and dramatic, way of putting it, but one is haunted by the question whether this is wholly and accurately true. Does Karl live in two worlds, and is his, then, a schizoid personality? Or is it the essential fact that he functions at two levels in the same world, playing dual linguistic and cultural roles, with the main problem the "wear and tear" of shifting "gears" constantly?

LINGUISTIC IDENTIFICATION WITH STATUS

In searching for a key to the various aspects revealed in the material of these 17 cases, as well as the net impressions gained in the course of the study, the idea of *linguistic identification with status* seems to be the most fitting to the facts. By this is meant the assignment of status to the individual on the basis of his linguistic behavior, measured in terms of the conformity or non-conformity of that behavior to the socially accepted modes of expression. It is proposed here as a fundamental social process, operating within the status system of the prevailing society and in terms of linguistic factors.

It is a further part of the thesis presented

here that while this is a generic process in all societies, it operates in the United States in two dimensions rather than in one. This difference is due to the highly heterogeneous population of this country. In a nation with a homogeneous population, this process operates in terms of one dimension. The socially acceptable form of expression is established in one language on a class basis, and status is determined in terms of adherence to or departure from it. In the United States, as in all countries where there are language minorities, there is the added dimension of bilingualism, for many persons, operating against a historical background of immigrant sequence and minority group status. In this added dimension, a second language and its vestiges are bound up with the status of the particular minority group which speaks that language.

How *linguistic identification with status* operates in the United States may be explained in graphic terms. Let the reader draw a right-angle triangle. Denote the vertical line as AB, with B at the base. The hori-

zontal line becomes BC. Let B identify the socially elite form of expression of the dominant group. Departures from it in a class basis can be marked along the line AB, while bilingual vestiges can be marked along the line BC in terms of the "other" language group status. Consider now the case of individual X. He speaks a low class or Vulgate English, so that his place on the perpendicular line AB, marked by X^1 , is near to A. He is a bilingual, whose other language and minority group status, indicated by X^2 on line BC, is quite near to point C. The line X^1 to X^2 is relatively far removed from B, so that his linguistic identification with status is quite low, measured in both dimensions. Other individuals would vary as either or both points in the status scale differ.

It must be added, by way of conclusion, that *linguistic identification with status* is not presented here as the whole explanation of the status system, but only as it is affected by linguistic factors. Obviously, too, the role of linguistic factors would differ from one society to another.

MUST THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FOSTER MORAL SKEPTICISM?¹

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IN THE PERIOD of the war before the attack upon Pearl Harbor, I talked with a number of undergraduates about the significance of the conflict. It developed that many of the brighter students argued along the same lines. They would assert that this was just another war wherein one group of powers was pitted against another group. No preference could be expressed for one side or the other, except in emotional terms. Anyone versed in the social and historical sciences would be constrained to view the

¹ Since certain general issues are raised here, the social sciences are grouped together. However, by training and experience, the writer is better qualified to analyze this question as it impinges upon the field of sociology.

whole process with scientific detachment. Germany was the product of various conditions and so was the United States. For their part, these students did not understand how any informed person could inject value-judgments into the picture. They asserted proudly that theirs was a strictly scientific approach to the question. These young citizens, the product of higher education in America, seemed thoroughly detached and ethically neutral in their point of view. As new converts to the religion of science, some were nothing short of fanatical in their complete rejection of any evaluative effort.

Actually values were hidden away in this interpretation. In part at least, the austerity of their approach turned out to be a ration-

alization. These youths had grown up in a country steeped in pacifism and a tradition of isolation from European affairs. Some of them were Communist sympathizers who denounced the war as a conflict between rival imperialisms—before the Nazi attack upon Russia. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the type of reasoning used here is commonly accepted as the scientific approach. According to this view, the social scientist must be detached from all ultimate evaluation of social processes and problems. As a scientist he is always the robust skeptic, not only intellectually but *morally*. It is this faulty interpretation of science that will be examined critically.

I

Contemporary moral skepticism has a number of social and ideological roots. (1) Rapid changes in the *mores* have occurred under the impact of political, economic, and technological forces. As a result, older and newer standards exist side by side, since these changes do not diffuse uniformly throughout the various segments of society. This condition leads to confusion and skepticism, especially in the young who observe the inadequacies of standards handed down from a previous generation. (2) Mobility uproots people from one moral soil and transplants them in another, with disorganizing effects. (3) The growth of large cities, where cultures intermingle and communal solidarity is weak, also leads to moral confusion. (4) The more educated classes are acquainted with the principle of ethical relativity and the concept of ethnocentrism. This anthropological perspective tends to produce a degree of detachment from the moral imperatives of one's culture. (5) The decline of the influence of organized religion has cut many loose from their moral moorings. (6) The critical spirit fostered by liberalism also is conducive to skepticism. (7) The prestige of scientific method resulting from the enormous progress of the physical and biological sciences has weakened man's capacity to believe in anything that cannot be established by this method. (8) Finally, new philosophies have come into power during the last twenty-

five years—philosophies that challenge the fundamental assumptions of the heritage of the Western world.

The theory to be developed here is that the social sciences must be included among the factors contributing to moral detachment and skepticism. Certainly the influence of these fields of knowledge is considerable, especially among the better educated groups whose effect upon public attitudes and opinions is disproportionately greater than mere numbers would indicate. It can be shown that the social sciences have encouraged moral skepticism and that their influence in this direction is based, in part, upon an inadequate understanding of the uses and limitations of scientific method.² This problem has received very little attention in the literature of the social sciences. Yet it seems desirable to develop the implications for ethical or moral³ thought and values of a narrow and inadequate orientation on the part of the scientist. This is a legitimate task; it might be considered a preliminary venture in what has come to be known as the sociology of knowledge. Social scientists have been so preoccupied with the establishment of objective methods in the face of many types of resistance and with the protection of their fields from natural enemies, that they have not been fully aware of ideological consequences. Now we must begin to realize that this precious objectivity has had implications for social attitude and belief that have gone unrecognized. Until a more adequate orientation develops, it must be admitted that the scientific approach to human nature and society is not an unmitigated boon.

II

It is a principle of relativistic thought that the validity of concepts and frames of reference must be judged in relation to the

² Actually the factors outlined in the preceding paragraph have affected the attitudes and arguments of social scientists, thus contributing to theoretical tendencies toward moral skepticism that will be analyzed here.

³ Although it is common to draw a distinction between these two terms, for present purposes "ethical" and "moral" are used interchangeably.

purpose involved. Such relativity is well recognized by those who have studied the philosophical bases of science.⁴ Nevertheless, there is a deeply rooted tendency in all groups to embrace one's own frame of reference so completely that any other is considered false. Such habituation to group standards and purposes easily leads to intolerance. Thus, physicians may hold so inflexibly to an organic approach to illness that psychiatry is neglected. Psychologists and sociologists have entered into fruitless disputes concerning the validity of the group concept, both sides manifesting little understanding of methodological principles. Partisans tend to think in absolute rather than in relative terms, failing to realize that a frame of reference may be valid for certain purposes but invalid for other purposes. This psychological tendency effects economy of mental effort and it is also favorable to individual and group morale. Disparagement of other frames of reference constitutes a defense mechanism that buttresses one's orientation to the world. Methodologically, however, such a habit of thought must be criticized severely.

Social scientists are careful to distinguish between science and ethics. These fields represent, of course, different and separate frames of reference. The former is concerned with the acquisition of knowledge, the latter with standards that motivate, or should motivate, personal and collective conduct. Each represents a valid purpose, fulfils a legitimate need. Yet one encounters scientists who are not content to let the matter rest here. In accordance with the intolerance and prejudice of partisanship noted above, aspersions are cast upon the study of ethics, while ethical convictions are viewed with alarm and distrust. In an age when the term "scientific" possesses a good deal of magical significance, it is stated that the selection of ends is not a scientific problem. This is meant to be a dreadful indictment. It is

argued further that ethical values (ideals) are phenomena of sentiment. This too suggests condemnation, since science views the emotions as a perennial source of bias. According to the viewpoint of such prejudiced scientists, who tend to belittle frames of reference other than their own, both cruelty and humanitarianism ultimately rest upon nothing more substantial than dogma and feeling; and in neither case can evidence be offered to establish validity. Moral ideals are matters of faith, sentiment, tradition, propaganda. Science can prove nothing here.

Thus, the failure to realize that frames of reference must be judged in relation to purpose, and that they have no general or absolute value, is responsible for unnecessary confusion and misunderstanding among social scientists. Ethical issues are cast aside because they do not fit into a scientific frame of reference. Such a naive and over-zealous attitude has led to the development of moral skepticism where it serves no purpose except to hinder personal adjustment and the amelioration of civic problems. Ethical thought and sentiment have been subverted, unwittingly perhaps, but effectively. In the undergraduate and graduate schools, as well as in the professional societies, over-zealous devotees of social-scientific method have prided themselves on a high degree of moral detachment about human affairs. One can only imagine the inhibitions of idealistic aspiration and effort involved for both teacher and pupils in such a process of indoctrination. The intrusion of the detached attitude, valid for certain purposes, into areas where standards for personal or group conduct are being determined represents an abuse of science. It can only lead to a sense of futility or to sterile intellectualism. When the scientific approach is applied indiscriminately and exclusively to all kinds of practical issues facing the individual and his community, it is no longer science operating in its proper sphere but a special philosophy of life that may be called *scientism*. Nor is the subversive influence upon the individual the sole consequence to be recorded. A philosophy of moral detachment also gives encourage-

⁴ Cf. G. A. Lundberg, *Foundations of Sociology*, Macmillan, 1939, Chap. I.

Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society* (edited by Arthur Livingston), Harcourt Brace, 1935, Chap. I.

ment to demagogues and various other moral quacks to chart the social course. Such vested interests and self-appointed saviors of mankind are not loath to postulate value-systems but rush in eagerly where scholars fear to tread.

The conclusion to be drawn from this part of the analysis, then, can be summarized as follows: In their zeal to secure the firm establishment of scientific method in the face of opposition from religious, moralistic, and other vested interests, certain social scientists have emphasized detached objectivity to the point of denying the legitimacy of ethical issues and convictions. The remedy here is for scientists to perceive their own activities and purposes in less distorted perspective. Frames of reference are valid for specific purposes. They have no absolute or exclusive validity.

Yet it is not sufficient to increase the tolerance of the scientist for an ethical frame of reference, for tolerance alone does not destroy the misleading conception that these two fields are separate realms without influence upon each other. It has been stated that these fields represent different and distinct frames of reference. At the same time it must be emphasized that this distinction does not warrant the corollary so often drawn; namely, that it is altogether beyond the province of science to influence the choice of ethical values. This latter notion is deeply rooted in contemporary thought. It is the point of view that is usually taken for granted among social scientists. However, in certain respects I cannot agree with the prevailing opinion. It seems to me that science, both the attitude of science and its more specific conclusions, has various ethical implications. In the following pages three lines of reasoning are indicated in support of this contention: (1) there is an ethics of science and a social-ethical *milieu* favorable to the progress of science; (2) scientific findings can influence moral judgments and attitudes; and (3) scientific and welfare interests are interrelated. These will be presented to support a negative answer to the question posed by the title, "Must the Social Sciences Foster Moral Skepticism?"

III

Up to this point it is claimed that science has fostered moral skepticism unnecessarily by direct or indirect disparagement of types of problems which lie outside its special and legitimate province. A more adequate understanding of the uses and limitations of science would reduce these tendencies. We can now carry the analysis further: an attitude of moral detachment is detrimental to science itself. Since this argument has been presented more fully elsewhere, only a summary of the main points will be given here.⁵ If social scientists view their work as important, they will abandon a detached attitude. Once we begin to advocate the value of science, we become involved in a whole pattern of social values. Such a pattern will encourage free discussion and the use of reason rather than unilateral propaganda and the use of force. There is an ethics of science. It is composed of such qualities as intellectual honesty, open-mindedness, and respect for evidence. Cultures are not equally hospitable to these values, of course. One need hardly belabor the point that dictatorships are more suspicious of free social inquiry than democracies. Nevertheless in a democratic type of society there are all sorts of vested interests that are obstructive. The scientist who is a detached skeptic will remain defenseless in the face of attack or obstruction from the outside. He has no professional will to live. Such an attitude is not a virtue; it is a disease.

The social scientist cannot be a moral skeptic for the simple reason that his endeavors possess ethical significance. When science is conceived as an activity worth preservation and advancement, acceptance of a whole system of ultimate values is implied. To be consistent, social scientists should favor social changes conforming to this general rationalistic pattern.

IV

There is a more direct manner in which science can influence moral judgments. The

* C. C. Bowman, "Evaluations and Values Con-

phenomenon of racial prejudice provides a good illustration. Let us consider a group of white persons in the United States who manifest the conventional type of prejudice toward the Negro. Some will be impervious to objective evidence, but let us assume, in this instance, that others are receptive to some degree. Now science can attack this question in several ways. In one direction it can trace out in detail the various causes of prejudice—historical, economic, political, etc. This kind of knowledge may be sufficient to influence a few members of our prejudiced group. These will begin to realize that their cherished attitude has a less substantial basis in rationality than they had hitherto supposed. Results will be especially effective if, in addition to the general genetic account, factors in personal history and experience contributing to prejudice can be located. Other persons in the group are likely to make assertions concerning characteristics of the Negro which he allegedly possesses by racial inheritance. Again, science is prepared to cope with many such assertions in terms of studies of regional and class differences in Negro behavior and the results of psychological testing. Evidence of this type may unseat the dogmatism of a few more. As a further attack upon the issue, the social consequences of prejudice can be set forth. This reveals a picture of denial of opportunities, conflict and tension in the community, ignorance, disease and poverty. In short, it can be shown that prejudice has kept the Negro as an underprivileged group and as a burden on the whole population. A consideration of such consequences may influence still others away from their original beliefs.

What has taken place here? It has been demonstrated that science can mold and remold attitudes usually classified as moral or ethical. There is, of course, nothing inevitable about the process of transformation delineated above. Prejudice and intolerance constitute a tight system of thought and feeling which may be utterly impervious to facts and objective reasoning. Yet the success of education along scientific lines indicates that

prejudices do yield before the onslaughts of the evidence and attitudes more consistent with the facts may emerge. Some members of our original group may even become actively interested in movements to bring about inter-racial cooperation. Scientific findings and theories do not posit any such moral imperative, to be sure, but I have seen the evolution of college students from conventional prejudice to participation in idealistic ventures of this sort. Science has not created the general reservoir of idealism at work here but it has laid bare the falsehoods and fallacies of cultural indoctrination. In so doing it has prepared the way for the application of idealism to social action.

There are innumerable instances where science can influence moral attitudes along these lines. Where causes and consequences are studied, it becomes apparent that ethical values and the practical policies based upon them are not to be dismissed as arbitrary and final choices unavailable to further study and evaluation. The process outlined above in regard to racial prejudice can be applied to broader issues. The study and evaluation of Fascism is a case in point. The social sciences and psychology have given significant assistance here. The personal history of leaders; the political, economic and social setting in which the revolutionary developments took place in the various countries; the techniques of control; the assertions of their official propagandists; the consequences to various groups and nations of fascist policies—all such aspects are open to objective study. The widespread dissemination of such findings to people everywhere produces, in the long run, a more profound effect than all the fulminations of crass propaganda. The quiet truth can be a mighty force.

Thus we see that science can influence moral judgments and values. It is not tenable to set up a rigid dichotomy between moral and intellectual areas. Psychology and the social sciences have, I believe, a great deal to contribute to the evaluation of individual and social ethics; but this potential contribution cannot be made actual so long as the conception prevails that the two areas are separate spheres that do not touch at any

sistent with the Scientific Study of Society," *American Sociological Review*, 8, 306-312, June, 1943.

point. The present effort aims to break down this conception by showing certain direct implications of the scientific attitude and its findings for ethical belief.

V

As a third line of reasoning converging on the main thesis of the present analysis, it is maintained that the scientific interest in society cannot be marked off sharply from an interest in societal welfare, since the two are inter-related. Stimulated by training along religious and humanitarian lines, a number of persons have entered the field of sociology in order to participate in the "solution" of social problems. As their study progressed, at least some have come to realize that humanitarian sentiment *per se* is not enough. Consequently they have turned to science in order to implement their ideals with a substantial fund of knowledge.

On the other hand, and more relevant to our present purpose, a student of society may start out to be strictly scientific and develop a social-welfare interest as his knowledge grows. In any scientific pursuit, particularly in its applied aspects, it is an easy and natural step from objective knowledge to interest in improvement. This is especially true in the United States where knowledge for its own sake is an ideal that runs counter to our pragmatic tendencies. Thus, the improvement of health becomes a professional goal of the medical scientist that develops directly out of his interest in the human organism. In the normal course of professional development the welfare interest emerges as a concomitant of scientific endeavor and provides an ethical orientation for the social scientist. The ethical evolves, *pari passu*, with the objective orientation. Moreover, there are external forces working to the same end: people see problems in which they and their friends are personally involved and they seek expert assistance. An economist does not need to justify a welfare interest, for the economic ills of mankind have led to public interest in ameliorative measures. It is the same with a physician. His heart need not bleed for suffering humanity. If he opens an office after obtaining

proper training, the sick will seek him out.

This normal connection between scientific and welfare interests may be blocked by various factors. In this country conflicts between strictly scientific and welfare sociologists are apparent from time to time. A polarity of relationship tends to exist wherein the scientists are too detached and the welfare group too impatient. Such misunderstanding represents an early stage in the evolution of a new field of knowledge that is trying to free itself from moralistic pre-conceptions and the unsubstantiated opinions of common sense. It probably has no permanency. Certain sociologists become excited whenever the term "welfare" is mentioned, for in their minds it connotes the limited approach of traditional social work or "uplift" activities based upon great passion but little understanding. In the present discussion the term is free from these connotations. The whole purpose is to oppose the view that interest in social betterment is imposed upon the scientific quest arbitrarily, if at all. It is maintained that, although the welfare interest is to be classified as ethical, it emerges readily from the professional interest and activities of the social scientist and from the needs of the public.

VI

It should be apparent also that the attempt to keep the social sciences free from moral detachment and skepticism does not imply advocacy of any special moralistic system. The sole concern is to show that an accepted framework of basic values or ideals is perfectly consistent with the fullest and freest progress of science and that some of these very values are implicit in the scientific spirit or evolve from it. It should be noted that reference is made to a "framework of basic values or ideals." This means such values as an interest in collective and individual well-being as opposed to a lack of such interest, the faith in reason rather than force and suppression, the advocacy of social understanding as opposed to prejudice. The moral dogmatist, on the other hand, has a whole system of thought worked out in detail, with scant reference to objective evi-

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dence and study. Religious ideologies, for example, provide not only ideals but also definite prescriptions as to how these ideals can be attained in personal and collective behavior. Such ideologies not only postulate a fixed set of ultimate values but insist upon closely specified types of conduct as the only proper moral paths to the good life and salvation. It is assumed here, on the contrary, that science is a better instrumentality than dogmatic morality for the attainment of ethical ends. In regard to such phenomena as the family, race relations, or recreation, the sociologist is, or will become, better equipped to outline ideal relations than advocates of religious-moralistic prescriptions.

One's position must be stated explicitly, especially in regard to areas studied by sociology, because moralistic beliefs sanctioned by culture are likely to come to mind whenever reference is made to moral values or ideals. Organized religion has supported its beliefs about man and society with supernatural sanctions. Vested interests have had special axes to grind in defining behavior as moral and immoral. It is a commonplace of sociological theory that the *mores* tend to be a tight system of intolerant beliefs and practices. The pre-scientific nature of such thought is obvious. Our attempt is not to defend these ideologies but to protect legitimate ethical considerations from the unwarranted criticisms of narrowly oriented scientists. In dialectical terms, it represents an effort to remove from the thesis (science) an unnecessary and undesirable antithesis (attitude of moral detachment). Or must we as social scientists retain ideological blind-spots?

VII

A final suggestion is offered to combat tendencies toward moral skepticism in social

scientific thought. Graduate departments in the social sciences could perform a valuable service by encouraging their students to study social ethics. Work in this field might include such topics as the study of the origin and history of various ethical systems; the impact of these systems upon institutions; the psychological, economic, political, sociological and philosophical bases of these systems, consistencies and inconsistencies among rival systems. Students in sociology commonly take courses in psychology, anthropology and economics. It is proposed here that social ethics should be considered just as important a related field. If this suggestion should be adopted, several favorable results would be likely to occur. (1) The emphasis upon social ethics in the training of students in all of the specialized social sciences would give these specialties a new basis for cooperation and integration. All processes of social inquiry lead ultimately to the same fundamental problems of values. (2) Since the graduate schools prepare many for teaching, effects upon classroom instruction should be considered. It seems to me that teaching would gain new breadth, new depth and new interest. In the educational process social issues should be subjected to a unified procedure of analysis and exposition. It is quite unsatisfactory to present students with discussions that are broken off abruptly with the excuse that "the scientist can go no further." (3) Social scientists would be less likely to make naive assertions about problems that lie outside their special domain. Such added breadth of scholarship would be an advantage of no mean proportions. Indeed, the social sciences and ethics should be good neighbors who influence each other in many ways. It has been the main purpose of this analysis to consider a few aspects of this relationship.

AN ANALYSIS OF MANUSCRIPTS RECEIVED BY THE EDITORS OF THE *AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW* FROM MAY 1, 1944 TO SEPTEMBER 1, 1945

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INTRODUCTION

A NUMBER of questions have presented themselves to the current editors of the *American Sociological Review* with respect to the various factors involved in the selection of manuscripts to be published. Among the questions which arose were those concerning the supply of manuscripts available for publication, the factors involved in the selection of what manuscripts are to be published out of the total number received, and the possible criteria that may be used as bases for determining the acceptability of manuscripts.

This analysis is for the most part an attempt to answer the above questions from the experience of the present editors from the time they assumed the responsibility for the *American Sociological Review* on May 15, 1944, until the time of the present writing, September 1, 1945. The careful records kept by the former editor and submitted to the present editors made it possible to carry part of this analysis back as far as August 1, 1942, the date at which the former editor took over his duties.

On May 15, 1944, the present editors received 30 manuscripts from the former editor. Eleven of these had been accepted or were recommended for acceptance, and were published in the August 1944 and October 1944 issues. Nineteen of the 30 remained to be read and accepted or rejected by the present editors, although several of these had been returned to the authors by the previous editor with suggestions for revision, then re-submitted for publication. Prior to the official transfer of editorial responsibility, the present editors had received 8 manuscripts directly from the authors. At the time

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of the transfer the June 1944 issue was in the hands of the printers, and the former editor completed the work necessary on that issue. The period covered in this analysis, therefore, represents 16 months of editorial responsibility, or 7 published issues of the *Review*.

NUMBER OF MANUSCRIPTS RECEIVED

During the 16 months of the present editorship, a total of 193 manuscripts was received, including 6 which were accepted as "Notes on Research and Teaching" and 6 which were accepted as "Communications" to appear in the Current Items section of the *Review*. Of the total number of manuscripts received, 182 were acted upon by the present editors, since 11 had previously been accepted by the former editor. This figure 182 is, therefore, that used in each of the following tables for the total number of manuscripts received by the present editors. Table 1 shows the number of manuscripts received

TABLE 1. NUMBER OF MANUSCRIPTS¹ RECEIVED BY EDITORS OF THE *American Sociological Review*, BY ACTION TAKEN, FROM MAY 1, 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1945

Action Taken	Number of Manuscripts	
	Number	Per Cent
Accepted ²	104	57.1
Rejected	68	37.5
Withdrawn by Author	3	1.6
No action ³	7	3.8
Totals ⁴	182	100.0

¹ Includes Research Notes (6) and Communications (6).

² Excludes 11 accepted by previous editor.

³ Includes manuscripts received since August 1, 1945 on which as to publication no decision had been made at the time of this analysis.

⁴ Includes 19 received from but not acted upon by previous editor.

with a percentage breakdown according to the action taken by the present editors.

From the records submitted by the previous editor, it was possible to make some comparisons with the experience of the present editors. The former editor between the period of August 1, 1942 and May 1, 1944, acted upon a total of 237 manuscripts, 140 of which were accepted and 97 rejected. The percentage of manuscripts accepted during the previous editorship was, therefore, 59.1 as compared with 57.1 for the present editors; and the percentage rejected was 40.9 as compared with 37.5 for the present editors. The percentages for the present editors may shift a little, of course, when final decision is made upon the 7 manuscripts now on hand (see Table 1).

In terms of the month-to-month flow of manuscripts coming in, it was discovered that for both editorships the average monthly receipt was 11+. More specifically, during the 21-month period of the former editorship, 237 manuscripts were received; and during the 16 months of the present editorship, 182 were received. A flow chart of manuscripts received was drafted for two-week intervals beginning August 1, 1942 and ending August 31, 1945. The major conclusions derived from the chart were these:

1. The range in the number of manuscripts received by two-week periods was from 1 (occurring 10 times during the 74 periods) to 30 (received during the last two weeks in December 1943, after the 1943 Meeting of the American Sociological Society).
2. Four peaks may be noted:
 - a. December 1942 (17 manuscripts received). The annual meeting for this year was cancelled after the publication of the preliminary program.
 - b. December 1943 (30 manuscripts received). This was the month in which the 1943 Annual Meeting was held.
 - c. March 1943 (15 manuscripts received). This may be a reflection of late submission of papers prepared for the cancelled 1942 Meeting.
 - d. February 1945 (22 manuscripts received). This was the deadline date for the manuscripts to be received for publication in the special "proceedings" issue of April

1945 published in lieu of the December 1944 Meeting which was cancelled.

3. Periods which showed the lowest number of manuscripts received were in general the summer months, particularly July and August of 1944 and 1945, and the one or two months preceding the time set for the annual meetings.
4. A slight tendency may be noted for manuscripts to come in in greater numbers during the first two weeks of the month rather than during the last two weeks.

A survey of the number of manuscripts accepted or rejected in terms of the date of receipt reveals that the percentages accepted or rejected remain fairly constant even when broken down by month intervals; that is, there are usually four manuscripts rejected to every six accepted, or in that proportion. The major discrepancies occur immediately after the month scheduled for the annual meetings: during the months of January and February the number of rejections tends to exceed the number of acceptances, or at least to be more nearly equal to the number of acceptances.

SELECTION OF MANUSCRIPTS FOR PUBLICATION

Supply versus Space. Some attempt was made in this analysis to determine what factors were operating in affecting, consciously or unconsciously, the decisions of the present editors with respect to the selection of manuscripts for publication. The number of manuscripts which can be accepted is automatically set, under the present conditions at least, by the limitations of (1) space available, and (2) supply of manuscripts. The first limitation is subject largely to the financial status of the Society, although the number of manuscripts which can be published is partly dependent upon the maximum length for articles set by the editors. The second limitation is subject to the control of the editors only insofar as it is possible and desirable for the editors or other members of the Society to solicit manuscripts from authors.

The proportionate space available for manuscripts, when analysed on the basis of six-month periods, tended to remain fairly con-

TABLE 2. DISTRIBUTION OF SPACE IN THE *American Sociological Review* BY TYPE OF MATERIAL PUBLISHED, AUGUST ISSUE OF 1942 THROUGH AUGUST ISSUE 1945

Month	Number of Pages					
	Total Pages	Articles	Official Reports	Current Items	Book Reviews	Miscellaneous ²
1942¹						
August	128	69	21	6	27	5
October	160	105	10	3	36	6
December	160	106	4	13	31	6
Sub-Totals	448	280	35	22	94	17
% of subtotal (448)	100.0	62.5	7.8	4.9	21.0	3.8
1943						
February	128	68	16	5	35	4
April	128	87	2	10	25	4
June	128	84	—	19	21	4
Sub-Totals	384	239	18	34	81	12
% of sub-total (384)	100.0	62.2	4.6	8.8	21.2	3.2
August	128	77	19	9	21	2
October	128	77	26	4	19	2
December	128	86	4	12	24	2
Sub-Totals	384	240	49	25	64	6
% of sub-total (384)	100.0	62.5	12.8	6.5	16.6	1.6
1944						
February	128	89	18	4	15	2
April	96	66	1	10	13	6
June	136	102	—	7	19	8
Sub-Totals	360	257	19	21	47	16
% of sub-total (360)	100.0	71.4	5.3	5.8	13.1	4.4
August	112	90	1	3	16	2
October	144	60	49	6	27	2
December	132	88	1	10	25	8
Sub-Totals	388	238	51	19	68	12
% of sub-total (388)	100.0	61.3	13.2	4.9	17.5	3.1
1945						
February	128	60	29	6	27	6
April ³	224	181	1	3	28	11
June	128	86	3	7	24	8
August	128	67	34	6	15	6
Sub-Totals	608	394	67	22	94	31
% of sub-total (608)	100.0	64.8	11.0	3.6	15.5	5.1
Excluding April 1945 issue						
Sub-Totals	384	213	66	19	66	20
% of sub-total (384)	100.0	55.5	17.1	5.0	17.2	5.2

¹ The 1942 and preceding issues were printed in larger type than the subsequent issues.² Miscellaneous refers to pages used for advertising, contents, standing page, etc.³ The April 1945 issue was the special "proceedings" issue for the cancelled 1944 meetings.

Note: double black line indicates time at which transfer of editorship took place.

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stant over the last three-year period (*i.e.* from August 1, 1942 to August 31, 1945). Fluctuations in the space needed for the Official Reports and Proceedings, especially for the Census of Research, the Membership List, and the Program of the Annual Meeting, resulted in a corresponding fluctuation in the space available in particular issues for articles. In general, it appears that between 60 and 70 per cent of the total space available was used for articles. Table 2 gives the absolute figures for the number of pages used for each type of material published in the 19 issues appearing during the last three years, and percentage breakdowns by six-month periods.

There appears to be considerable variation in the length of articles, as indicated by

TABLE 3. FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF THE NUMBER OF PAGES PER ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN THE *American Sociological Review* FROM AUGUST 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 1945¹

Number of Pages	Number of Articles
0-0.9	5
1-1.9	5
2-2.9	3
3-3.9	8
4-4.9	10
5-5.9	13
6-6.9	11
7-7.9	16
8-8.9	16
9-9.9	5
10-10.9	3
11-11.9	4
12-12.9	2
13-13.9	2

¹ Number of articles included 5 research notes and 6 communications. These are the articles *published* during the term of the present editorship, including those accepted by the former editor, and excluding those accepted by the present editors which have not yet appeared in print.

Table 3 which is drawn from the experience of the present editors, but the consistency shown by the two editorships in the proportion of space available for manuscripts and in the number of manuscripts accepted indicates that the average length of articles has probably remained constant over the three-year period.

Papers Prepared for Annual Meetings or for Special Issues. It seems advisable that some attention be given to the number of accepted or published papers that come from unsolicited sources and to the number which result from invitations to authors to prepare papers for annual meetings and for special issues. During the period between August 1, 1942 and August 31, 1945, one annual meet-

TABLE 4. NUMBER OF ACCEPTED PAPERS WHICH WERE PREPARED FOR ANNUAL MEETINGS OR FOR SPECIAL ISSUES OF THE *American Sociological Review*, AUGUST 1, 1942 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1945

Accepted Manuscripts Prepared for:	Number of Manuscripts	
	Accepted by Former Editor ¹	Accepted by Present Editors ²
December 1941 Meetings (held)	6	
December 1942 Meetings (cancelled)	12	
December 1943 Meetings (held)	16	9
December 1944 Meetings (cancelled) Published in April 1945 Issue		24
Special 1944 June Issue	13	
Totals	47	33
Grand Total	80	

¹ Total manuscripts accepted by former editor does not include those accepted by his predecessor but published during former editor's term of editorship.

² Total manuscripts accepted by present editors includes one prepared for 1944 Meetings and published in October 1945 issue.

ing was held and two were cancelled. On August 1, 1942, however, 11 manuscripts from the December 1941 meeting were turned over to the former editor by his predecessor. Of these 11 manuscripts, 5 had already been accepted, and 6 were left to the decision of the former editor and subsequently published. Altogether, 67 manuscripts prepared for or read at the annual meetings have been published since August 1, 1942, and 13 manuscripts prepared for the special June 1944 issue on Russia were published. See Table 4 for breakdowns by editor and for meetings and special issues.

In summary, the total number of articles accepted since August 1, 1942, includes 80 papers which were prepared for annual meetings or for special issues of the *Review*, or a percentage of 32.8 of the total number of papers accepted during this period. This means that the *Review* has depended upon unsolicited manuscripts to the extent of 67.2 per cent of the total supply of manuscripts coming in. Invitations to authors to prepare papers either for the annual meetings or for special issues does not automatically guarantee acceptance of the manuscripts, but it appears that a very high proportion of these are accepted. A rough index computed for the three-year period would run something like this: out of every 10 manuscripts received by the editors, 6 are accepted; and out of every 6 manuscripts accepted, 2 have been solicited by the editors or by program chairmen.

Possible Criteria for the Selection of Manuscripts for Publication. Within the framework of the limitations discussed as to space available and supply of manuscripts, it becomes part of the editorial responsibility to select from the total number of manuscripts received, about 60 per cent for publication in the *Review*, although a third of this 60 per cent may be selected from papers prepared for annual meetings or special issues.

The question as to what should be desirable bases on which to make decisions as to the acceptability of manuscripts for publication led the editors to formulate the following suggestions as criteria on which to evaluate the manuscripts which are received. These are not necessarily the criteria which have been followed by the present editors; they are simply their suggestions as to possible bases for judging the acceptability of manuscripts.

1. relevance of the subject matter to the field of sociology
2. the degree to which material within the field of sociology is sufficiently advanced to be of interest to professional sociologists
3. level of technical competence of the manuscript, as revealed by
 - a. clarity, coherence, and organization of materials

- b. proper use of terms, concepts, and definitions
- c. accuracy in the use of statistical and other methodological techniques
4. membership of author in the American Sociological Society
5. representativeness of manuscripts in terms of the institutional affiliation of authors by regions and type of institution
6. representativeness of manuscripts in terms of the varied interests of the readers of the *Review*

Dr. F. Stuart Chapin has suggested the following "Indicators of Authentic Work" as a further refinement of bases on which to evaluate the quality of a particular manuscript.

1. Intellectual Component
 - a. Choice of appropriate technique of analysis
 - b. Technical proficiency in the use of method
 - c. Critical use of materials
 - d. Vocabulary of objective terms
 - e. Insight (data broken down into sub-factors)
 - f. Conciseness, incisiveness, and simplicity of statements
 - g. Use of fact referents rather than merely linguistic designata
 - h. Avoidance of normative terms
2. Ethical Component
 - a. Intellectual honesty
 - b. Openmindedness
 - c. Respect for evidence
3. Spurious authenticity
 - a. Esoteric vocabulary
 - b. Citation of sources indiscriminately and in great number

Some Observations as to Quality of Manuscripts. No attempt has been made to rank or evaluate the manuscripts that have been published under the present editorship. In the initial decisions as to the acceptability of papers, attention was given by the editors to the first three criteria listed above. Whether the other criteria should have been used is as yet undecided; whether they have been used unconsciously will be discussed later.

It must be remembered that initial decisions as to acceptability of papers must be made within the framework of balance between supply and space. Under the present

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limitations of space, only so many manuscripts *can* be accepted; and if the space is to be filled with articles, so many papers *must* be accepted. Ultimately, then, manuscripts are not just "acceptable" or "unacceptable"; they are "more" and "less" acceptable. The criteria of acceptability, therefore, can be by no means absolute. A manuscript is "more" or "less" marginal to the field of sociology; it is "more" or "less" elementary in nature; it reveals "more" or "less" technical competence on the part of the author. These decisions as to gradations in quality will differ from editor to editor,

experience of the present editors that there are fluctuations in respect to quality in terms of date of receipt. It seems likely, also, that the war years have affected the general quality of manuscripts submitted; the same may be true of the years following the cessation of hostilities.

Necessity for Special Editing. The experience of the present editors reveals that ordinarily manuscripts can be evaluated after initial reading as "acceptable," "unacceptable," and "marginal." Some papers may be judged immediately as being of high quality; some are so elementary in nature, or

TABLE 5. NUMBER OF MANUSCRIPTS¹ REQUIRING SPECIAL ACTION RECEIVED BY THE EDITORS OF THE *American Sociological Review* FROM MAY 1, 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1945

	Number of Manuscripts							
	Total ² No.	%	Accepted No.	%	Rejected No.	%	With- drawn No.	No Action ³ No.
Revised	51	28.0	46	44.2	3	4.4	—	—
Sent to Assistant Editor	13	7.2	6	5.8	6	8.7	—	1
Requiring no Special Action	118	64.8	52	50.0	59	86.9	3	6
Total	182	100.0	104	100.0	68	100.0	3	7

¹ Includes research notes (6) and Communications (6).

² Includes 16 manuscripts received from the former editor on which no action had been taken, but excludes 11 manuscripts which had been accepted but not published.

³ Includes manuscripts received since August 1, 1945 on which decision as to publication had not been made at the time of the analysis.

and it seems likely from month to month as well. A paper accepted by one editor might not be accepted by another. A paper received when the supply of manuscripts is plentiful may be subject to more rigid comparisons with others than would be true if it were received during a month when the supply is low. The observation made above that the number of rejections tends to exceed the number of acceptances during the months just preceding that in which the annual meeting was scheduled seems to bear out this last statement. An attempt is made by the editors, of course, to maintain fairly fixed standards of acceptability, but a too rigid standard assumes that the supply of manuscripts remains at the same level of quality throughout the year and over a period of years. Insofar as quality can be determined, it has been the

are so poorly organized, or so marginal to the field of sociology, that they can be immediately labelled "unacceptable." The great majority of papers seem to fall into the "marginal" category. It is from this category that papers are "salvaged," when papers are needed to fill the space required, or are "rejected" when more acceptable manuscripts fill the space available. These are the papers which are sent to the Assistant Editors for comment, or are returned to the author with suggestions for revision, or require extensive editing to get them into shape for the printer. These are the papers, in other words, that require the greatest amount of editors' time. Table 5 was compiled to indicate the percentage of manuscripts that required special action on the part of the editors during the present term of editorship. It can be seen

from this table that nearly one-third of the manuscripts received required either revision and/or reading by Assistant Editors. More importantly, it reveals that one half of the accepted manuscripts required this special attention. We also find that of the manuscripts which were presumed to require no special action, 59 out of 118, or 50 per cent were rejected. The net effect of this is that only 52 out of 172 manuscripts, or 32.3 per cent, were considered publishable in the form

who were members; and of the rejected manuscripts only about one-fourth were written by members of the Society. Or, put the other way, of the total number of papers received from members of the Society, about 19 per cent were rejected; of the total number of papers received from persons who were not members of the Society, about 59 per cent were rejected.

No particular attempt was made on the part of the present editors to accept or re-

TABLE 6. MEMBERSHIP STATUS OF AUTHORS WHOSE MANUSCRIPTS¹ WERE RECEIVED BY THE EDITORS OF THE *American Sociological Review* FROM MAY 1, 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 1, 1945

Membership Status	Number of Manuscripts						With- drawn No.	No Action ³ No.
	Received ² No.	%	Accepted No.	%	Rejected No.	%		
Member of American Sociological Society	99	54.4	75	72.1	19	27.9	1	4
Not Member of American Sociological Society	83	45.6	29	27.9	49	72.1	2	3
Total	182	100.0	104	100.0	68	100.0	3	7

¹ Includes research notes (6) and Communications (6).

² Includes 16 manuscripts received from the former editor on which no action had been taken, but excludes 11 manuscripts which had been accepted but not published.

³ Includes manuscripts received since August 1, 1945 on which decision as to publication had not been made at the time of the analysis.

in which they were received. These findings, together with the fact that only 3 out of the 51 manuscripts revised were rejected, seems to suggest that the *Review* must depend to a very large extent upon the so-called "marginal" papers, in order to fill the space available.

Turning now to the question of other possible criteria of acceptance of manuscripts, the tables presented in the following pages showing the distribution of authors in terms of membership in the American Sociological Society, regional location, and institutional affiliation may be of interest.

Membership of Authors in the American Sociological Society. Table 6 indicates that papers received were fairly evenly divided between members and non-members of the Society. Of the accepted manuscripts, however, almost three-fourths were by authors

who were members; and of the rejected manuscripts only about one-fourth were written by members of the Society. Or, put the other way, of the total number of papers received from members of the Society, about 19 per cent were rejected; of the total number of papers received from persons who were not members of the Society, about 59 per cent were rejected.

Regional Distribution of Authors. Table 7 presents the regional distribution of authors who submitted papers to the editors, with the regions used being those of authors at the time papers were published or rejected. The regions set up by the Census Bureau were used, and may or may not be a fair regional distribution in terms of the field of sociology. It may be seen, however, that the greatest

proportion of manuscripts received were from the Middle Atlantic and the East North Central States, with the West North Central and the New England States and Washington, D.C. not far behind. When the total number of manuscripts received by region is broken down into "accepted" and "rejected"

tiveness in these two cases may be the result of differential regional distribution of well-known departments of sociology, or of sociologists with high professional standing.

In connection with this analysis it might be of interest to consult a paper published in the April 1943 issue of the *Review* (p. 203)

TABLE 7. REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION, BY INSTITUTION,¹ OF AUTHORS WHOSE MANUSCRIPTS² WERE RECEIVED BY THE EDITORS OF THE *American Sociological Review* FROM MAY 1, 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1945

Region	Number of Manuscripts							
	Received ³		Accepted		Rejected		With-	No
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	drawn	Action ⁴
							No.	No.
New England (Me., N. H., Vt., Mass., R. I., Conn.)	19	10.3	12	11.5	7	10.3	—	—
Middle Atlantic (N. Y., N. J., Pa.)	45	24.6	21	20.2	22	32.4	2	—
East North Central (Ohio, Ind., Ill., Mich., Wis.)	35	19.1	24	23.2	9	13.2	—	2
West North Central (Minn., Ia., Mo., N. D., S. D., Neb., Kan.)	21	12.5	9	8.7	10	14.7	—	2
South Atlantic (Del., Md., Dist. of Columbia, Va., W. Va., N. C., S. C., Ga., Fla.)	12	6.5	6	5.7	5	7.4	—	1
East South Central (Ky., Tenn., Ala., Miss.)	3	1.6	3	2.9	—	—	—	—
West South Central (Ark., La., Okla., Tex.)	4	2.2	2	1.9	2	2.9	—	—
Mountain (Mont., Idaho, Wyo., Colo., N. M., Ariz., Utah, Nev.)	1	.5	—	—	1	1.5	—	—
Pacific (Wash., Ore., Calif.)	12	6.5	9	8.7	3	4.4	—	—
Washington, D. C. ⁵	23	12.5	12	11.5	8	11.7	1	2
Miscellaneous (Hawaii, India, Canada, Brazil, England, Puerto Rico)	7	3.7	6	5.7	1	1.5	—	—
Total	182	100.0	104	100.0	68	100.0	3	7

¹ Institutional affiliation is that which was used by the author at the time the manuscript was published.

² Includes research notes (6) and Communications (6).

³ Includes 16 manuscripts received from the former editor on which no action had been taken, but excludes 11 manuscripts which had been accepted but not published.

⁴ Includes manuscripts received since August 1, 1945 on which decision as to publication had not been made at the time of the analysis.

⁵ Includes members of the Armed Forces and government employees.

no marked selection can be noted. If no selection took place, the ratio between accepted and rejected should be about 6 to 4 (see Table 1). The major exceptions to proportionate representativeness were in the cases of the East North Central States which showed an acceptance rate of about 2 to 1, and the Middle Atlantic States which showed an acceptance rate of about 1 to 1. Here again the editors made no conscious effort to accept or reject papers on the basis of region. The lack of proportionate representa-

entitled "Some Notes on the 1942 Membership of the American Sociological Society" by Robert C. Meyers, which includes among other things an analysis of the geographical distribution of the members of the Society, showing the highest concentration of membership in the New England, Middle Atlantic, East North Central, and West North Central states, along with the northern states of the South Atlantic region.

Institutional Affiliation of Authors. Table 8 is the result of an attempt to discover how

the total number of manuscripts received and rejected were distributed in terms of the institutional affiliation of authors. Any attempt to classify educational institutions in terms of their prominence in offering training in sociology must, of course, be quite arbitrary, but it was felt that some classification could be made which would separate the better known departments of sociology from the total number of institutions whose members submitted manuscripts to the *Review*. The total number of manuscripts received repre-

Within the limits of this classification of educational institutions certain conclusions may be drawn. Table 8 shows, for instance, that the largest percentage of manuscripts received, 37.4 per cent, came from the less prominent educational institutions, while about 25 per cent came from the institutions categorized as "major public" and "major private."

More interesting, however, is a comparison of the rates of acceptance in terms of institutional affiliation. Again using the ratio

TABLE 8. INSTITUTIONAL AFFILIATION BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION¹ OF AUTHORS WHOSE MANUSCRIPTS² WERE RECEIVED BY THE EDITORS OF THE *American Sociological Review* FROM MAY 1, 1944 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 1945

Type of Institution	Number of Manuscripts						With- drawn No.	No Action ⁴ No.
	Received ³ No.	%	Accepted No.	%	Rejected No.	%		
Major Public Educational	26	14.3	21	20.3	5	7.4	—	—
Major Private Educational	21	11.5	18	17.3	3	4.4	—	—
Other Educational, Public and Private	68	37.4	39	37.4	23	33.9	1	5
Government and Armed Forces	30	16.5	16	15.4	11	16.1	1	2
No Educational Institutional Affiliation ⁵	37	20.3	10	9.6	26	38.2	1	—
Total	182	100.0	104	100.0	68	100.0	3	7

¹ Institutional affiliation is that which was used by the author at the time the manuscript was published.

² Includes research notes (6) and Communications (6).

³ Includes 16 manuscripts received from the former editor on which no action had been taken, but excludes 11 manuscripts which had been accepted but not published.

⁴ Includes manuscripts received since August 1, 1945 on which decision as to publication had not been made at the time of the analysis.

⁵ Includes authors who used only private addresses or addresses of non-educational institutions.

sented 68 different educational institutions. Out of this 68, 9 were classified as "major public" institutions, and 7 as "major private" institutions. It must be remembered that this classification of "major" institutions is on the basis of the prominence of the departments of sociology, not on the prominence of individual authors. In addition to those manuscripts received from authors who identified themselves with educational institutions, 30 manuscripts were received from persons in the government or armed forces, and 37 from persons who were affiliated with other than educational institutions (10) or who gave only private addresses (27).

of 6 to 4 (accepted to rejected) for purposes of comparison, we find that manuscripts submitted by authors identified with major institutions are accepted in greater proportion than are those coming from authors with other affiliations. More specifically, the acceptance ratio is about 4 to 1 for "major public" institutions, and about 6 to 1 for "major private" institutions. This overrepresentation is, however, offset by the underrepresentation of accepted manuscripts for persons who indicated no educational institutional affiliation or who gave only private addresses. Manuscripts submitted by persons from the less prominent educational institu-

tions and from the government and armed forces are accepted at a ratio approaching 6 to 4; that is, they are proportionately represented in the number of manuscripts accepted.

No attempt was made on the part of the editors to accept a disproportionate number of manuscripts from persons in well known institutions, nor to reject the manuscripts of persons who were not affiliated with educational institutions. The high rate of rejection of manuscripts submitted by persons falling in the latter category is likely to reflect marginality of the subject matter to the field of sociology, or an elementary treatment of sociological materials.

SUMMARY

The following represent the principal findings of this analysis:

1. The flow of manuscripts over the three-year period represented by the former and present editorships shows a striking degree of consistency in that manuscripts are received in about the same numbers from year to year. Consistency is shown, too, in the space which was used for manuscripts and in that used for other materials such as book reviews and current items.

2. The consistency in the supply of manuscripts and in the space used for articles reflects very largely the finding that the percentages of manuscripts accepted and rejected has again remained consistent over the period of the two editorships. Even though there are monthly fluctuations, the number of manuscripts accepted has been

about 60 per cent of the total number received.*

3. Of the total number of articles accepted, two thirds are unsolicited; the remaining one third result from the annual meetings, or from invitations to authors to prepare articles for special issues.

4. One half of the manuscripts accepted for publication by the present editors required special action, either having to be returned to the author for revision, or necessitating reading by one of the Assistant Editors before final decision as to publication could be made.

5. Almost three fourths of the manuscripts accepted for publication were prepared by members of the Society, although only a little more than half the manuscripts received were submitted by members.

6. The greatest proportion of manuscripts received and accepted came from authors who identified themselves with the middle-western and eastern states.

7. Manuscripts submitted by authors identified with the more prominent departments of sociology were accepted in greater proportion than those submitted by authors identified with less prominent institutions or with the government and armed forces. This lack of proportionate representativeness is compensated for almost entirely by the high rejection rate for manuscripts submitted by persons who gave no educational institutional affiliation.

* Parenthetically, it is an interesting fact that the four-year experience (1929-1932) of *Social Science Abstracts* showed that 95 per cent of all published articles examined were judged not worth abstracts because they failed to contribute "new information."

RELIGIOUS ORIGINS AND SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

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IF THE QUESTION of religious origins is a scientific question at all, it would seem to belong to the theoretical sociologist rather than to the historian, the archaeologist, or the anthropologist.

The historian's documentary and monumental evidence does not go back far enough to reveal the first signs of a human interest that is by common consent very old indeed. The archaeologist retraces the course of religious evolution somewhat farther, but even for him the earliest data, whether in the form of artifacts, cave-paintings, or mortuary practices, show religion as already well established. The student of "our primitive contemporaries" realizes now that, after all, the cultures he investigates are as far removed in time from any starting-point which may be posited as other cultures more "advanced."

For some while it was thought that the anthropologist had the answer. Did he not deal with the "simplest" cultures known? Was it not fair to assume that the Andaman Islanders or Tasmanians or Australians or some other group were still standing on the lowest conceivable levels of human nature and culture, fixated right where their more progressive cousins began their ascent? Spencer refused to yield this logical ground of his evolutionary scheme and was condescending when he wrote: "But to assert that the human type has been evolved from lower types, and then to deny that the superior human races have been evolved, mentally as well as physically, from the inferior, and must once have had those general conceptions which the inferior still have, is a marvellous inconsistency. Even in the absence of evidence it would be startling; and in the presence of contrary evidence it is extremely startling."¹

¹ Herbert Spencer, *The Principles of Sociology*, New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1899, Vol. I, p. 295.

The notion that all cultures have passed through the same stages was axiomatic with Comte and Spencer and is a tacit assumption in many more recent writings. It dies hard, even with those who lampoon it. But it ought to be laid away entirely. The so-called primitives have been evolving as long as anybody else. Some aspects of certain primitive cultures are by no means simple. Consider the eligibility rules for marriage among the Arunta or the ceremonialism of some of our American Indians. Compared with the religious life of the little brown church in the vale, many primitive religions seem highly evolved and complex. And this is precisely what would be expected where people have made the religious interest a primary one for a long period of time.

The anthropologist has made his contribution, to be sure, to the understanding of religious change. He has expanded the range of comparative data and made them available for checking the validity of inclusive cross-cultural sociological generalizations.² This is no mean service, but it does not disclose the beginnings of religion in human life. We must agree with Andrew Lang who said, nearly a half-century ago: "We have thus, in short, no opportunity of observing, *historically*, man's development from blank unbelief into even the minimum or most rudimentary form of belief. We can only theorize and make more or less plausible conjectures as to the first rudiments of human faith in God and in spiritual beings. We find no race whose mind, as to faith, is a *tabula rasa*."³

I

A plausible theory of religious origins must square with principles generalizing the ob-

² Adolph S. Tomars, "Some Problems in the Sociologist's Use of Anthropology," *American Sociological Review*, 8:630 (1943).

³ Andrew Lang, *The Making of Religion*, London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1898, p. 53.

served responses of human organisms-in-environment. It is inadmissible to posit a human nature unknown to science and build upon that. The primitive or primordial man of many religious-origin theories is the figment of an imagination lacking in guidance from either reliable observations of men as they are or sound principles descriptive of how they change.

Again, it must be borne in mind that what we are after is how religion arose out of a life *not religious at all*. Too commonly the investigators in this field have offered accounts of how particular religious systems arose while begging the question whether other forms of religion did not exist prior to these. Spencer had to confess that ancestor-worship, which he made the earliest form of religious behavior, could not have arisen prior to permanent settlements.⁴ He espoused, as corollary to this, the now exploded idea that nomadic tribes with rudimentary ancestor-worship are lacking in religious ideas generally.⁵ Others have shown how personal divinities arose out of non-religious rituals of the Year-Spirit.⁶ We need more such studies to illuminate the processes involved in religious change, and it seems altogether likely that what we really have in the great classics in the field of early religion is how one form of religion passes into another through interaction with traits and interests not hitherto functional parts of the religious complex.

The basic assumption of this paper is that religion comes from human nature. The problem is to show what it is in human nature that gives rise to religious impulses.

Our procedure will be to define religion in terms simple enough to permit of its identification on first appearance, and then to indicate what Comte would have called the conditions of its existence.⁷ A frank statement of the postulates on which the study is

based will be furnished. Then we shall attempt to show how the primary religious impulse arises, following in the main the analyses of human nature and reflective thought made by Cooley and Mead. Following this will be a consideration of how the primary religious impulse takes concrete form and acquires functional vigor and stability in becoming a phase of some historical culture. The conclusion will comprise comments on several of the famous books in this field, serving more to clarify and accent the present position than to survey the literature in any comprehensive way.

Considering the multitude of definitions of religion, any formulation may seem arbitrary. The one we offer is descriptive, we believe, of what most people mean by the term, and definite enough to distinguish religious phenomena from some other things.

Religion is the interaction between man and a supernatural order which he believes to exist and which he defines in terms derived from his social experience, together with whatever is implicated in such interaction. Or, more concisely, religion is the interaction of living personalities with symbols of assumed supernatural social objects.

The focal ideas are "interaction," "supernatural," and "social." Religion is not belief by itself, or emotion, or anything else short of a process of *inter-action*. It is a two-way process, a give-and-take, a mutual influencing, not infrequently a transaction. It goes on, of course, within man's experience, and the question of an objective counterpart, while vital to the actor, is irrelevant from the standpoint of the scientific observer.

Religion deals with the supernatural. It is true, certainly, that notions concerning the supernatural cover a very wide range. The primitive does not contrast it with the same conceptions of natural order and process which some modern scientists have achieved. Yet, despite Spencer, all normal adults are capable of rational surprise, and there are events everywhere calculated to evoke strong emotion and the sense of the extraordinary. The modern philosopher may attempt to telescope the notions of natural and supernatural

⁴ Spencer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 286-287.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ Jane Ellen Harrison, *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion*, Cambridge: University Press, 2nd ed., 1927.

⁷ L. Levy-Bruhl, *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte* (Tr. by Kathleen de Beaumont-Klein.), New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1903, p. 89.

into something that is one or the other or both or not quite either one, but even he may find meaning in an area of experience that transcends in some respects the matter-of-fact world of mundane objects and obvious reality.

Religion, as we define it, is social. There is an Other in religious experience, and we respond to it very much as we do to persons or social collectivities. It may be personal or partake of the nature of some more generalized other, but it is social. It is not always avowedly social, to be sure, and so one of the fundamental distinctions belonging to the type of analysis attempted here is between responses and objects which are explicitly, and those which are implicitly, religious.

It is often said that religion is not to be separated from some other things, say, magic. That is true in the material sense, for we cannot invade the concrete experience and dissect it to put religion into one compartment in space and magic or something else into another. But then the same thing might be said of all aspects of culture and experience. What we can do here is what we do everywhere else, namely, abstract certain aspects which we may define as we please, and treat them separately in thought. We think the distinction between social and non-social is important, both for the illumination of origins, and for the guidance of conduct, all definitions being, in a way, functional and instrumental.*

What is meant by the expression, "whatever is implicated in such interaction?" Any object or activity is religious by virtue of some sort of functional connection with the primary process of interaction defined as religious. Hymn-books, organs, stained-glass windows, preaching, baptizing, and even playing basketball in the inter-church league may all be religious if implicated in a process that is manifestly so.

If the definition of religion is acceptable, the historical prerequisites to its emergence are readily stated. The "conditions of exist-

ence" of a complete religious experience must be: (1) social experience, supplying the pattern for religious interaction and the terms in which the supernatural order is defined; (2) social suggestion, essential to continuing faith; (3) reflective thought to constitute supernatural social objects; and (4) events and needs motivating the formation of religious objects and interaction with them. If, as we think, early religion developed *pari passu* with these conditions, it must have been shallow, unstable, and incomplete by later standards.

II

The analysis which follows rests upon certain postulates:

1. *Universals in human nature rather than historical accident and diffusion explain the wide distribution of religious phenomena.* This is not true of particular religious systems, nor of all specific traits.

2. *Functional religious beliefs and practices presuppose social corroboration and sanction.* There are certain aberrant individuals in whose cases this principle calls for some qualification, and any individual may, of course, show minor peculiarities which set him apart.

Corollary: *Religion lacks authority and stability until communicated and shared.*

3. *Religious stimuli or objects are constituted by the responses men make to them.* Religious quality is conferred upon objects and situations by what men do with them. Therefore, what is religious in one culture may not be in another. Objects may pass in or out of the religious category. Example: circumcision.

Corollary: *Objects may be implicitly religious before they are explicitly defined as such.*

4. *Religious responses and the objects they constitute become differentiated and diversified through interaction with other responses and their objects.* The form of the initial religious response is very likely that of some previously acquired social response in a specific culture. Religious responses and their correlatives, religious objects, give and

*L. L. Bernard, "The Definition of Definition," *Social Forces*, 19:500 (May, 1941).

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take color with reference to other aspects of culture or personal experience. Example: "In the religion of the North American Indians, the Heaven-god displays perfectly the gradual blending of the material sky itself with its personal deity."⁹

Corollary: *The world of religion reflects social structures, processes, values, and concepts.*

5. *There is a strain toward consistency manifested in systematizing, rationalizing tendencies which are present from the beginning.* Motivation exists to bridge the hiatus between what is accepted and what is questioned, and to establish functional interrelations between aspects of culture or experience.

III

Because religious phenomena are so widely distributed and conform to a basic pattern despite the bewildering diversity in secondary characters, and because they flourish in very different environments, it seems improbable that they owe their existence to historical accident in the form of one or several primordial inventions or revelations.

Any origin theory which interprets religion exclusively as tradition or makes of it a mere survival from a primitive past neglects its functional vitality in contemporary life, to say nothing of the spontaneity with which religious attitudes and objects arise in persons and situations regarded hitherto as non-religious. It looks as if there is something in the human adjustment process itself to provide ground for the popular generalization that man is incurably religious.

Our theory is that there is a primary religious impulse rooted in human nature and more particularly, in the social structure of thought, therefrom deriving both its mechanism and its motivation. By primary religious impulse is meant the tendency to vest objects and situations with supernatural power and sociality and to interact socially with them. There is much more than this, of course, to any historical religion, which

comprises in some measure ritual, taboo, myth or theology, organization, ideas, artifacts, interests, activities, and codes, but this is the heart of the matter. The conditions prerequisite to religious experience are absent prior to the evolution of human nature and reflective thinking, and they evolve with the psycho-social nature of man, growing in definiteness and completeness as it does. In pondering the mystery of beginnings we can see that no religion was possible until *Homo* became human in the sociological sense of the term, but the same processes that made him human endowed him at the same time with religious impulses.

It should be understood that to posit a primary religious impulse in human nature is not the same thing as ascribing to all cultures and persons a developed religion with supernatural objects explicitly defined as social. It would be futile to argue that authentic religious behavior is recognizably present in all men. Yet the impulse is potentially present, though it may be neglected or repressed, sublimated or perverted, and it is the ultimate spring and source of the religious experience, sustaining much the same relation to it as do the drives of hunger and sex to dinner-parties and weddings.

This primary religious impulse, integral to human nature and dynamic with its drive, is the clue to the riddle of religious beginnings.

But we must show the mechanism and motivation by which supernatural social objects arise in experience. And since we refer these to human nature, there is no better way to begin than by examining it and the manner of its development.

Human nature is an adaptive growth. The process by which it develops has been likened by Cooley to a game of tennis: there must be someone at the other end of the court to return the ball, and play is a matter of adapting to his behavior and dealing with it. Thus far there is nothing distinctively human about this, for animals acquire habits likewise by adapting to other living forms. But man, by virtue of his more highly developed nervous system, may go further. He

⁹ Edward B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, New York: Brentano's, 7th ed., 1924, Vol. II, p. 255.

can learn to reproduce within his own organism the behavior of the other person. This is what makes communication possible and with it mutual understanding and sympathy. Human nature grows not only in adaptation to the overt behavior of other individuals but also to the various symbols of more implicit responses. There is a characteristically human level of intercourse where very little is going on besides the give and take of symbolic behavior which, as mere overt behavior, seems very insignificant. We learn to react to the meaning of each other's symbolic behavior, and we become fully human only through this kind of interaction. Thus it is said that human nature is the product of inter-communication with one's fellows.

Human nature is social in the sense that it is constituted in a process of interaction, and you cannot define it in individualistic terms any more than you can define the scissors as a single blade by itself. Cooley has made this plain in his classic statement:

... Human nature is not something existing separately in the individual, but a *group-nature or primary phase of society*, a relatively simple and general condition of the social mind. It is something more, on the one hand, than the mere instinct that is born in us—though that enters into it—and something less, on the other, than the more elaborate development of ideas and sentiments that makes up institutions. It is the nature which is developed and expressed in those simple, face-to-face groups that are somewhat alike in all societies; groups of the family, the playground, and the neighborhood. In the essential similarity of these is to be found the basis, in experience, for similar ideas and sentiments in the human mind. In these, everywhere, human nature comes into existence. Man does not have it at birth; he cannot acquire it except through fellowship, and it decays in isolation.¹⁰

So the substance of human nature, according to Cooley, is "sympathy and the innumerable sentiments into which sympathy enters."¹¹

Sympathy implies the ability to fill out the other term of the interaction process through imagination. It is said that a great part of

the adjustment process consists in imagining imaginations. We are capable of sympathy when we can bring into our own conduct the attitudes of another person. The ability to do this enables us to furnish, to some extent, our own stimulation and to achieve a relative emancipation from the objective social world.

But what is the mechanism which gives us this kind of control over the content of our experience? It is, Mead tells us, the significant symbol, that which "calls out in the individual making it the same attitude toward it (or toward its meaning) that it calls out in the other individuals participating with him in the given social act, and thus makes him conscious of their attitude toward it (as a component of his behavior) and enables him to adjust his subsequent behavior to theirs in the light of that attitude."¹² Manifestly, a symbol of this sort must have a social history to produce such effects. It is, at the beginning of its life-history in individual or racial experience, a mere gesture, "that part of the social act which serves as a stimulus to other forms involved in the same social act."¹³ Now the meaning of the gesture is given in the response which the other makes to it. When the individual has learned to make the same response to a given gesture which the other makes, he may call forth, by his gesture, the beginnings in himself of the same response which he perceives the other making overtly. Furthermore, this implicit response becomes, in turn, a stimulus to a further adaptive response on his own part. The gesture has now become a significant symbol and makes possible the internalization of the social process within the individual's experience. This is what thought is, and it can become as abstract and impersonal as it often seems to be through the substitution of a generalized for the personal other.

Defining the self as that which is both subject and object, Mead goes on to speak of the inter-play between the "I" representing the actor, and the "me" which stands

¹⁰ Charles Horton Cooley, *Social Organization*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1929, p. 29-30.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² George H. Mead, *Mind, Self and Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937, p. 46.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 42.

for the organized set of attitudes of others, as mind. The "I" calls out the "me" and responds to it.¹⁴

This reflective intelligence is what enables man to analyze his responses, take them to pieces, and reconstruct them.¹⁵ And since responses are what constitute objects, this means that man has the power to set up new objects to serve his needs. This is of the utmost importance for his religious experience.

We may now see how and why the Other of religious experience arises. Human nature, built up through social processes, is incomplete apart from the social setting, and demands social stimulation to be itself. Nearly everything we do that is important presupposes social objects and settings, and it is not surprising that we are ever in search of the social, and pine when it is not. If we can find the right persons or groups, we go forth-with into action and keep at it until the particular impulses engaged lose their urgency or give way to other impulses for the time being more pressing.

It is not always possible, of course, for the social impulses to secure appropriate objects in the environment. It then becomes the peculiar function of the reflective intelligence to furnish imaginary objects—that is, objects not spatially or temporally present—for stimulation. The "I" sets before itself a "me" from memory, or it may do the much more creative thing of fashioning a new object not having any concrete counterpart in the world of its previous experience. These objects release impulse in some way and allow the incomplete to move to completion.

We may distinguish three kinds of adjustment in which mind functions. In the first, the mind furnishes objects which facilitate the consummation of impulse on the level of overt stimulus and response. A boy wanting to dance thinks of securing a car and driving to the adjoining town where a dance is going on. In the second, the whole social process remains on the implicit level. He remains where he is and amuses himself by imagining himself dancing. This may be

called day-dreaming. There is nothing that happens for the observer to see: implicit object evokes implicit response. In the third, the object is in thought but the response is overt. The boy turns on the victrola and dances with a formless partner in his arms.

So human nature has social impulses and various devices for gratifying them. But religious objects are not only social but supernatural. How does the supernatural social object arise in consciousness?

One possibility is through giving social quality to the supernatural. Some marvelous event may occur, like a great storm, or earthquake, or the birth of triplets. In the excitement of the moment the response is probably random. But later, in retrospection, one talks to himself in the role of the supernatural other to get the meaning of the extraordinary phenomenon. In the retrospective act, to use Faris' term, the other becomes a "me." Now the "me" is always constituted by responses which we evoke with significant symbols. It need not be social, but it is very likely to be. Our first objects were all social, that is, they were capable of response. Subsequently, when some objects did not behave like social objects we formulated our first physical objects, but it required a good deal of sophistication to do so, and we tend to fall back into the older type of response when under stress. I believe it was William James who once confessed that during an earthquake he could not rid himself of the feeling that the thing was alive.

Or secondly, we may begin with the social object and supernaturalize it. The social object which carries more than ordinary power may intensify the response or in some way or other make it more satisfying. In hero-worship we are not satisfied with run-of-the-mill objects and that is why we mythologize them so often. We get more stimulus-value, more reaction, a heightened experience, and so by the constructive imagination we bring social objects to the level of the supernatural.¹⁶

Some supernatural social objects may owe

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 242-243.

¹⁶ Charles Horton Colley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, rev. ed., 1922, p. 314-315, 341.

their rise in consciousness to something like the play impulse, having nothing more to motivate their appearance than the desire for exotic experience to relieve tedium. There has always been a lot of idle play in human life, and religious objects may owe more to it than we realize.

One thing may yet be lacking to the supernatural social object before it can properly be called religious. That is belief in its existence. I can think up all kinds of supernatural social objects, but they are not religious for me unless I have dealings with them. And the question is, how does one gain the conviction that the objects of his imagination are real?

One possibility is that he accepts them as real on the authority of others. The round earth is real to us because everybody says it is, and so are the chromosomes because the biologists are agreed upon them. God and other religious objects come to us on authority too. Only, this is not very helpful as we are trying to get back to the very first religious objects before the days of group-wide tradition on the subject.

An answer may lie in a powerful motive to believe. It is to be remembered that the content of the other which enters into one's personality in reflective thought is "the response in the individual which his gesture calls out in the other."¹⁷ But what response is the individual calling out in the other? Here we draw an important corollary from the doctrine of the significant symbol: that *the stimulus which calls out the same response in us that it calls out in the other is assumed to call out in the other the same response that it calls out in us*. And the more urgent our own response to the stimulus, the greater strength there is in our feeling that the same response is given in the other. This is the truth in the notion that in one's greatest stress and need he is most likely to find God. Since the "me" which stands in thought for the other is made up of our own responses, it grows in reality as the

responses grow in power. Or, put differently, the sense of kinship with the other brings assurance that what moves us must have equal effect upon him. "If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask him?"¹⁸

A very important factor in the evolution of religion has been the tendency to localize the Other in the spatial environment. Why have men done this so generally? If the Power was already there before they socialized it, the reason is obvious. Nor is there any great difficulty for interpretation where a sense of presence led to localization, considering the tendency to refer responses to objective stimuli. We hear a sound and look for its source, visualize something and assume it is out there—inferences natural enough when we remember that sensory experiences have been associated in the past with objects in space. Indeed, experience does not seem real unless there is a counterpart in environment. It is as natural to provide the Other of religious experience with a local habitation as it is to become aware of the presence of someone behind us, or over there, or downstairs, when we hear a noise. Jacob said of the place where he had dreamed of God and the angels, "Surely the Lord is in this place; and I knew it not." So he marked the spot and called it the house of God and the gate of heaven.¹⁹

The stimulus-value of the Other of religious experience as of social experience generally is enhanced by localizing it and identifying it with some source of sensory stimulation. Men make images and fashion rituals for the same reason that they carry pictures of loved ones and visit tombs and historical shrines. It is easier to have the desired experiences in the presence of these objects. Just as it is easier to play the parent when the child has the doll in her arms, so men repair to holy places and manipulate sacred

¹⁷ Mead, *Op. Cit.*, p. 161.

¹⁸ Matthew 7:11.

¹⁹ Genesis 28:16-17.

objects to facilitate and intensify the religious experience. It is, of course, unnecessary to assume that men do these things with conscious purpose and appreciation of the significant elements in the setting. There are some who go deliberately to work to set up the conditions of the mystic's vision, but most, no doubt, have been unconsciously motivated. They find God more readily in certain circumstances and are drawn to these as they are to environments where hunger and thirst and other wants have found gratification in the past. Likely as not they have never thought of analyzing the factors conditioning their experience.

Projection into space is often necessary for overt response. If gifts are to be presented to gods in the ritual way, it is almost necessary to act as if the recipient is there in a particular spot. Inasmuch as social action is directed towards social objects which occupy space, men tend to assume definite localization when dealing with religious objects. Even Christians focus on the altar or look up to the sky in worship.

The projection of the Other has been significant in regard to the communication of the religious experience to other persons. Any experience must be objectified in some way if it is to be communicated. This is more readily done when some tangible stimulus can be presented. Even if the gods are defined as spirits, they may be localized in environment. When this is done and their votaries respond overtly to their presence, it becomes possible to reconstruct the object in terms of this overt response. Religious educators sometimes advise parents to adopt the posture of prayer before a very young child and pray in his presence, long before the child is given any verbal instruction about God. Overt response to a localized Other defines the Other for him.

We have gone into the matter of localization to a greater extent than the subject may seem to merit. But we think that this is the clue to the diversity of religious objects. In localizing the religious Other in space, we bring it inevitably into interaction with other

objects occupying the space—objects defined by other-than-religious responses. If we look to the sky when we address God, it is hard to keep the sky from becoming a part of our concept of deity. The totemist may react to the religious Other in the kangaroo, but he reacts to the kangaroo at the same time, and his religious object and response thereto must be significantly different from those whose Other lies in the bear, or the river, or a human personality.

The result of our investigation of religious origins is this: we may say that religion as defined could not have come into existence prior to the emergence of human nature and mind, for reflective thinking is essential to the construction of religious objects, and reflective thinking is in turn a social emergent. At the same time, we cannot imagine a developed human nature which has not been affected by the communication of religious objects, and the consequent establishment of religious tradition. Our difficulty is the one confronted by the old social contract theorists, namely, that we are in constant danger of presupposing the very thing we are trying to account for. The only way out is by having human nature and religion develop *pari passu*. If the complete religious experience as we know it calls for a developed human nature and for social suggestion, we shall have to say that the very first experiences which could be classified as religious must have been fleeting, ill-defined, and lacking in authoritativeness. But such as it was, the religious object answered to social impulses and reflected the social structure of personality and the common interests of the group because, as we have seen, its content must necessarily have consisted of responses which the subject shared with other members of the community—responses which he could therefore command with the available significant symbols.

IV

We are dealing with the roots of religion, not with the visible course of its evolution and differentiation, but in order to distin-

guish more clearly what is primary from what is secondary or institutional, we shall trace the growth to where we can see it dividing into its main limbs and branches.

The first necessity is for the religious experience to be communicated and socialized. If it has come simultaneously to a number of people under the same conditions, its communication is made much easier. But in any case religion must win a place in the culture. The reason for this is not so much that if uncommunicated it will die with the subject who keeps it a secret, but rather that he needs corroboratory social suggestion to hold on to the experience himself. It is a notable fact that people with unusual experiences try to get disciples, partly because they want other people to have them too, but also because they find it hard to believe in the validity of their own experience without the assurances of other people.

Once religion becomes a part of the culture, it takes on a collective character. There continues to be a great deal of direct personal experience with religious objects, but these objects are a collective achievement, and many people have helped to give them form. One may show originality in forming religious objects, but these are not likely to be unaffected by religious elements in the existing culture. Collective patterns of overt response are added to the more personal patterns, and these have their own characters, tendencies, and needs. Personal and institutional religion interact with one another.

In the processes by which religious experiences are shared may be seen evidences of the so-called strain toward consistency in the culture. Sometimes religious objects can be imparted by mere suggestion; at other times they will meet resistance. This is because the person at the receiving end already has his definitions and finds no place in his world for the new objects he is offered. Imagine yourself trying to get somebody else to worship an object in wood. The natural thing for him to say is that it is only wood and quite incapable of understanding your problems and helping you out; he knows his wood and you have been deceived. You will likely

try to show him that there is more to your object than meets the eye. You will show yourself master of the various forms of rationalizing by which man has justified his religious responses. The notions of soul and spirit and mana, capable of penetrating all kinds of objects, have arisen, we believe, to rationalize religious responses which seem incompatible with other responses defining the same *loci* in space. These ideas have added strength to religion but they are not, historically speaking, its ground. They are true causes in religious evolution but are in turn effects of causes more profound, more universal, and less rational. Desire gave birth to reason.

The chief tests of the rationalizing capacities of primitives, as with us, have come in propagandizing and defense. The great dogmatic systems, for example, have built up only in part out of perseverative tendencies and the natural delight in manipulating and arranging the profusion of insights. It is in the interest of meeting objections and winning adherents that the contents of creeds are re-defined and rationalized and systematized.

Another line of religious development is seen in the tendency to move from the implicit to the explicit. The first religious objects may serve to stimulate religious impulses without being clearly recognized for what they are. With the efforts to control religious experiences there will come increasing discrimination and labeling of the stimuli that will do the work. The objects which stand for the Other of religious interaction will become more avowedly supernatural and social. The exigencies of communication tend to make them so. If you are trying to draw out of another person responses appropriate to religious objects, it helps to explain that they are proper objects for such responses. It is logical, for example, to canonize saints toward whom the religious attitude is favored. In Israel's history, the Brazen Serpent became recognized as a religious object when people worshiped it.²⁰ Attitude and object

²⁰ II Kings 18:4.

are but aspects of the same phenomenon, and if either is defined as religious, there is a notable strain to recognize the other as such. The social worker who rejects the church may, if she holds on to God, insist that her service to mankind is more properly religious than attendance on church services.

The rise of a professional religious class makes men more consciously religious, there being now times and places and activities differentiated from others and presided over by the religious functionaries.

The trend may be reversed and what was once explicitly religious may cease to be. One may thus think of objects and activities in an endless process of entering and quitting the religious classification.

The tremendous diversity which characterizes religious phenomena is explained, we repeat, by the fact that these phenomena are in interaction with other phenomena already diverse. It is impossible really to divorce the great secular interests from religion. This is because they are integral to the same human life out of which come the responses that constitute religious stimuli. When these interests change, religion changes. Religious change may seem to be delayed, sometimes, through the unusual authority of religious tradition and the zeal of a special class of functionaries interested in preserving the *status quo*. But though words and rituals remain as they used to be, meanings change with contexts in the general life. The Apostles' Creed does not mean the same things to the modern ecclesiastic as to the medievalist.

In concluding this section, a word might be said about *mana*. This seems to be an ambiguous concept. Is it something mechanical or social or not differentiated into either? I think that in order to clarify the matter we should have some such distinction in our terminology as *free mana* versus *controlled mana*, the former answering to confusion in response, the latter reflecting developed tradition and technique. Emotional behavior is disorganized behavior, and with no definite, well-defined responses there can be only confusion in the objects. The categories go into solution because the dominant mood is one

of Great Expectations. Anything can happen—anything makes sense because, paradoxically, nothing makes sense. Is this magic or religion? Is it not something which is logically more primitive than either?

When the emotions die down, *mana* thins out. This allows the matter-of-fact qualities of objects to show themselves once more. The old responses which defined objects are released again and serve to delimit and differentiate the enveloping *mana*. *Mana* in a tree is now different from *mana* in an animal because tree and animal behave differently. It is true that *mana* may spread over virtually anything by analogy, but inferential or dogmatic *mana*, born of the rational processes, is no longer a world unto itself. Since it interacts with mundane distinctions and classifications, we call it *controlled mana*. And to the extent that the world is consciously dichotomized into things and persons (or non-social and social objects) we may expect the recognition of the disparate natures of magic and religion. In saying this, we are not to assume sharp lines of demarcation between the two in primitive experience. Magic and religion have existed together. They co-exist to a great extent today. Men are not as logical as their theoretical definitions.

V

We close our study with comments on five of the great classics in the field of religious origins. This is done by way of clarifying our own findings, not to assess what others have done. Nor do we imply that these are the outstanding books on the subject.

In *Primitive Culture*, E. B. Tylor has collected and classified a vast amount of valuable data pertaining to primitive religion, and presented them with such objectivity that they may be readily used by later students. We think his "minimum definition of religion" as "the belief in Spiritual Beings"²¹ begs the question of early man's actual definition of his religious objects. In saying this, we freely grant that our definition of *religion* has a sharpness of which early man

²¹ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 424.

was unaware, but this is not the point. The real issue is whether the question "spirit or not spirit" was raised at all *at first* with reference to his supernatural social objects. Lang thinks it was not raised at first with reference to the high gods which he has investigated.²² The idea of soul has no doubt had an important place in the history of religion, but more as "the groundwork of the Philosophy of Religion,"²³ to use Tylor's own words, than as the foundation of the religious experience itself. We view it as a monument to man's desire for rationality and system in his behavior, affecting his conduct a great deal, to be sure, but his verbalizations about that conduct a great deal more. It has been important in facilitating the spread of religious responses to new objects.

Tylor's basic error lies in assuming that man must have a developed metaphysics of his religious objects in order to react to them in the religious way. It is the same kind of error we would run into if we assumed that a child had to find a soul in her doll before she could deal with it as a social object. The safer rule is to assume that in the beginning response motivated rationalization rather than *vice versa*. Take, for example, Tylor's remark that the principles of *manes*-worship are not difficult to understand, "for they plainly keep up the social relations of the living world."²⁴ What does this mean? Tylor would say that on account of their ideas about the soul and its wants, men entered into social relations with the departed. But is not the other view more plausible; namely, that because they continued their social relations with the dead, they came in time to their philosophy concerning the departed ancestors and their demands upon the living?

Incidentally, Tylor drops a hint on the motivation of religion which we think is worth developing. He speaks of "a craving for the marvellous, an endeavor to get free from the tedious sense of law and uniformity in nature."²⁵

Herbert Spencer borrowed heavily from Tylor's analysis of animism and is open to the same criticisms. His work is much less objective and, accordingly, less enduring. His method is to arrange data from the most unrelated sources in a graduated series, assuming the while that the logical arrangement demonstrates a genetic sequence. Idol-worship, like all else in religion, is traced back to funeral rites. The sacrifices are first made to the recently-dead body, then to the dried body. The remaining objects in the series are, respectively, relics, a figure made partly of relics, figure on a box containing the relics, figure placed on the grave containing the remains, and finally the figure itself.²⁶ The reconstruction makes sense only on the basis of the now discredited doctrine that all cultures have evolved through the same stages. But there is another criticism to be made of Spencer which is equally devastating. What has become of the original motivation by the time it has been shunted to circuits so far distant from where it functioned at first? Spencer's theory, if true, could hardly explain the vitality of contemporary religion which knows nothing of ancestor-worship. What is functionless tends to die, at least if it costs too much to keep it alive.

We pass over Spencer's curious denial of any real intelligence to the savage while basing his behavior on rational inferences, and his failure to carry ancestor-worship back of the first permanent settlements. Embedded in all the miry clay of his theorizing is a gem Spencer is content to let lie. In discussing the process by which a house used as a burial place evolves into a temple, he makes this penetrating observation: "Whether the house thus used tends to become a temple, depends on whether it is, or is not, abandoned."²⁷ In other words, the continued use of the house as a domicile stands in the way of defining it as a temple. Thus Spencer glimpses the postulate that religious objects are constituted by religious responses, with its corollary that other responses which are incompatible with the religious tend to di-

²² Lang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 182.

²³ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 426.

²⁴ Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. II, p. 113.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 145.

²⁶ Spencer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 306-315.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 255.

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vest objects of religious character, but he makes nothing of it.

Andrew Lang, in *The Making of Religion*, holds that primitive men believe in High Gods all over the world.²⁸ Suppose we accept his contention that the data are authentic and do not represent late missionary influence, and suppose we grant that with primitives, as with most of us, the ideal of God is vague and nebulous and gets its definiteness mostly through the process of communication. How are we to interpret the wide distribution of such a conception?

We shall assume with Mannheim that in such a concept, "there is contained the crystallization of the experiences of a certain group."²⁹ Now if the concept is universal, there must be universal conditions of life to go with it. Lang tells us that the High God "is the Supreme Being of a certain group of allied local tribes. One of these tribes has no more interest with him than another, and the whole group do not, as a body, wage war on another alien group."³⁰ The High God tends to lose his position with class differentiation, the departmentalization of life, and the union of independent tribes.³¹

What we seem to have here is a type of community life resembling what on a smaller and more intimate scale Cooley called the primary group. If we place the primary group ideals side by side with the attributes of Lang's High God as he reports them, we have the following:

Cooley's primary group, characterized by moral unity expressed through the ideals of:³²

1. Loyalty
2. Truth
3. Service
4. Kindness
5. Lawfulness and justice
6. Freedom

²⁸ Lang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 173-277.

²⁹ Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1940, p. 19.

³⁰ Lang, *Op. Cit.*, p. 289.

The two lists are all but identical most of the way. Lang's High God looks like the Generalized Other reflecting an undifferentiated moral community.

Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* has long been a focus of controversy. The book embodies some profound insights as well as elements tempting a variety of assailants. In our limited space we express appreciation for these points: (1) Religion is functional; (2) The group needs to localize the Other of religious experience in something tangible; (3) God is the symbol of society (we hasten to add that so is every other object defined by the responses of the group as a whole); (4) Faith requires social corroboration; (5) The sense of obligation is a function of social pressure; (6) Rationalization serves the interests of propagandizing and defense; (7) Self and material object "participate" in one another—that is, the various responses defining the same material object never achieve complete autonomy.

The following, from the viewpoint of the theory outlined in this paper, belong in our judgment to the debit side: (1) The rejection of the supernatural as an earmark of religion on the ground that primitive man can have no notion of the supernatural; (2) The identification of religion with the sacred (neither term exhausts the content of the other); (3) The idea that collective emotion in itself is sufficient to constitute objects and situations as religious; (4) The

Lang's High God, interested in the whole of known mankind, characterized by or standing for:³³

1. Loyalty
2. Truth
3. Unselfishness and self-sacrifice
4. Kindness, fatherliness, friendliness
5. Justice, punishment of sin, no propitiation, no favoritism
6. Eternality
7. Creative Power

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 285-287.

³² Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 32-50.

³³ Lang, *Op. cit.*, p. 186, 203, 273, 278-279, 331.

neglect of the self and of social structure and tradition, and the relative overemphasis on crowd phenomena, in the aetiology of religion. We pass over as beyond the range of our interest the ethnological assumptions for which Durkheim has been taken to task.

Themis, by Jane Ellen Harrison, has much in common with Durkheim's study, from which it frankly draws inspiration. The sociological theory of the book, not to mention the archaeological reconstructions, is highly controversial, but it is in any case a brilliant work whose importance lies in its illumination of the process of interaction between religious and other objects, and of the effects of such interaction upon both.

Purporting to be a study of the origins of Greek religion, *Themis* attempts to show how gods arise by projection from ritual dances. These dances, expressing tension over the crises of life and especially those centering in the food interest, are at first purely social. Mimetic in character, they call for a great deal of make-believe which serves both to accentuate emotion in the dancers and to facilitate its discharge. Masks and disguises suppress the private aspects of personality and emphasize the collective character of the performance, thereby lending it power and tending to lift it to the religious level. What is *re-done* as commemoration becomes stylized and abstracted as it is *pre-done* for the sake of the subjective effects produced and, more consciously no doubt, for the magical effects hoped for in the external world.³⁴

The band of dancers feel the need to externalize their strong feeling and project it upon some object, and for this the dance leader is chosen. This chief dancer may play the part of the bull or snake or whatever symbolizes the interests in food and fertility. He is thus endowed with *mana*, constituted by the collective emotion in true Durkheim tradition. This chief dancer, put forward and magnified, gradually evolves into a god—not the dancer himself, of course, but the ritual office which he occupies. Meanwhile

a myth evolves to provide him with a life-history dramatized in the chief episodes of the ritual and to rationalize what would otherwise be unintelligible. The myth, product of the "story-telling instinct," arises out of what is at first no more than the vocal part of the mimetic rite.³⁵

Miss Harrison has shown, we believe, *not* how the religious evolves *de novo* out of the merely social, but how it interacts with the social and takes character from it. She is on the right scent, we think, in emphasizing the importance of make-believe in religious development. The religious Other interacts with the generalized other of the ritual situation and then more especially with the office of the chief dancer once that is given religious interpretation. She has illuminated the tendency to anthropomorphize the gods and differentiate them according to familiar social functions, as the old tribal life becomes decentralized and redistributed with advances in knowledge, social differentiation, civilization, and social idealism. With all this differentiation, some of the power projected by the earlier undivided community in its collective enthusiasm is lost. Religion is taken less seriously.

The chief defect of the book is overgeneralization. Miss Harrison is sure she has isolated *the* sequence of events in *every* god's natural history. She seems to forget, all through her study, that the chronological starting-point for her analysis is only four thousand or more years ago. We find it hard to believe that at that relatively late date there was in Greece only social custom and nothing worth designating as religious.

Then there are fallacies shared with the Durkheim school of sociological sociologists. The most notable one, perhaps, is the denial to the primitive *individual* of the power to project his "own separate soul"—whose conscious existence is denied—into "animated nature,"³⁶ while assuming a necessity in an excited *band* of dancers to do so.³⁷ The true evolutionary sequence, it would seem, is not from a self-conscious group to the self-

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 46-47.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 472, 475.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p. xiii, 46, 472.

³⁴ Harrison, *Themis*, p. 42-46.

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conscious individual member of the group, but from human nature with scant self-consciousness either individually or collectively to the same with a more highly developed self-consciousness all around.³⁸

We shall know more about religious origins when we know more about human nature—what it is, how it develops, how and why it constitutes a world of objects to meet its needs.

ATTITUDES TO THE STRANGER

A STUDY OF THE ATTITUDES OF PRIMITIVE SOCIETY AND EARLY HEBREW CULTURE

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THE ATTITUDE of a society towards the stranger determines the present and future roles the stranger may assume within the "in-group." The attitude towards the stranger by a group also characterizes the culture of the group, the stage of its development, and the extent and flexibility of its mental reactions. The social organization of a community is more highly differentiated and correspondingly increases in diversity as evidenced by its reaction to the stranger. The more varied and discriminating that reaction, the more flexible and adjustable is its social order. When the prevalent attitude of a culture to the stranger is humanistic, prone to be protective of him, inclined to accept cultural differences, this culture has moved away from vicinal isolation, tribalism, and mental immobility. The attitude to the stranger is one of the barometers which marks the growth in ethical refinement and sensitivity of a community. I shall attempt to trace these factors by a comparative study of the attitudes to the stranger on the part of primitive, pre-literate peoples and a literate people, the Hebrews, during the early developmental period of its history.

Primitive society, pre-literate peoples, manifest a high degree of mental immobility due to vicinal isolation, remoteness from contacts with other peoples. Their social pattern is fixed. Habit, custom, and routine form an inflexible structure and rigid social

control results. In this type of society, kinship ties are strong; what "has been" is sacred and tradition (mores, rites, taboos) carried through the spoken word, is the only source of knowledge. Intrusive factors disturb these simple cultures. Thus one may expect a great resistance to change, a dread of newness and adverse reactions to variants and strangers.

The stranger, as I shall regard him, is a newcomer to the group. He has come into face to face contact with it for the first time. As described by George Simmel¹ "the man who comes today and stays tomorrow, the potential wanderer . . . has not quite gotten over the freedom of coming and going." He may settle for a time, usually a trader not fixed in space. Whether he remains or not depends on circumstances, but as long as he is regarded as a stranger, he retains the earmarks of being a member of an "out-group."

I. THE STRANGER IS AN ENEMY

Pre-literates' past experience with strangers or with members of the stranger's group and their fear of the infraction of their sacred codes dominate their reaction pattern. "In view of the multiplicity of taboos and restrictions governing even the minute details of the institutional life of the many pre-literate groups, it is easy to see how the most amiable stranger might commit sacrilege every time he turned around."

³⁸ Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, p. 45.

¹ Robert E. Park and E. W. Burgess. *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1921. pp. 322-327.

Aversion is not of the "stranger himself as such, but of the stranger offending against the sacred code of the (in-group)."² Antagonism to a member of another cultural group is not so much due to the individual *per se*, but rather as a reaction to the implied threat to the culture of the "in"-group. The newcomer may bring with him a potentially dangerous code or a set of disturbing or competing status-bearing moral values.

The fear of the stranger on the part of primitive people is not only based on their dread of his breaking the sacred codes and thus affronting the gods through ignorance or malice, but also because of their apprehensiveness of the dangerous magic he may bring along with him. "Of all the sources of danger none are more dreaded by the savage than magic and witchcraft" states Sir James Frazer in *The Golden Bough*,³ "and he suspects all strangers of practicing these black arts. To guard against the baneful influence exerted voluntarily or involuntarily by strangers is therefore an elementary dictate of savage prudence."

Newcomers are regarded with hostility by pre-literates because they may also offend their ancestors and the spirits of the dead. Ancestors as well as gods are regarded as a more definite part of the social group among primitive people than in the case of more advanced communities. The stranger enters the jurisdiction of the dead of the new region. He is unknown to them and is ignorant of the code and etiquette of behavior towards the spirits.

Regarding the stranger as an enemy to be barred under all circumstances is a common attitude among primitive communities. He is the enemy who must be exterminated when met. Among the tribes in Northern Australia, the stranger is speared unless he gives evidence that he is a sacred messenger. In Melanesia the stranger throughout the

island is regarded as an enemy to be killed. Briffault states "To primitive men, all men are either tribal brothers or strangers, and the latter term is equivalent in primitive society to 'enemy'; there is no middle state between those two opposite relations." In his account of the life of the natives of the Andaman Islands, Radcliffe-Brown describes them as neither quarrelsome nor bloodthirsty among themselves but most ferocious to strangers.⁴ Among the Arapesh in New Guinea, according to Margaret Mead, the word "enemy" is synonymous with stranger. Their world is divided between two groups of people, relatives, and enemies or strangers. They are the bogeymen in children's lives, hated, feared, mocked and outwitted. "Upon whom all the hostility that is disallowed in the group is (thus) actively displaced." The parents mutter and place all the misfortunes that happen to them at the door of strangers. "The child is led to believe that hostility itself is a feeling that exists only between strangers."⁵

2. THE COVENANT RITUAL

In case the stranger is allowed to stay for any length of time, he invariably must undergo some ritual which is designed to cut him off from his previous connections and prepare him for some limited relationship with his host; a "degroupping" and "re-groupping" process ensues. These ceremonies are variously described by anthropologists as "Rites of Passage," "Rites of Initiation," "Purification," etc. These are ceremonial forms that do not carry with them any emotional overtones. The stranger remains an outsider and is not incorporated into the life of the host tribe. He is merely being disinfected from foreign magic and divested of evil forces which may lodge within him or cluster about him. His power to do evil is thus neutralized. Frazer in discussing the purification rite says: "We know that early

² Harry Elmer Barnes and Howard Becker. *Social Thought from Lore to Science*. I. Boston: D. C. Heath and Co., 1938. pp. 13-14.

³ Sir James Frazer. *The Golden Bough* (I Vol. Abridged Edition) New York: The Macmillan Co., 1923. p. 194.

⁴ Margaret Wood. *The Stranger: A Study in Social Relationship*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1934. pp. 80-81 for a fuller account.

⁵ Margaret Mead. *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, New York: William Morrow and Co., 1935. pp. 54-55.

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man stands in great fear of the magic of strangers, and that he resorts to a variety of ceremonies in order to protect himself against it either when he admits strangers to his own country or when he enters the territory of another."⁶

These rites of separation take many forms. Creveaux describes the practice of the Apalai Indians in South America who compelled each stranger to be bitten by large black ants and when his body was completely covered with bites, allowed him entrance. Frazer details a variety of purification ceremonies. He describes ceremonies wherein the newcomer passes through fire and water. He cites practice in Borneo of smearing the blood of a recently killed fowl on a newcomer and among the Sioux Indians of North America the stranger is wept and slobbered over before he is permitted to come within the tribal settlement.⁷

In some instances, rites of passage are elaborated into three stages: (1) Rites of Separation, (2) Rites of Preparation, and (3) Rites of Incorporation. Rites of Incorporation have been prevalent among the Semitic peoples who have long held to a tradition of hospitality. The Arabs, the Syrians, and the ancient Hebrews seem to consider the stranger as a guest so long as he does not belong to an enemy group. Among the Semites the Rites of Incorporation have been elaborated into what is known as the "covenant ritual." Wood describes it: "As generally performed, it symbolizes the establishment of a bond of relationship with mutual obligation and which is associated with profound sentiment."⁸ The exchange of blood or the spilling of blood upon the threshold establishes such a bond of unity. The stranger thus becomes a blood member of the group. This blood sharing ceremony usually ended in feast partaking. Thus salt and wine became, in time, blood substitutes and are still so re-

garded in Hebrew, Arabic and Catholic ritual.

The ancient Hebrews, a migratory, nomadic people with a Semitic cultural heritage, incorporated this covenant ritual into their tradition. The Covenant with Abraham is based on the sharing of blood with the deity through the ceremony of circumcision and marks the initiation of the individual Israelite into the tribe. In the story of the flight from Egypt in *Exodus*, the blood of the Paschal lamb smeared upon the door posts of the Israelites marked them off as being members of the group and thus saved them from the depredations of the Angel of Death, who "passed-over" their homes and spared them.

3. SEMITIC HOSPITALITY

The life of the early Hebrews in many other respects resembled that of other primitive Semitic groups. "The more we learn about the people of the world of Western Asia, the more similarities we discover between them and the Hebrews," states J. M. Powis Smith.⁹ The tradition of the "protected stranger" grew out of the nomadic life of the Semites. As pointed out by W. Robertson Smith "from earliest time of Semitic life, the lawlessness of the desert in which every stranger is an enemy has been tempered by the principle that the guest is inviolable."¹⁰ The Hebrews incorporated this folkway into their tradition.

That the Hebrews inherited this practice of hospitality from their Semitic forebears and from their nomadic past is evidenced by a number of instances described in the ancient book of *Genesis*, practices which find parallels among present day Arabs. We are told of Lot who not only endangered his own life but was willing to jeopardize the honor of his daughters in order that he give refuge to strangers who were visiting Sodom and Gomorrah. The reception the patriarch

⁶ Sir James Frazer. *Folk Lore in the Old Testament*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1927. p. 168.

⁷ Sir James Frazer. *The Golden Bough*. pp. 194-198.

⁸ Wood, *op. cit.*, pp. 84-89.

⁹ J. M. Powis Smith. *The Prophets and Their Times*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925. p. 261.

¹⁰ W. Robertson Smith. *Lectures on the Religion of the Semites*. First Series. Edinburgh: A. & C. Black, 1889. p. 76.

Abraham gave to the three strangers who passed his way, washing their feet and spreading food before them is another illustration of typical Semitic hospitality. These strangers are designated in the Bible as angels of the Lord, a belief that is in line with those held by some primitive people and shared by the Greeks and the Romans that guests may be gods or their representatives in disguise. No chances should therefore be taken with any guest who may either be a benefactor or a powerful source of evil.

The Hebrews, however, went much beyond this simple type of Semitic hospitality. They used these mores as a base upon which they elaborated an involved and conceptualized structure. W. Robertson Smith describes the process: "The precepts of the Pentateuch did not create . . . on an altogether free basis but only reshaped and remodelled in accordance with a more spiritual doctrine."¹¹ Their concept and treatment of the stranger is a good example of the evolution of a culture complex from a simple tribal folkway into a philosophy and doctrine that became a universal ideal.

The sense of being a stranger was burned deeply into the Hebrew psyche at the very inception of its group consciousness. The word "Hebrew," which is transliterated from the word "Ivri" means "the man who came from across the river." The very progenitor of the group, Abraham, the traditional father of his people, who was first given the appellation "Ivri," was regarded at the very start of his career as a newcomer, a foreigner and an alien by those among whom he settled. He is described in the Bible as the wandering shepherd Sheik, a stranger in many lands, who had to adjust himself to the culture of his hosts. The manner in which he purchased land for a family burial plot after the death of his wife Sara, is an instance of his attempts to follow the customs of his adopted group. (*Genesis* 23)

4. ATTITUDES TO THE STRANGER IN THE BIBLE

Permeating the tradition, echoing through

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 2.

Biblical literature, ingrained in custom and ceremony, the precept, "be kind to the stranger," became the silver cord which linked the early memories of the people to their religious and ethical concepts and major social values. From offering a passerby food and raiment, as Abraham did following Semitic custom, to the opening sentence of the Passover ritual: "let anyone who is hungry come and eat"; and to the Biblical dictum: "thou shalt not abhor an Edomite for he is your brother. Thou shalt not abhor an Egyptian for thou wert a stranger in his land" (*Deuteronomy* 23-7), or "and if a stranger sojourn with ye in your land, thou shalt not vex him but the stranger that dwelleth with you shall be unto you as one born among you, and thou shalt love him as thyself, for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt" (*Leviticus* 19-33) is quite a jump in cultural development.

In the earliest books of the Bible, in *Exodus* and in the Priestly documents in *Leviticus*, we first come across injunctions to guard and protect the stranger: "Ye shall have one manner of law, as well as for the stranger as for the home born" (*Leviticus* 24-22). "Ye shall neither vex a stranger nor oppress him for ye were strangers in the land of Egypt" (*Exodus* 22-21). This latter phrase is oft repeated: "remember ye were slaves." The codifier keeps jogging the Israelite's memory to stir him with compassion and thus, by recalling past historic group experience, aims to justify the concern for the newcomer and alien.

In the book of *Deuteronomy*, we get a greater elaboration of the code. Since this book is considered the product of a wave of reform which swept through Palestine between the 6th and 7th centuries B.C. brought about by the fiery preaching of the early prophets, it is to be expected that the treatment of the stranger will be accorded considerable space. We find nine separate injunctions, each detailed and explicit. The stranger should receive his wage before sundown; he has the same right as all who are poor and propertyless to follow the reapers and garner the fallen sheaves or

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¹³ *Ibid*

collect the fruit that has been overlooked or unpicked in the gardens and vineyards.

There were, however, certain restrictions the stranger had to bide by. He could not become a member of the congregation of Israel unto the third generation (*Deuteronomy* 23-8); a native could receive interest on loans from a stranger, but not from another native. (Baron claims that this was probably due to the fact that the stranger, who was usually a merchant, used capital for immediate profit. He was also uncertain as to the length of his residence, while the native, usually a farmer, borrowed money as a mortgage on his farm or for seeding purposes. A loan to the stranger was therefore made at a considerably greater risk.)¹² Nor could a stranger become a ruler in Israel (*Deuteronomy* 17-15), although during the Second Commonwealth, 514 B.C.-70 A.D., there were rulers of foreign or mixed extraction. This proscription against assuming leadership in political life did not hold against the religious practices of the stranger. They were permitted to practice their religion and bring sacred objects into the country. The wives of Solomon went so far as to build temples for their deities and import priests for their ministrations. Dr. Salo W. Baron summarizes the Biblical attitude to the stranger: "The Deuteronomic law as well as the pre-exilic prophets frequently refer to this half foreign element in the population. They stress, as a rule, the moral if not the legal obligation of the Israelite to protect these strangers against oppression . . . characteristically enough 'history' is involved to support all these injunctions, the Israelites being reminded time and again that they also had been strangers in the land of Egypt. The attitude of the Deuteronomist is favorable even to the full fledged foreigner."¹³

5. SOCIAL CHANGE AND THE PROPHETS

The nomadic virtues were forgotten by Israel as they conquered cities and in turn

¹² Salo W. Baron, *A Social and Religious History of the Jews*, Vol. I. New York: Columbia University Press, 1937, p. 119.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 119.

became urbanized. The early pre-exilic prophets, who were either country people or shepherds inveighed against the evils of city life and extolled the simple and homely virtues of the nomad. Their claim was that "the vices of civil and urban life will be exterminated through revival of pure, primitive life."¹⁴ That social inequalities will give way to equal rights as in the days of old, was the essence of the preaching of Amos, Hosea, Malachi and the first Isaiah. They preached the simple virtues of kinship, brotherhood, hospitality, and charitable sharing prevalent during the glorified days of nomadism. They preached the return to the Golden Age when might will be no more and the Messiah, a descendant of the House of David, the shepherd king, will lead all peoples into an era of peace; when military might will vanish and "nation shall not lift up sword against nation." Baron sees these prophetic doctrines as a complete acceptance of all differences among peoples "the ethos offers prospects for the coexistence forever of different racial stocks, with full co-operation of the various cultural forces."¹⁵

The evolution of the attitude to the stranger from a primitive folkway into the ideal of the brotherhood of man, not only marks basic differences between the attitudes of primitive people and that of a civilized group like the Hebrews, but also illustrates the historic and social processes that set them apart. I shall describe later how mobility, geographical and vicinal factors, historical and cultural experiences affected the Hebrew attitude.

Primitive man, in his attitude to the stranger, by contrast to the flowering of this attitude among the Hebrews into a doctrine that places all races on an equal footing, is the victim of his isolation from cultural contacts. This resulted in an inflexible social structure, conservatism, and an automatic behavior that resisted change and strangeness. Hemmed in by fears and tied to a rigid code of practices, he became unre-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 81.

flecting and hence mentally immobile. As demonstrated by Franz Boas in his *The Mind of the Primitive Man*, the primitive is mentally as well equipped as civilized man. Environment, he points out, plays an all important role and affects custom and belief. These are, however, based primarily on cultural conditions, which in themselves are due to historic causes. "Cultural stage is essentially a phenomena dependent upon historical causes, regardless of race."¹⁶ Thus what determines the growth of a culture cumulatively as well as in quality and refinement is a tradition exposed to cultural contacts and affected by cultural changes; these new experiences are then intellectualized, recorded, and interpreted, and in time may become part of the tradition of the group.

6. CULTURAL CONTACTS AND RECORDED EXPERIENCE

The attitudes of the Hebrews to the stranger evolved and became differentiated and intellectualized as they moved away from vicinal isolation and became exposed to cultural contacts and cultural change. Palestine, the land they chose to settle in was at the crossroads of the world. Periodically overrun and possessed by stronger peoples on the way to conquest, the Hebrews lived between the wheels of the chariots of successive conquerors. Their history is a story of movement from subjection to subjection. It begins with slavery in Egypt. They then were conquered and oppressed in turn by the Hittites, Philistines, Assyrians, Babylonians, Greeks, Romans, etc. Frequently scattered and sent into many exiles after 722 B.C., they were exposed to infinite contacts with other cultures. Their early exilic literature, the stories of "Ruth" and "Esther," which are ascribed by Bible students to the period of the First Exile (514-586 B.C.) illustrate the attitude to foreigners which they absorbed. In each story, the heroine inter-marries. In one instance the alien

becomes the progenitor of the Hebrew shepherd King David and in the other, the Jewish maid through intermarriage saves her people.

Social change played a considerable part in giving the Hebrew a readiness in accepting strangeness and the stranger. The nomadic Israelite invaded the land of Canaan and possessed it. Thus they not only acquired a country but a new way of life as well. In the words of George Foot Moore, "Speaking generally, the nomadic elements are original constituents of the religion of Jehovah, and the agricultural rites are engrafted upon it."¹⁷ This cultural change was soon followed by the development of an urban civilization and brought about a transformation of their pattern of social organization from a loose tribal democracy to an authoritarian monarchy.

While a multiplicity of cultural contacts and inner cultural change gave the Hebrews a lowered resistance to strangers, social adaptability as well as mental mobility, it was their literacy, their ability to abstract and record, that preserved these attitudes and made possible their refinement by succeeding generations. Their writings kept certain historic lessons fresh and gave their attitudes and concepts continuity. As a perennial minority, ever a stranger, and never a nation, always at the mercy of the might of the majority, it was no more than good sense for the group to propagate the common origin of all men, pit the might of the pen against the sword and educate the majority in the acceptance and protection of the minority. The prophets proclaimed this sound lesson, gave it poetic grandeur and drove it with zeal and fervor into the consciousness of the Hebrew. They intellectualized their attitude to the stranger and gave the concept vastness and depth. All men are strangers, they taught, living by God's bounty, sojourners in His land, for "the earth is the Lord's." There is no dividing line between the oppressor and oppressed. There are no natives, no foreigners, no home born or strangers, all are children of one

¹⁶ Franz Boas. *The Mind of the Primitive Man*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1911, p. 249. For a fuller discussion of environment, the historic process and primitive society pp. 165-pp. 203-243.

¹⁷ George Foot Moore. *History of Religion*. Vol. II. p. 5.

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God. This is a good heritage for men to adopt and follow. The Hebrew has only been chosen to carry and deliver this message and therefore must live differently as a servant of the Lord.

7. JEWISH MARGINALITY

Most likely the inner conflict which many modern Jews are heir to, the pull and tug between two cultures must have afflicted the ancient Hebrew as well. Living under a dominant culture at different historic periods must have produced in many the type of character described by Robert E. Park as a "marginal man," "one whom fate has condemned to live in two societies and in two, not merely diffuse but antagonistic, cultures."¹⁸ The individual considers himself a stranger, in between cultures. In a sensitive and intelligent person this feeling translates itself into a detached view of one's own as well as other cultures, a tolerance and acceptance of members of other ethnic groups and, as in the case of the prophet, an expansion of ethnocentrism into a world view, an identification of self with humanity. Stonequist gives a clear analysis of the process. "The marginal man is the key personality in the conflict of cultures. It is in his mind that the cultures come together, conflict and eventually work out some kind of mutual adjustment and interpenetration. He is the crucible of cultural fusion. . . . Thus the practical efforts of the marginal person to solve his own problem lead him consciously or unconsciously to change the situation itself. His interest may shift from himself to the objective conditions and launch him upon the career of nationalist, conciliator, interpreter, reformer, or teacher."¹⁹ Robert E. Park in his introduction to *The Marginal Man* amplifies this point of view. "This marginal man assumes, in relation to the world in which he lives, the role of a stranger and cosmopolitan. In-

variably he becomes, relative to his cultural milieu, the individual with the wider horizon, the keener intelligence, the more detached and rational viewpoints. The marginal man is relatively the more civilized human being. He occupies the position which has been historically that of the Jew in the Diaspora."²⁰

8. AN ATTITUDE GROWS INTO A PHILOSOPHY

In summary, we see the following major factors activating and moulding the attitude to the stranger on the part of the Hebrews, which were absent in the environment of the primitive: (1) a multiplicity of cultural contacts; (2) social changes within the group; (3) historic experiences which were recorded and taught to succeeding generations and made sacred in ritual and ceremony; (4) the prophets reinforced and conceptualized that experience into a universal doctrine. Thus, the primitive's attitude of fear and suspicion brought about by his vicinal isolation and mental immobility is dissolved in Hebrew culture because of environmental and historical causes. On the one hand, we get rigid cultural forms which bring about greater isolation vitiated, even more so, by the dread and treatment of the stranger as an enemy, while in the case of the Hebrew, because of a more flexible cultural tradition and historic experience, we find the interpretation and elaboration of an attitude into a philosophy which in time became the basis for the ethical religions of mankind. The Hebrew attitude to the stranger became the springboard to a cluster of principles which set forth that man should be free to live anywhere and receive treatment and protection on a par with the native born. Out of it grew the idea of "liberty, equality, and fraternity." From "thou shalt have one manner of law for the stranger as the home born" is but a short step to the Bill of Rights. The attitude and practices regarding the stranger thus serve as a barometer to the cultural stage of a society and are an indication of its rise on the scale of what the western world considers civilization.

¹⁸ Robert E. Park in the "Introduction" p. xv, to Everett V. Stonequist *The Marginal Man a Study in Personality and Culture Conflict*. New York: Charles Scribner and Sons, 1937.

¹⁹ Everett Stonequist. *The Marginal Man*. pp. 221-2.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. xvii-xviii.

SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE COURTS IN MODERN TIMES

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A FEW years ago the Congress of the United States made a fundamental change in the status of labor by enacting a law to safeguard the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining, and establishing the National Labor Relations Board. This legislation on a broad matter of basic social and economic policy was later nullified in part, not by a board of experts in the social sciences, but by a group of experts in law.

For, on February 27, 1939, the Supreme Court of the United States in the person of Chief Justice Hughes, but with Justices Reed and Black dissenting, drastically amended this act. The cases then before the court concerned the relationship of the National Labor Relations Board with Fansteel Metallurgical Corporation, the Columbian Enameling, and the Sands Manufacturing Companies.

The facts were as follows: Certain employers had engaged in illegal and provocative acts. Thereupon certain of their employees started a sit-down strike. This the court held to be unlawful and high-handed procedure. Though the buildings and the equipment of the employers were carefully protected by the strikers, the court held the sit-down to be a violent seizure of the premises. The fact that the employers had used unfair labor practices, hence had not clean hands, was ignored. The conduct of the strikers was held to absolve the employer from any duty of re-employing them.

Thereupon, as the dissenting justices stated, the Court legislated that workers could not have the protection the Congress sought to give them under the Labor Act. Hereafter the employer might discharge any striker, with or without cause; he was obligated only to recognize labor's rights of self-organization and collective bargaining. But, contrary to the plain intent of the Congress, strikers would no longer remain

eligible for reinstatement regardless of their conduct under stress.

Thus part of the protection offered by the act was withdrawn. On the same day the Court also held that an employer had a right to dismiss an employee for breach of contract, whereupon he became free to bargain with other workers. It held also that the Labor Board must always adduce substantial evidence for its actions as its discretionary power was severely limited. This, Justices Black and Reed declared, permitted the Court illegally to review and overrule the Board's findings of fact, though the law gave the Board judicial power.

The merits of these cases do not here concern us. We only ask why broad social and economic policies are decided by the courts, in last analysis by the Supreme Court, rather than by boards of experts? We call this an age of science. Why do we not resort to qualified specialists for the determination of basic national policies, instead of to august groups of lawyers however respectable and learned?

Even in the stress of war it is important to remember that peace will come. Unless during that peace we construct a better world we may as well not have won the war. In this stress we may have forgotten the incredible Supreme Court controversy of 1937-38 which was carried on by both sides in emotional rather than intellectual terms. What is worse, the really important question at issue was ignored.

The progress of science and technology has, in recent years, completely invalidated the idea that individuals lacking highly specialized training and experience can pass intelligent judgment upon complex technical questions. In other words, it is anachronistic for us to depend upon legally trained persons for the determination of our national social, economic, and scientific policies.

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we make the legal decision of the Supreme Court final with regard to technical matters. The cases presented to our courts increasingly tend also to involve highly complex questions in the specialized fields of physical, biological, economic, and social science. Such problems can only be solved intelligently by scientific experts.

Tentatively this would mean such extension of judicial notice, based on the conclusive fact findings of expert administrative courts, as would facilitate the expert decision of questions that arise. Judicial notice should then be extended to all non-controversial technical propositions, the kind regarding which the consensus of qualified opinion is agreed by overwhelming majority.

The cases the Supreme Court (and other courts) are called upon to decide are much too technical in most instances even to be considered intelligently by persons learned only in the law. Take for instance the Florida Chain Store Case, *Louis K. Liggett Co. et al. vs. Florida*. This hinged upon the broad question of whether a State should use its taxation system to crowd out an enterprise if found repugnant.

As Justice Roberts said, in rendering the Court's opinion, it did seem that no State should have the right unfairly to tax a trade unit merely because of fortuitous circumstance that some such units (of the same overall group) stood a few feet outside certain county lines—for that is what it amounted to. But the dissenters, led by Justice Brandeis, held that a State had a perfect right to use its taxing power to discourage the establishment of chain stores and to encourage that of independents.

Justice Brandeis held this was legitimate use of a legitimate weapon. He reviewed the entire history of the corporation law to prove his point. He was sure that any State could rightfully prohibit a business it regarded as "noxious" by any "legitimate" means. But the real point is whether chain or independent stores better, more efficiently, and more economically serve consumers. There is evidence that they very often do and that a little judicious regulation would

render them even more efficient. That point the Court ignored.

However, Justices Cardozo and Stone, in a separate dissent, held that chain stores did have broad social and economic significance not shared by local businesses. They felt the State was right in regarding county boundaries as lines of cleavage between what would be regarded as local and as national enterprises. But the real need for a board of qualified experts to rule on the utility and value of chain stores to Florida consumers went unmet.

The same thing was true in the case of *Appalachian Coals, Inc., et al. vs. The United States of America*, Opinion read by Chief Justice Hughes on March 13, 1933. The case concerned a group of bituminous coal companies which produced three-fourths of the coal in a certain region. They wanted to make uniform contracts and thus control prices. Except for Justice McReynolds, the Court thought this monopoly warranted, regardless of the Anti-Trust Laws.

To circumvent these laws the Court contended that the local producers' consolidated sales agency would effect great economies which would be passed on to consumers in the form of cheaper, more efficient service. In short, the monopoly would be a good one, justified by its works. Even consumers testified in its favor. The Court believed that only "bad" combinations would "unduly" restrict competition and thus be illegal.

Here the Anti-Trust Laws were used to foster monopoly rather than to destroy it. In the Chain Store case a monopoly had been regarded as malign. As Robert L. Hale showed in the *Columbia Law Review* for March 1934, the Supreme Court has in the past taken action regarding all sorts of business enterprises, whenever it regarded these as "affected with public interest."

In the Milk Control Board case indeed Justice Roberts went so far as to say that "there is no closed class or category of business affected with public interest." For it must be determined "in each case whether circumstances vindicate the challenged regulation as a reasonable exertion of govern-

mental authority or condemn it as arbitrary or discriminatory."

Many earlier jurists, including Chief Justice Taft, were very liberal in this connection, though even he drew the line when he found the New York statute limiting the re-sale price of theatre tickets unconstitutional. Justice Stone was thoroughly right when he said that the phrase "affected with public interest" was "too vague and illusory to carry us very far." Again we see need for a board of qualified experts to render expert decisions in such matters.

In the case of New York State Ice Co. vs. Liebmann, the Supreme Court refused to foster what certainly appears to have been a very efficient and economically justified monopoly. In the Milk Control Board case Nebbia's conviction was sustained for selling milk at less than nine cents a quart, though neither a State franchise nor a monopoly existed. In this case the State was held justified by the Constitution in legislatively promoting the public welfare by means of any economic policy it thought best.

Possibly the decision in all these cases was legally correct, though that seems dubious in view of the Court's freedom in self-reversal. From time to time Court decisions must be sound economically, socially, and technically by the law of averages, but that is accidental. It cannot be regarded as the deliberate result of mature consideration by qualified individuals in the light of all relevant facts.

In the celebrated Gold cases, *Nortz vs. United States* and *Norman vs. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.*, decided February 18, 1935, for instance, the argument centered not on the regulation of our monetary system in a time of economic crisis, as it would have before an expert board. Instead it was concerned with the problem of whether the Government contracted legally to deliver 25.8 grains of gold, nine-tenths fine, or to deliver one dollar of whatever gold value Congress chose to give it.

In this case Justice McReynolds actually dissented because he claimed to view "repudiation and spoliation of citizens by their

sovereign with abhorrence!" That is emotion, not reason. We should have a permanent monetary commission of qualified experts to judge such matters with competence.

Again in the cases of *Schechter Poultry Corp. vs. United States*, the N.R.A. case decided May 27, 1935; *United States of America vs. Receiver of Hoosac Mills Corp.*, the A.A.A. case decided January 6, 1936; and *George Ashwandler et al. vs. Tennessee Valley Authority*, decided February 17, 1936, legally qualified judges who were laymen in the highly technical questions concerned rendered the decisions.

Each case had broad social and economic implications. Yet in each instance an irrelevant judgment was rendered as to whether certain acts were in violation of the Constitution, or of States rights. In no instance did a reviewing board of qualified, competent experts, hear all relevant facts and render an expert judgment. We do not know even yet whether certain of these Government agencies were socially and economically sound. We simply have the opinion of a group of sincere legal students on their constitutionality, which is an irrelevance.

What is more, Supreme Court justices often emphasize their awareness of the fact that they pass upon legality alone and have no concern with the basic questions which are of real importance to the Nation. At times they glory in ignoring important social and economic consequences of their decisions. They assert that their concern is with laws not with their consequences. At times they give vent to such sentiments as this from Justice McReynolds in the Milk Control Board case:

Grave concern for the embarrassed farmers is everywhere; but this should neither obscure the rights of others nor obstruct judicial appraisal of measures proposed for relief. The ultimate welfare of the producer, like that of every other class, requires dominance of the Constitution. And zealously to uphold this in all parts is the highest duty entrusted to the courts.

Again, in the Home Building and Loan case, Justice Sutherland had this to say in his dissent regarding the merits of a State

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I quite agree with the opinion of the court that whether the legislation under review is wise or unwise is a matter with which we have nothing to do. Whether it is likely to work well or work ill presents a question entirely irrelevant to the issue. The only legitimate inquiry we can make is whether it is constitutional.

That may satisfy the Court, but then some board of qualified experts should make a relevant, technical decision or social policy. In this case even the so-called but much misunderstood "liberal" element of the Court, while making an extensive review of the effects of the existing economic emergency, carefully avoided all discussion of the wisdom or unwisdom of the legislation in their prevailing opinion.

However, in the Bituminous Coal case, Justice Sutherland delivered the opinion of the Court. Here he admitted, surprisingly enough, that the protection of the public interest, health, and comfort; the conservation of privately owned coal; the maintenance of just relations between producers and employers; and the promotion of the general welfare "it may be conceded, are objects of great worth." But so long as the Constitution blocked the path these considerations were disregarded.

In the N.R.A. case Chief Justice Hughes wrote: "It is not the province of the court to consider the economic advantages or disadvantages of such a centralized system (of government). It is sufficient to say that the Federal Constitution does not provide for it." In the A.A.A. case the entire argument swung around the power of Congress to authorize processing taxes. But, as Justice Roberts said for the Court: "The question is not what power the Federal Government ought to have but what powers in fact have been given by the people." No such powers were found.

In this case the so-called liberals—Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, dissented. They found the A.A.A. act constitutional because it authorized "a levy unquestionably within the taxing power of Congress." They accused the majority of "a tortured con-

struction of the Constitution," and warned them that the "courts are not the only agency of government that must be assumed to have capacity to govern." They said that the Court as well as the Congress might "unhappily falter or be mistaken in the performance of their constitutional duty." But they concluded that the Court was "concerned only with the power to enact statutes, not with their wisdom."

Hence liberal court members are of no more aid to technically sound administrative decisions than conservatives so long as their attitude remains legalistic. The Supreme Court controversy should have turned on the question of the anachronism of courts when it came to decide moot questions in the field of science, economics, technology, sociology, agriculture, industry, and other specialized spheres of human activity. The extension of administrative courts should have been advocated by someone.

Administrative courts should be composed of specialists and experts duly qualified in their subjects as ascertained by the equivalent of a civil service examination. They should make findings of fact. These should be accepted as final, which was the contention of Justice Black in his opinion on *Federal Trade Commission vs. Standard Education Society, et al.*, delivered for the Court November 8, 1937. He held that the Commission's fact finding was final and that the Court had no right to pick and choose among the facts to arrive at findings contrary to those of the Commission. The Commission is an administrative tribunal.

The Commission's members may not all be experts, but it is a progressive tribunal for modern times as compared with the average court. Courts hear expert witnesses, it is true, but are under no obligation to credit them even when they are in general agreement with one another. Authoritative scientific knowledge has no finality in court whatever. The court may take it or leave it. The extension of judicial notice to factual findings made by well-qualified administrative courts composed of proved experts is essential to any rational program of court reform.

Actually the most conservative legalists have increasingly to consider basic facts as did Justice McReynolds in the T.V.A. case. He reviewed the subject of the generation and sale of power by government, but he also held that the Constitution would disappear "if under the thin mask of disposing of property the United States can enter into the business of generating, transmitting, and selling power." This is absurd.

In the Milk Control Board case the Court's opinions bristled with economic data, though the opinion of Justice Roberts contained more than did Justice McReynolds' dissent. The whole trend of milk production and distribution in New York State, its place as a dietary essential, various State efforts to control commodities for consumer benefit, the necessity for curtailing the free enjoyment of private property were all discussed. But legal precedents were nonetheless cited as compelling. Finally the Court said that: "The Constitution does not secure to anyone liberty to conduct his business in such fashion as to inflict injury upon the public at large, or even any substantial group of people." So the review of the facts stood disregarded.

A man named Liebmann wanted to put up a plant in Oklahoma City which was already well supplied by the New State Ice Co., which protested. In discussing this New State Ice case, the majority of the Court merely groped around in arguments about abridged constitutional liberties, whereas the dissenters made a full review of the problem placing it in its economic and social policy context. They sought to prove that, given the Oklahoma climate and the economic level of its average citizen, ice manufacturing was affected with public interest in that state.

In their dissent in the New State Ice case, Justices Brandeis and Stone made an extensive appeal to the facts, whereas Justice Sutherland's opinion stuck to arid legalism. The actual question was whether ice manufacture in Oklahoma could be regarded as a business affected with public interest. If so, then application for a certificate of convenience and necessity must be made and the

document procured before a new ice plant could be built.

However, the court proved in the main concerned with legality; so precedents were cited. But there was also evinced a full awareness of social and economic conditions in Oklahoma, of technological and scientific progress, and of the necessity of bringing consumption and production into better balance in a society where so many were technologically unemployed. The dissenters lost, but they did well. They lost perhaps just because they were too scientific and insufficiently legalistic.

But, at best, they were merely trying to do by indirection what should be done deliberately by properly qualified experts. Such experts should assemble the facts carefully and without bias. The facts should be presented quietly, unemotionally, and certainly not by lawyer-ranting methods to the impartial board. Experts to man the boards could be selected from different specialties and professions by civil service means, the composition of the particular board varying with the kind of question to be considered.

The board would also hold private discussions and would finally adjudicate on a basis of the facts as ascertained and in the light of current social, economic, scientific, and technological conditions. The courts would, if necessary in some cases, deal with the purely legal factor, but would accept the administrative tribunal's findings of fact without question. Only thus could our broad national policies be decided intelligently. Today they are usually decided obliquely or by subterfuge and usually with as little reference to the relevant facts as possible.

For the Supreme Court is still called upon to adjudicate by traditional and obsolete legalistic procedures highly technical and scientific questions which could be reviewed properly only by impartial boards of experts. Yet, whereas disputants argued a few years ago about the mere size of the court, its speed of operation, the age or putative liberalism of its members, and a variety of other inconsequential questions, the basic problem went undiscussed.

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The discussion should have centered around the anachronistic methods and procedures of the national life. It should also have considered the inadequate training of lawyer-judges for the tasks they regularly undertake. Modern times require modern techniques, as well as an understanding of scientific methods.

This is one of the most important problems we now face after the war. The necessity for highly trained, expertly qualified individuals to function in an orderly, systematic way as fact finding boards of review and administrative tribunals is fundamental. We cannot safely afford much longer to ignore this necessity.

THE GRAND JURY AS AN AGENCY OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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ONE ENCOUNTERS much difficulty in using existing theoretical schema for the analysis of social control situations.¹ Practically, if not ideally from the methodological standpoint, the elements in a schema for social control should permit drawing together for integration and further inquiry the findings in such now conceptually divergent fields as public administration, public opinion, conformity behavior, social control of business, social movements, sociology of law and the social psychology of power. The conceptual framework, if really general, should allow the productive analysis of many diverse social control situations without the necessity of inventing, as is so often and confusingly done, a whole new set of concepts for each research project.

A recently suggested system for the analysis of social control includes the factors of: (1) the amount of power; (2) its distribution; (3) the purposes for which it is used; and (4) the means by which it is applied.² The writer has found this system valuable when certain modifications are made and when a logical structuring is arranged among the elements. Rephrased and amended to permit more systematic development of an analysis, the elements of control become:

¹ For criticisms of social control theory see: A. B. Hollingshead, "The Concept of Social Control," *American Sociological Review*, April, 1941; also, Edwin M. Lemert, "The Folkways and Social Control," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1942.

² Kimball Young, *Introductory Sociology*, 1942, pp. 895-96.

(1) the objectives (aims, norms, standards, goals) of control; (2) the power differential between the agencies of control and persons or groups being controlled; (3) the means of control; and (4) the forms of control.

The writer has found it necessary to distinguish between control used to attain specific behavioral norms and control used to obtain or maintain power itself irrespective of ethical goals.³ The difference between these objectives becomes an important factor in the way in which the agencies, means, and forms of control are structured in any given situation. Furthermore, in order to be of mensurative use objectives of control should be stated in terms of a variable relationship to customary behavior.⁴ It is really dispersion or deviation of the control objectives from modal tendencies in behavior of those being controlled which structures the situation.

The amount of deviation in any situation is determined by the point on a continuum of

³ N. S. Timasheff distinguishes between ethical equilibria and power equilibria, ethical coordination and imperative coordination. *The Sociology of Law*, 1939, Ch. I.

⁴ More simply this is an expression of the anthropological distinction between social (customary) behavior and the ideal pattern. See: J. Gillen, "Acquired Drives in Culture Contact," *American Journal of Anthropology*, October-December, 1942; R. Linton, "Society, Culture and the Individual," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 33, 1938; C. S. Ford, "Society, Culture and the Organism," *Journal of General Psychology*, January 1939.

norms, either a normal or J-curve, at which an agency of control identifies itself. This action has an immediate bearing upon the power differential, particularly the more dynamic adjuncts of power differences found in personal and group alignments and their permutations. Thus if an agency of control identifies with modal norms it automatically decreases deviation, limiting it to the lower frequencies at the ends of a curve. This action gains much personal and group support for the control agency and neutralizes potential opposition. In "ideal-typical" terms, the other alternative is identification of the control agency at the extreme end of a continuum of norms. This has the effect of eliminating most dynamic power accessories and permits a measurement or informal assessment of institutionalized power, or, where the latter is absent also (as in times of revolution) an estimate of power deriving more exclusively from the means of control.

As deviation between controllers and controlled increases, through action of either, a point is reached where the situation gets structured as a struggle for power. Often this is as much a problem of semantics or putative (spurious?) deviation growing out of a superimposed pattern of institutionalized conflict as it is a problem of genuinely gross or cumulative deviation. Passive social control is a form arising from modal identifications in control programs or from stabilized mores; active social control arises from upper or lower quartile identifications or that which comes from identification with extreme right-hand steps of a J-curve. Each form of control conduces to a characteristic structuring of agencies of control, role definitions of agents of control and control procedures.

The above hypothetical formulation has been made the subject of testing by data on the grand juries of Los Angeles County. The data cover the activities of seventeen grand juries from 1929 through 1945, gathered from official reports, newspaper files, public records, and personal interviews. The grand jury was selected as an agency of control for this particular analysis because it seemed to illustrate the refunctioning of latent

patterns of organization in the area of social control and seemed to demonstrate significant fluctuations between active and passive forms of control.

Objectives of Control: In some degree the objectives of control for the Los Angeles County grand juries, as well as for all grand juries, are set by the common law. A second source of goals is state legislation. Both of these are subject to interpretation in the oral and written instructions to the jury by the particular judge presiding over the jury. The district attorney, due to his close organizational tie with the grand jury, ordinarily has played an important role in determining the direction of its interests. Community pressures in the nature of complaints from groups and individuals are involved to a variable extent, and finally must be considered the social status of the persons making up the panels from which the juries are drawn.

For the most part the juries studied did not identify themselves with extreme, non-modal attitudes. This was partially due to the fact that they were composed of lay persons uninformed as to the common law conceptions of grand jury functions and to the confusion over the interpretation of the state law regarding specified activities of the grand jury.⁵ In some cases juries had trouble separating valid complaints from those of emotionally unstable or politically ambitious persons.⁶ This caused them to grow excessively skeptical or drove them to a greater reliance upon the court system for guidance.

Both the judges in charge of the grand juries and the district attorneys, in spite of mutual hostility, preferred to conceive of

⁵ The Final Report and the Report of the Committee on Administration of the 1932-33 jury contain long discussions of the difficulties created by lack of clarity in the Penal Code, Section 928. This was also mentioned in the reports of the 1933, 1934, and 1942 juries.

⁶ One jury listed the following types of complaints: (1) persons with no criminal cases; (2) persons civilly not criminally wronged; (3) persons harboring a personal grudge; (4) neurotics and psychopaths; (5) chronic complainers; (6) political wranglers; (7) meritorious cases outlawed; (8) meritorious cases. *Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury, 1931.*

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grand juries as an extension of the court system rather than as autonomous agencies of control. In instructions to the 1945 jury the judge called its membership: "... the liaison between the people and their appointed and elected officers . . . in the administration of justice. . . ." When questioned personally about United States Supreme Court decisions defining grand juries differently, one judge admitted that while it was technically true that grand juries were governmental agencies actually they were instruments of the court. He cited as recent trends in judicial attitudes the questioning of the sufficiency of evidence in grand jury indictments, and also a case of his own in which he reduced the number of charges from 82 to 56 on grounds of insufficient evidence.⁸

An official spokesman for the present district attorney defined the grand jury as the "eyes and ears of the court," taking care to point out that it was not an inquisitorial body. He expressed the belief that the greatest value of the grand jury lay in the fact that it was there, acting as a symbolic deterrent. The grand jury reports over the period covered by this study indicated very clearly the efforts and more than sporadic success of the district attorney in winning over and guiding the grand juries. This was done by assigning personable young assistant attorneys to the task of advising members of the jury and initiating them into the fascinating business of law and crime control. To the degree that these overtures succeeded the objectives of control for the grand juries were determined by the dominant interests of the prosecutor's office.⁹

⁸ William McKay. *Instructions To The 1945 Grand Jury*. Mimeographed.

⁹ Greenberg vs. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 2, 319; in re Kennedy, 160 Cal.

¹⁰ All but the more militant juries had elaborate praise for the work of the district attorney's office in one or another of their reports. One report spoke of: "... the earnest cooperation of our esteemed comrade and able counselor—, to whom we looked for safe guidance through the bewildering maze of legal intricacies." *Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury, 1931, Criminal Complaints*, p. 5.

A cursory analysis of the social and economic composition of the 1945 panel of 119 persons, from whom the jurors were selected provides a further cue to the normative basis for grand jury action. The average age for this panel was 52 years. Forty-three per cent of the panel were female. An occupational analysis discloses the following structure.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION BY OCCUPATIONAL CLASS OF MEMBERS OF PANEL FROM WHICH THE 1945 LOS ANGELES COUNTY GRAND JURY WAS DRAWN.

Occupational Class	Per Cent
Professional	16.8
Business Executive	21.
Business	16.8
Housewife	33.6
Retired	6.7
Farmer (Citrus Growers)	2.5
Clerical	.8
Skilled Workers	.8
Unskilled Workers	.8

Tabulated from the *Legal Journal*, December 15, 1944.

The only significant difference between this jury panel and those of earlier juries had to do with sex composition, women being excluded for the most part from earlier juries. Yet it is questionable whether, save in minor respects, the changing sex composition altered the normative character of jury action. Out of the forty women listed as housewives, two were wives of lawyers and nine referred to themselves as "clubwomen." As far as the writer was able to discover no Mexicans have ever been chosen for jury duty; in recent years, however, it has been the habit of one judge to appoint Negroes to the panel, and there was a Negro member on the 1943 and 1944 juries. It is probably safe to conclude at least for economic and closely related issues the tendency of grand juries had been to assume a conventionally conservative, right-of-center position. Further reason for such belief is found in the status of the persons selected as foremen.¹⁰

¹⁰ 1934, M.D.; 1936, Retired Rancher; 1937, Paint Manufacturer; 1938, Manager, Civic Auditorium in wealthy residential suburb; 1939, Invest-

The "business man" outlook of the grand juries has been very obvious in their reports with reference to such things as government economy, real estate assessments, taxes, labor unions, and relief, welfare and school expenditures. Attitudes on civil rights and the apprehension and punishment of criminals stressed security and deterrence, while strong ethnocentric tendencies characterized their attitudes towards minorities. Juries favored lower costs of government, tax reductions, expediency in crime control, stricter punishment for criminals and juvenile delinquents, increased parental responsibility for delinquency, and stringent citizenship and land laws (for Japanese). The 1937 grand jury "pointed with pride" to its record in indicting sit-down strikers of a local aeroplane plant, thus "causing the end of sit-down strikes in Southern California."¹¹ The 1932-33 jury expressed its viewpoint with reference to the depression and deflation in the clichés of classical economics: "The action of economic law can be delayed but not set aside."¹²

Although with reference to hypothetical modal attitudes of the community, the attitudes of jury members represented only a small deviation it must be remembered that deviation is meaningful only in specific interrelationships of groups in the effective control situation. Thus a conservative attitude on government economy may become radical, or represent wide deviation when the groups to be controlled are agencies of county government. For this reason generalized concepts such as "radical," "liberal," "conservative," and "reactionary" were found to be of limited value for the purposes of this study.

Differential Power: The difference in power between the grand jury and the agencies of county government, the commonest control-

ment Broker; 1940, Ex-Superior Court judge; 1941, Desk Company executive; 1942 retired High School Principal; 1944 Manager Engineering Co.; taken from files of *Los Angeles Times*.

¹¹ Report, *Los Angeles County Grand Jury*, 1937, Criminal Complaints.

¹² Report, *Los Angeles County Grand Jury*, 1932-33, Taxation and Budgets.

lees, became apparent under two conditions: (1) when the jury was used by political or civic groups as a device for gaining power or changing power relations between various county departments; (2) when high deviation existed between customary behavior and control goals. Often both were present, or one merged into the other. This latter stood out very clearly in the 326-page report of the 1934 grand jury. The vigorous research of this jury unearthed such widespread dishonesty and inefficiency that the body eventually began to seek changes in the basic organization of the county government. An attempt was made to weaken the informal political organization in the county by indictment of the incumbent district attorney.¹³

The 1937 grand jury was perhaps the best illustration of social control where emphasis was on power struggle growing out of putative or spurious deviation. In this case one member of the jury, backed by an independent community vice committee of dubious origin and representativeness, used his position to charge conspiracy on the part of county and municipal officers to protect vice and gambling interests. He demanded the right to carry on a secret investigation apart from the jury and district attorney. It is significant that the judge who presided over this jury later became mayor in a recall election. He was also the judge of the aggressive 1934 jury. Of course, it is probably true that municipal police were protecting prostitutes and gamblers, or living in symbiosis with them, as occurs in many large cities. The important thing here is that the control action did not arise primarily out of any change in the objective relationship between attitudes of citizens of the jury and customary behavior by county officers. Rather it derived from aspirations to power, and signified a shifting alignment of political forces within the community.

The power of the grand jury is part institutional, in part influenced by monopolizability of skill and information, and partly based upon dynamic interrelationships of persons

¹³ Final Report, *Los Angeles County Grand Jury*, 1934.

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and groups. The institutional power springs from the roots of the grand jury in the common law, clarified and verbalized in court decisions. In a careful comparison between grand juries, legislative investigative committees and magistral investigators, one writer concludes that the former, by virtue of its *de facto* existence and right of subpoena, to be the most powerful.¹⁴ While quite a few states have let the institution of the grand jury lapse into desuetude, Pennsylvania is the only state in which statutes and court decisions have grossly compromised the traditional power of the grand jury. However, these seem to lack American and English authority.¹⁵ Strong tendencies of this sort exist in the California Code in provisions for the hearing of legal evidence only, permission for the district attorney to be present at all hearings except when his office is under investigation, and the right of the prosecutor to conduct public hearings.¹⁶

There can be little doubt that the majority of the seventeen grand juries studied were closely controlled by the district attorney. They were completely dependent upon his office for secretarial, investigational and interrogating personnel and services. Being under the illusion that the jury must proceed legally, its members automatically turned in this direction for procedural as well as substantive information on cases under investigation. The personnel assigned to the juries by the district attorney remained, as would be expected, irreproachably loyal to their own strongly in-grouped, politically vulnerable department. Independent action of the grand jury was often forestalled by suggesting avenues of investigation that led to innocuous revelations. In other cases jury members were incited to go after what might be considered "fair game," public "whipping boys" such as the General Hospital, the jails or old public

building scandals. Experience had demonstrated that few repercussions would follow such excursions. The inane and futile results of many such investigations were revealed in such things as clearing persons of charges because of their "straight-forward answers" or because of their "fine reputation." One report on a local sanitarium painfully revealed the naïveté of the jurymen: "As far as the committee could see, everything seemed to be in good order. Mr. S—, the owner, said he would discharge any guard or guards who are found to be cruel."¹⁷ More aggressive investigations were blocked by questioning their legality or withholding information.¹⁸

Many times juries engaged in pertinent investigations bogged down in technical problems for which they did not possess requisite information or reliable access to it. The investigation of the sale of textbooks in the county schools, inquiry into flood control projects, county insurance of public buildings, and to a lesser extent the inquiries into co-operation of county departments and into minority group problems, all disclosed a sense of inadequacy on the part of the juries dealing with them. Beyond these was the periodic auditing inquiry of the juries. In this case the juries were dependent for approval of their audits upon Superior Court judges, not always given with alacrity.

When commercial firms were hired for auditing, the auditors were usually poorly prepared by their experience in business accountancy for the highly specialized, legally complicated task of governmental audits. The helplessness of private auditors was born out by their tendency to ask heads of the county departments they were checking, what they

¹⁷ Report, *Los Angeles County Grand Jury*, 1941, p. 35.

¹⁸ "In many investigations there was a feeling that something was involved but we were unable to obtain one little thing needed to complete the case. This led us to suspect that the D.A. was either holding back or covering up." Statement by member of the 1939 grand jury. One jury formally recognized its inability to act in several matters due to: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) lack of evidence; (3) no means of individual investigation. Report, *Los Angeles County Grand Jury*, 1940, p. 5.

¹⁴ G. H. Dessions and I. H. Cohen, "The Inquisitorial Functions of Grand juries," *Yale Law Journal*, March, 1932.

¹⁵ See U. S. Supreme Court ruling: *Hale vs. Henkel*, 201 U. S. 43, 61. Also A. M. Kidd, "Why The Grand Jury Is A Menace To Organized Crime," *Panel*, September-October, 1934.

¹⁶ *California Penal Code*, 919, 925, 925A.

should do. About all that came of their investigations in some cases was an education at the county's expense. The 1929 jury hired an auditor who had been used by four previous juries. A subsequent jury found that county departments had become accustomed to his methods and had been able successfully to disguise accounts to hide irregularities.¹⁹ In 1939 the juries began to use the regular county auditing department, with limitations of possible inadequate personnel and the possibility of political connivance in the auditor's department when party loyalty became an issue.

The fact that each jury had an entirely new membership composed of lay persons meant that it was relatively impossible for it to build up a stable system of group allegiances that would enhance its power. Such support tended to be kaleidoscopic and fluctuating with the issues under consideration. The local Grand Jurors Association has had only a nominal existence and there has been little in the way of well organized civic group action consistently to support grand juries. The California Taxpayers Association and other groups interested in governmental economy have shown the most enduring interest in the activities of the juries.

The interests of the grand juries frequently led them into investigations of crime and fraud only to end up confronted with the fact that they were dealing with crimes of middle class business men, "white collar" crime. This not only aligned powerful business groups against the juries but also risked the passive or active sabotage of the district attorney.²⁰ Furthermore, it produced splits and factional disputes in the juries themselves. One business executive jury foreman was accused of having been involved in dishonest transactions with the municipality and of violating his oath as a jurymen. Signifi-

cantly a deputy district attorney appeared to defend him before the jury.²¹ In another case a jury member deliberately destroyed evidence. These internal stresses and strains usually appeared when the power of the jury was being put to test. The weaknesses of its traditional power and power in other forms were amplified by confusion and conflict over goals. The 1934 grand jury in the midst of a depression year, when political reform was in the air in many cities, indicted the district attorney. Yet it had to reduce the charge from bribery to perjury in order to get the necessary votes.

Other weaknesses of the grand jury were exposed in the history of what happened to its recommendations. Proposals for modernizing the procedures and equipment in the assessor's office were made as far back as 1931 yet were not carried out until 1941. Criticisms of the Civil Service Commission were first expressed by the 1932-33 jury, but little constructive action was taken until a change of municipal administration came in 1938. Recommendations of the Jails Committees were monotonously repeated from year to year, with but little attention paid to them. In 1939 an excellent technical report on the General Hospital was prepared by a representative of the National Association of Nursing Education. On the basis of this and its own investigations the grand jury recommended to the Board of Supervisors that all county welfare institutions be placed under a non-political board of regents. The Board of Supervisors in a joint meeting with the 1940 jury persuaded it to delay action until a new hospital director could be appointed. Meantime this jury passed out of existence. The 1941 jury began to lose interest in the problem and the 1942 jury actually rejected the report alluded to as inaccurate, at the same time contending that the local General Hospital compared favorably with any in the country.^{21a}

The Means of Control: There were three techniques by which the non-institutional,

¹⁹ *Report Los Angeles County Grand Jury, 1931, Finance.*

²⁰ In the past the district attorney has been accused of close relationships with large business interests and the motion picture industry, which he is alleged to have spared from prosecution in some instances. June Halberg, *The Fitts-Palmer Campaign*, M. A. Thesis, UCLA, 1940, pp. 21, 34-39.

²¹ *Los Angeles Times*, August 5, 1938.

^{21a} *Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury, 1942, Charities and Health.*

²² *Initial Jury, 1934*

non-organizational power of the grand juries was supplemented: (1) indictment and its threat, (2) formal censure and publicity, (3) informal persuasion and suggestion. Indictment or its threat generally proved a poor tool for reaching the goals of the various juries. This was plainly recognized by several, especially the 1934 jury, which found graft, fraud, dishonesty, and inefficiency so pervasive as to defy any significant amelioration by formal punishment of the individual culprits.²²

The value of the publicity used by the grand juries may well be questioned. The reports of juries are narrowly bound by libel laws. In the case of Los Angeles County juries some discretion apparently rested with the judges as to whether reports would be accepted. One judge refused to accept the minority report of dissenting members of a jury. On the whole committee reports tended to be routine, non-controversial, and with few constructive recommendations. There has been little public use of reports. More flagrant publicity ensued from informal "leaks" to the local newspapers. The inclination of the press to pontificate and sensationalize the news probably had the long-run effect of minimizing rather than effectively communicating such revelations to the community. Running through many news accounts and editorials was an attitude of benign amusement at jury doings, punctuated frequently by doubts as to the value of continuing the grand jury as an institution.

Undoubtedly much effective work was accomplished by simple informal persuasion, recommendations and suggestions. This was especially true of the on-the-spot work of some of the commercial auditors as well as of the county auditors once they had the power of the jury behind them. The accounting procedures of the Justices of the Peace were brought up to date in this way as well as those of many county departments. One jury attempted to work by conferences with heads of departments prior to investigating them. The 1940 jury, with an ex-judge as

foreman designedly undertook to adjust and correct irregularities without formal accusations.

The Forms of Control: The data in this study seemed to indicate a fundamental conflict in two forms of social control: passive and active.²³ The identification of the grand jury with the courts tended to make its control activities passive and post-critical, intervening in the governing process only after conflict or crises arose, then moving in the direction of adjusting the controversy and ending its function. As such, its rationale and internal organization were oriented to static conditions disturbed irregularly by odd personal deviants. Yet Los Angeles County juries served in a vast, rapidly growing metropolitan region, in which crises were commonplace and recurrent, where there was "permanent revolution." Manifold pressures from many groups called for continuous adjustments and readjustments. But more important was the fact that even routine acquaintance of jury members with county problems led to the anticipation of trends and the drive to stave off crises before they occurred.²⁴ By virtue of a salient position in the local social system and access to information permitting them to participate on many group levels the juries perceived the demands of changing situations long before any considerably powerful combination of community groups interested themselves. They were forced to identify themselves with norms far from the modal tendencies of the groups which had to be controlled. The strain on the power resources of the juries stood out clearly whenever the impetus to active control appeared.

Paradoxical but obtrusive was the fact that the strain to active control arose most consistently from the pecuniary anxieties of propertied groups in the community, ordi-

²² The terms have been suggested to the writer by Read Bain, derived from older concepts used by L. M. Bristol, *Social Adaptation*, 1915.

²⁴ As early as 1930 the grand jury pointed out the non-actuarial basis of the County Employees Retirement Association Fund. Its exhaustion came in 1934. The fact further demonstrates the weakness of the indictment.

²³ *Initial Report, Los Angeles County Grand Jury, 1934, Report No. 1.*

narly thought of as "conservative," and centered around auditing procedures. The reluctance of the Board of Supervisors to follow recommendations of the juries save in epochs when dynamic adjuncts of power were present in group support drove the juries to seek changes aggrandizing their power. This is shown by the fact that eight out of seventeen juries proposed semi-annual impanelling of the body, with overlapping membership. Five other juries raised proposals to enhance and clarify their powers, the concern about auditing services and investigational facilities being uppermost. The wholesale failure of these led to an expressed sense of futility and frustration on the part of intellectually alert jurymen. In other cases the juries seemed to be content to make adjustments at the verbal level, or hold hearings in which dissident groups aired their grievances, and then assumed their duty was done. It was not to be unexpected that ambivalence and random aggressions should develop from the equivocal situations in which jury members found themselves. The results were caustic accusations, militant crusades, violations of confidences, and internal tensions.

While the more militant investigations of certain juries were not without results their costs in terms of the morale of groups under scrutiny were high. The 1931 jury was aggressive in many ways yet nevertheless perceived the dangers of unrestrained attacks on the local police, a group with perennial low morals and morale. Institutionalizing an inquisitorial and control agency outside the framework of the groups it must control, i.e., in this case, separating the grand jury from the courts and county agencies when it functions in this capacity, may well be incompatible with building the morale and creative ingenuity necessary for governing in a complex technological society.²⁵ Yet the

American tradition of power relations, the institutionalized character of political conflict, and the fear-oriented nature of our social organization made this development inevitable in the face of pressure to expand the inquisitorial functions of grand juries.²⁶

Contrapuntal trends could be seen in efforts at closer integration of the juries into the county system. Those juries which prevented their functions from being defined in terms of power struggle achieved many worthwhile objectives. Yet often investigations permitted no other course of action than reorganization at the level of power and status. The technique of creating new jobs and titles for ousted functionaries and groups, used by the Federal government, or "kicking them upstairs" as used in industry and business cannot be easily adapted to local government. Hence juries strove for instruments of power to enforce their recommendations even when experience pointed to the superior feasibility of working through informal means.²⁷ When deviation reaches a point where power relations must be changed it is unrealistic to assume that any groups will liquidate themselves out of rational considerations. If active control is to be achieved by grand juries the legal basis of their power probably has to be invocable even though it increasingly recedes into the background in the actual process of control.

Public Administration and the Public Interest, 1936, p. 58. In Soviet Russia the local variety of "purge" trials of factory managers and others by committees of workers and citizens in mass meetings eventually was questioned in terms of morale costs. Edwin M. Lemert, *Technological Change and Social Control in Soviet Russia*, Ph.D. Dissertation, Ohio State University, 1939, Ch. 5.

²⁶ Grand juries became very active all over the country around 1933-34. See issues of the *Panel*, publication of the New York Grand Jurors Association.

²⁷ One writer suggested that grand jury recommendations go to the legislature with priority for consideration. Unless accepted they should go on the initiative ballot. M. R. Kirkwood, "Note on California's Grand Jury," *Panel*, March-April, 1933.

²⁵ Congressional investigations have demonstrated this. The investigation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in 1922 damaged the morale of employees for months perhaps years afterwards. E. P. Herring,

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CHANGING FOOD HABITS OF THE JAPANESE IN HAWAII

JITSUICHI MASUOKA

Fisk University

TO THE savage as to the civilized man, there is nothing more important than *what* he eats and *how* he eats. In his effort best to satisfy his hunger, man everywhere and at all times finds himself caught in a complex of cultural and institutional imperatives. Furthermore, he is everywhere habituated to his customary food and the usual mode of satisfying his hunger. It is this subjective force of habits, together with the inertia of social institutions, that gives to food habits a measure of permanence. However, under certain conditions of human group life, man's food habits do change. The introduction of a new mode of eating and production of food as well as an impact of commercialized foodstuffs and new modes of cultural life, all function to modify man's pre-established food habits. In every instance the change is wrought by such external and impersonal forces as trade, rise in income, and the availability of different kinds of food, and by such subjective and personal forces as change in food tastes and in conceptions of social status. By far the most important factor to be reckoned with is the disorganization of the traditional institutions as an incident to culture contacts and change; it unfastens, so to speak, the traditional and customary control over *what* man eats and *how* he eats.

A study of changing food habits is more than a problem in the field of nutrition, health, household economy and economics; it is a sociological problem as well. Indeed, so complex is this phenomenon of changing food habits and so manifold are the problems associated with it, that its study by any highly abstract discipline reveals very little of its true significance. The crux of the problem from a broader point of view seems to be to ascertain what has been the prevailing food complex of a given society and how this complex was maintained, to describe the processes through which changes

have taken place in the traditional food complex, and to isolate the factors giving rise to the new food complex and food habits. So conceived, the problem falls within the wider problem of culture change and the assimilation of people into the culture complex of a new society. Within the framework of the dynamics of culture change, the present paper attempts to describe and analyze the changing food habits of the Japanese people in Hawaii. In other words, the process of culture contact and change is the primary interest of the study.¹

II

For this study, the data were drawn chiefly from one hundred household records assembled by the present writer. The families studied were chosen from three plantation camps, located within a radius of half a mile from the sugar mill of the Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company on the island of Maui. These families studied constituted nearly forty-one per cent of the total of 247 Japanese families then residing in the three

¹Anthropologists have made extensive studies of diet among the primitive peoples. For a theoretical statement on this problem see, B. Malinowski, *The Dynamics of Culture Change*, chap. X and his, *A Scientific Theory of Culture and Other Essays*, chaps. VIII and XII; A. I. Richards, *Hunger and Work in a Savage Tribe*, and her, *Labour and Diet in Northern Rhodesia*. For other discussions having some bearing upon food habits, see, C. Wissler, *Introduction to Social Anthropology*, pp. 79-80; Margaret Mead, "The Problem of Changing Food Habits," in *Bulletin of the National Research Council*, No. 108, pp. 20-31; H. Stiebeling, "Food Habits, Old and New," *Yearbook of Agriculture*, 1939 pp. 124-126; and, C. W. Townsend, "Food Prejudices," *Scientific Monthly*, XXVII (1928), 65-68.

With reference to the changing Japanese family in Hawaii see, Jitsuichi Masuoka, "The Life Cycle of an Immigrant Institution in Hawaii," *Social Forces*, 23(1944), 60-64; "The Structure of the Japanese Family in Hawaii," *American Journal of Sociology*, 46(1940), 168-178; and "Japanese Patriarch in Hawaii," *Social Forces*, 17(1938), 240-248.

camps. However, when eighty-five families which failed to meet the requirements of a "good sample" were excluded from the total of 247 families, the proportion of the families examined equalled sixty-two per cent of the total of 162 families.²

There were 672 persons in these 100 families; of this total 342 or nearly fifty-one per cent were males, and 330 or forty-nine per cent were females. The mean age for the whole group was 24.2 years. Of the total of 672 persons, nearly half or 49.4 per cent were less than 15 years old; 37.2 per cent between 15 and 44 years old; and, 13.4 per cent, 45 years old and over. In these 100 families, there were ninety-six male heads and ninety-nine housewives: the mean age for the former was 47.1 years and for the latter, 39.4 years. Seventy-eight out of ninety-six male heads and seventy-six out of ninety-nine housewives were the *Issei*, and approximately three-fourths of them came from Chugoku and Kyushu regions: the remainders were the *Nisei* born in Hawaii. For the *Issei* men, the average number of their residence in Hawaii was thirty-one years, and for *Issei* housewives, twenty-one years. Moreover, 152 of the *Issei* family heads and wives have been on the same plantation since their coming to Hawaii.

In regard to the occupational status, 230 or nearly sixty-eight per cent of the total, 15 years old and over, were gainfully employed either within or without the planta-

²The primary objective of this study was not to obtain a cross section of foods most commonly used by the Japanese in Hawaii, but to measure objectively the forces that bring about changes in food habits of a people. It was, therefore, important to confine my field work to a single community. The sugar plantation was selected for this study. I knew this community well, for I have lived on it for almost eight years, prior to my coming to the mainland United States.

In this study, the criteria of a good sample were as follows: (1) that a family be a sociological unit; (2) that at least a major portion of the household income be obtained from the plantation in a form of wage or salary; and, (3) that the head of the family should be the *Issei* born in Japan proper or the *Nisei* whose parents were born in Japan proper. The last requirement was to minimize as much as possible the regional differences in food habits of the people in Japan.

tion. When the persons 20 years old and over alone were considered, nearly ninety per cent of them were working.

The median annual family cash income for 100 families was \$1,246.86, and the mean income for the group was \$1,365.00. In terms of the sources of income, the median cash contribution of family heads was \$737.33; that of other working members, \$356.40; and, the median cash income from "other sources" comprised the remainder of \$153.13.³

Every cooperating family was canvassed daily for a period of thirty successive days. During the first five months (beginning with October, 1933 and ending with February, 1934), seventy families were called upon, and the remainder of thirty families, during the months of April, May, and June, 1934. A wide-spread practice among the people on the plantation to buy things on credit facilitated the keeping track of their daily purchases. A record of what these families bought was transcribed from the bills of sale to the writer's daily sheets. Other items of food, ordinarily paid for in cash, were reported orally to him. These items included vegetables, fruits, candies, loaves of bread, fish, meats, and other small groceries. Every item of food recorded was specified as to name, kind, amount and cost.

At the end of the thirty days, the total cost of foods bought was summarized by specific items of food. The writer called on every housewife after the summation was completed and made necessary readjustments as to the amount and cost of foods per month. The materials obtained in this manner were classified according to the major food groups. They were: (1) cereals, (2) fats, (3) fruits, (4) vegetables, (5) legumes and their products, (6) milk, (7)

³ The term "income" as here used includes all cash receipts which went into the family purse. The income in kind, especially plantation perquisites, were excluded. In the case of the working children, the sum contributed by them for the specific purpose of meeting the family expenditures alone was included. If one wishes to compare, one should add \$200, which was the best estimate of the plantation perquisites as of the time of this study, to a family's annual income.

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protein foods, (8) sugar, and (9) miscellaneous.

III

In the course of thirty odd years of the adjustments to conditions of plantation life, the food habits of the Japanese have more or less changed. This fact may be noted from such casual comments as: "Our mouths are so sweet (meaning they like delicate foods) that we are not satisfied with coarse foods any more"; and, "We are so accustomed to *zeitakuna Seikatsu* (extravagant ways of living) that we are laboring daily just to eat well." Upon his return from Japan, a salesman made the following comments to one of the housewives:

When I went back to Japan, I found that I could not eat the food. Everything was so tasteless that I could not enjoy it. The farmers ate very ordinary foods.

Really in Hawaii we eat as good food as a *Kencho* (a governor of a prefecture). The people in my village never dream of eating raw fishes everyday, or beef and pork three to four times a week.

A cursory survey of the kinds of food eaten by immigrants around forty years ago, gives us a picture of their simplicity. Mr. Nakayama, who came to the plantation in 1900, recalled his daily menu in a boarding house. It was as follows: breakfast—steamed rice, *miso-shiru*, and thinly sliced dried *daikon* seasoned with *shoyu* sauce; lunch—cold rice, kidney beans with salt, and stew made of potatoes, *daikon* and *aburage*; and dinner—steamed rice, pickled *daikon*, beef stew and dried fish. Raw fish was had only once in a long while. His family, consisting of seven members, spent on the average \$58.50 or 36.4 per cent of the monthly income. Of the total expenditure, nearly \$30.00 or fifty-one per cent was spent on various non-Japanese foods. They constituted such items as white flour, macaroni, bread, pastry, oatmeal, soda crackers, beef, pork, poultry, butter, Crisco, mayonnaise, canned pork and beans, canned fruits, canned vegetable soups, sweet pickles, poi, canned milk and fresh milk, jelly and jam, baking powder, yeast, chocolate, cocoa and coffee.

Changes in the items of foods as exhibited by this single case, have been experienced to a greater or lesser degree by all other families on the plantation. From the distribution of food expenditure of 100 families studied by specific food groups, this fact may be seen broadly. The total cash spent on cereal products alone constituted \$140.28 or 30.6 per cent, and the average money spent on meat and protein-high foods amounted to \$136.56 or 29.7 per cent of the total annual food expenditure. For fruits and vegetables these families spent on the average \$72.12 a year or 15.7 per cent of the total; for sugar and "other sweets," the cash expended was \$31.44 or 6.8 per cent; for milk and cream, the sum was \$27.72 or 6.0 per cent; and, for the remaining items of food—fatty foods, food adjuncts, and "other groceries"—these 100 families spent on the average \$51.36 a year or 11.2 per cent of the total food expenditure. Thus, the percentage of cash spent on the first two major food groups came to as much as 60.3 per cent of the total food expenditure; while, slightly over one-half of this 60.3 per cent was spent for the purchasing of rice and fish alone.

When the allocation of food money by major food items of the Japanese families on an Hawaiian plantation was compared with that of the white rural families in Ohio (as of 1928), interesting facts stood out. The average annual food expenditure for the former was \$459.48 and that of the latter, \$494.72, or a difference of \$35.24. But in terms of per adult male equivalent unit,⁴ the difference was \$17.78 a year. For the Japanese families, the average money spent on meat and other protein-high foods, in terms of per adult male unit per year was \$30.24 and for the Ohio families, it was \$38.68. Per adult consumption of fruits and vegetables per year for the former was \$16.08 and for the later, it was \$22.82. For sugar and "other sweets" the difference in the per adult consumption between these two groups was small—only \$1.16 in favor of the Ohio families. A greater discrepancy appeared in re-

⁴ See *The Quarterly Bulletin of the League of Nations*, Vol. I, No. 2, 1932, pp. 477-483.

gard to the amount of money spent on milk and cream: in terms of per adult consumption the white families spent \$11.20 more than the Japanese. Only on the items of cereal products did the Japanese group spend more money than the Ohio families: there was an excess of \$17.32 per adult per year. This comparison is shown in Table I.

and salaried men in Japan the amount of money spent on rice tended to increase as the income became higher; whereas among the Japanese families in Hawaii, the amount of money spent on rice actually decreased with the increasing income. In Japan as a family rises in its standard of living, it tends to discard the use of wheat or sweet potatoes

TABLE I. FOOD EXPENDITURE, BY FOOD GROUPS, FOR 100 JAPANESE FAMILIES ON A HAWAIIAN PLANTATION, COMPARED WITH RURAL WHITE FAMILIES OF OHIO

Food Group	Japanese Families on a Hawaiian Plantation			Rural White Families in Ohio		
	Average per year in terms of dollar			Average per year in terms of dollar		
	Per family	Per a.m.u.*	Per cent	Per family	Per a.m.u.	Per cent
Total cost	\$459.48	102.00	100.0	\$494.72	119.78	100.0
Meat and other protein-high foods	136.56	30.24	29.7	159.76	38.68	32.2
Fruits and vegetables	72.12	16.08	15.7	94.25	22.82	19.1
Cereal products	140.28	31.20	30.6	57.34	13.88	11.6
Sugar and other sweets	31.44	6.96	6.8	33.53	8.12	6.8
Fatty foods	19.32	4.32	4.2	44.23	10.71	8.9
Other groceries	9.24	2.04	2.0	4.78	1.16	1.0
Food adjuncts	22.80	5.04	5.0	29.28	7.09	5.9
Milk and cream	27.72	6.12	6.0	71.55	17.32	14.5

* a.m.u. means adult male equivalent unit.

The foregoing comparison revealed that among the Japanese families on the plantation the rice-fish complex has remained relatively intact. In spite of this fact, the importance of rice as the basic diet of the people has been slowly losing ground. When, for example, the amount of money spent on rice by these families on the plantations was compared with the families of more or less similar social status—employees, industrial workers and land laborers in Japan—the Hawaiian group of Japanese families spent in proportion less money on rice than the groups of Japanese families in Japan. The per cent of income expended on rice by Japanese in Japan was as high as forty to sixty per cent of the total food expenditure.⁵ Moreover, among families of laborers

⁵ Figure taken from the *Statistical Bureau of the Government, Japan* 1930. In speaking of the importance of rice as a diet, Tobata writes: "To the Japanese people, rice is a necessity, and no matter how much money they may have to spend on it,

and eats *hakumai* or polished rice. But in Hawaii, as a family rises in social status it eats less rice and spends more money on American foods, such as white flour, macaroni, crackers, breads, and other cereals as well as on vegetables, meats, milk and coffee.

This change came about rather slowly in Hawaii. In the beginning of the Japanese adjustment to new conditions of life, there was a definite tendency for them to discard sweet potatoes, wheat and millet from their diet. If they ate sweet potatoes, they did not mix them with rice; and if they ate wheat; they ate Quaker oatmeal. Upon their coming to Hawaii, the Japanese people

they would not give up the consumption of it. Of course the consumption of wheat, wheat-flour, fruits, vegetables, etc., is annually increasing, but this does not imply that rice has been replaced by these foodstuffs. In this sense, rice is an indispensable commodity in the daily life of the people . . ."—"Control of the Rice," Japanese Council, *Institute of Pacific Relations*, 1933, p. 3.

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took to *hakumai* or polished rice, for the eating of polished rice meant the rise in their social status. (In Japan only the very well-to-do eats *hakumai*.) Moreover as polished rice became a basic food for all, it lost its traditional status value among the Japanese in Hawaii.

Fish was had in Japan only rarely among the small farmers and the eating of beef and pork was discouraged by the teaching of Buddhism and also by the fact that they could not afford to buy them. Beef, pork and fish were eaten as "vitalizing food for the sick" or served chiefly on special occasions. In Hawaii they were plentiful and in some instances beef was provided for laborers by planters in the early days. In Hawaii the descendants of poor farmers of Japan became wage earners and cash was valuable, thus with a few exceptions—usually the old women who still abhorred the idea of eating beef or pork—the eating of beef, pork, poultry and fish became one of the daily or weekly dishes.

With the gradual displacement of the *Issei* by the *Nisei*, rice lost completely its status value as the latter regard the eating of rice as adherence to old world customs and habits. For the *Nisei* status is gotten more readily by eating American foods.

From all indications it appears that the eating of rice among the Japanese in Hawaii is being slowly replaced by other substitutes. Bread, crackers, cookies, cornflakes, oat-meals, white flour, and macaroni were the common commodities of their daily and weekly purchases. Corresponding with this displacement, has been the increasing importance in the consumption of beef, pork, poultry, and other American items of food. This relation—the decrease in the consumption of rice associated with the increase in the consumption of all other items—may be seen clearly when two groups: namely, Group I consisting of twenty-five families whose consumption of rice per adult male is greater than twenty per cent of the total food expenditure, and Group II consisting of the same number of families but differing in the fact that the consumption of rice per adult male unit was less than eleven per

cent of the total food cost, are compared with respect to the apportioning of money by specific food groups.⁶ This is shown in Table II.

For Group I, the per adult consumption per year of rice alone was \$22.20 or twenty-three per cent of the total food expenditure; for Group II, it was \$12.96 or 10.7 per cent of the total. The consumption per adult per year of bread and other American cereals was for Group I, \$9.84 or 10.2 per cent of the total, and for Group II, it was \$12.84 or 10.7 per cent, showing a slight difference. Annual adult per capita consumption of meat and other protein-high food for Group I was \$22.80 or 23.6 per cent, and for Group II it was \$34.08 or 28.2 per cent of the total food expenditure. This considerable difference was due to the fact that the Group II spent \$11.28 per adult more than the Group I. Likewise, the annual adult per capita consumption of the remaining items of food was greater for Group II than for Group I.

However, it is interesting to note that an increase in the money spent on food is definitely associated with increase in the volume of varied foods, and yet this has not always been in the direction of greater nutritive efficiency nor the greatest domestic economy. For example, shift from rice to bread, crackers and other American types of cereal products increases the cost of food greatly without substantially improving in nutritive values.⁷

The most conspicuous change has taken place in the breakfast menu. Bread, butter, coffee, chocolate, fruit juice, etc., have taken

⁶It would have been better if we could have made a paired comparison as to income and size of family and compared the *Nisei* family and the *Issei* family. The number of available cases has been too limited to make such a paired comparison and still have sufficient number of paired samples to make a valid generalization.

⁷An examination of the food-intake of 18 families selected at random and classified in terms of lower and higher income groups showed that although the cost of food consumption for the higher income group has risen by \$238.87 a year, the deficiencies in calories, calcium, and phosphorous remained about the same for two groups.

the place of the traditional *miso-shiru* and rice. Of the 100 families studied, there was not a single family which did not buy bread, butter, jelly or jam, coffee or chocolate, and milk. The frequency of their use varied from one family to another depending chiefly upon the type of work men were doing. Men who did hard work out in the field still ate rice in addition to their bread and butter. But those who worked in the sugar mill and in

families studied never ate roast beef, roast pork or roast chicken. (For one thing they do not know how to cook them.) The fish was likewise cooked in the traditional manner: fried, boiled, or eaten as *sashimi*. When fried, fish was eaten with *shoyu* sauce; when eaten as *sashimi*, it was sliced thinly and eaten raw with *shoyu* and mustard sauce; and, when boiled, fish was seasoned with *shoyu*, sugar, and other condi-

TABLE II. AVERAGE MONTHLY FOOD COST PER ADULT MALE UNIT, BY SPECIFIC FOOD GROUPS, FOR GROUP I AND GROUP II

Specific Food Group	Average Food Cost per year per Adult*			
	Group I		Group II	
	Money value	Per cent	Money value	Per cent
Total cost	\$96.60	100.0	\$120.72	100.0
Cereal products				
Rice.....	22.20	23.0	12.96	10.7
Bread and others.....	9.84	10.2	12.84	10.7
Meat and other protein-high foods				
Fish, raw and dried.....	13.20	13.7	16.80	13.9
Beef, pork and others.....	9.60	9.9	17.28	14.3
Fruits and vegetables				
Fruits.....	4.56	4.7	7.32	6.0
Vegetables.....	9.36	9.7	15.60	12.9
Milk and cream.....	4.56	4.7	8.16	6.8
All others.....	23.28	24.1	29.76	24.7

* Adult male unit for Group I was 5.7 and for Group II, 3.3; and the average size for the former was 8.2 persons and the latter, 4.8 persons. The average annual income for Group I was \$1,264.80 and for Group II it was \$1,418.76.

other more preferred jobs on the plantation said that rice in the morning was too stuffy and that they liked coffee and toast better. All the children liked toast, butter, jelly and cocoa in the morning. Other meals remained relatively unchanged in their form.

Moreover, the manner of preparation of foods remained much the same, since the cooking was done chiefly by the *Issei* women. Beef, pork, and poultry were still prepared in the traditional way as *sukiyaki* or stews. *Sukiyaki* was had in Japan only rarely among the farmers but in Hawaii it has become one of the weekly dishes. The

ments. At the time of this study the stews had more beef or pork in them and were more often thickened with flour than was formerly the case.

Fresh vegetables, especially leaf and head cabbages and *daikon*, were made into *tsukemono* (pickled) and seasoned with *shoyu* sauce and *ajinomoto*. When cooked, fresh vegetables were boiled and seasoned with *shoyu* and a small quantity of beef, pork, fish, or *ajinomoto*.

Salads of all kinds have been appearing on the dinner menu more often than formerly, but desserts are never served. Cakes,

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cookies, candies and canned fruits were eaten between meals by all members of the family, or served with tea when guests arrived.

IV

There are many factors and motives underlying changes in the food habits among Japanese in Hawaii. Such factors as availability of food, convenience and ease of preparation, change in the types of work on the plantation, influences of advertisement and pressures of salesmen; the relinquishing of traditional institutional control over certain kinds of food; new items of food introduced by the *Nisei* from public schools; all have affected the changes in the food habits of the Japanese people. Change in the mental orientation of the *Issei*, from one of desiring to return home to one of staying in Hawaii, resulted in the relaxing of their control over the spending of money on foods. They have generally come to the point of enjoying good food rather than saving money.⁸

More fundamental than all the factors enumerated above is the changing attitudes of the *Nisei* toward food and Japanese folkways, mores and institutions in general. The education of the *Nisei* in the public schools resulting in their wider participation in the American ways of life has done more to bring about change in the traditional food habits. The schools constantly introduce these children into a social world which is unlike that of the old world of their parents, and the schools unflinchingly urge them to change their mode of life, including their food habits. What the *Nisei* introduce into their own homes may at first be rejected by their parents; but these new items of American culture may be, and often are, gradually accepted. In each case the attitudes of the *Issei* are further modified.

I don't say much to my children. I know that

⁸On the average these 100 families were spending at the time of the study \$495 annually or 36.3 per cent of their income on food.

they know and understand about America better than I. My children tell their mother what foods are good for our health. They say that we must eat more vegetables and fruits and less rice. They learn this in school—American school, I mean. I believe that their teachers are better informed along this line so I do not interfere nor ignore their suggestions. I believe firmly that the children should obey their teachers.

Judging from what my children tell me, nearly all the ideas that the *Issei* have are greatly different from what they learn in the school.

It is impossible for us, *Issei*, to become Americanized and act and talk like the *haoles* (white people in Hawaii are called *haoles*). We have "old heads" or set minds. Even though we know that we should be Americanized, since we intend to stay here for good, we cannot. But, we know that our children could because they know how to talk *haole* language and associate with them more freely. When we pass away, we are sure that they become Americanized.⁹

A *Nisei* girl, a graduate of an American high school working at the time of this study in a *haole* family as a domestic, said: "I don't like Japanese foods, I don't know why. I don't like rice and fish. Fish smells bad and the rice takes too long to cook. Anyway it is so troublesome to prepare Japanese dishes." It is perhaps such a simple change in the attitude of this kind that in the long run brings about change in the traditional food habits of the people.

Thus, in the face of the declining influence of the Japanese social institutions—family, religious, business, and educational—the change in the attitudes of the *Nisei* towards things Japanese can be safely regarded as the important cause in bringing about the change in the traditional food habits. It may be concluded, in view of the trend as noted in the foregoing discussion, that with the passing of the *Issei*, much of the Japanese foods will pass out of the picture.

⁹*Personal Document* (translated into English by the writer).

THE PURITAN POLICEMAN

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I

WHATEVER their practical punitive utility in the rest of colonial America, the pillory and the stocks had perhaps special symbolic significance in seventeenth century Massachusetts where obstinate necks were bent to wooden-collared conformity and wayward feet fettered not merely for straying into sin but for departing from theocratically well marked paths of righteous orthodoxy. The codes and crimes and pains and penalties of the early period in the Bay colony signally and more thoroughly than in most cultures measured not merely an attempt to punish what may be commonly accepted as wrong-doing. They represented beyond that an attempt to force intellectual and religious homogeneity on the whole community. Banishment, the branding iron, the whipping post, the bilbows, and even the hangman's noose were used as means of enforcing conformity and uniformity in politics and religious faith as well as in suppressing what later ages would accept as clearly defined crimes.

The civil and religious strait-jacket that the Massachusetts theocrats applied to dissenters in their midst was more rigorous than any that had been forced on the Puritans in England. Conformities enjoined by the Established Church in the mother country had left the individual free except in relation to the church and its doctrines. Few chinks were left in the Massachusetts structure, however, for individualism to express itself. Nearly all the ordinary social usages, not to mention patterns of thought and faith, could be regulated according to the will of God as expressed in Holy Writ. The theory was that Jehovah was the primary law-giver, the Bible a statute book, the ministers and magistrates stewards of divine will.

In a Bible commonwealth the importance of the magistrates was enhanced. They

brooked no floutings of the voice of God speaking through them. Governor Winthrop regarded criticisms of the magistrates as "the workings of Satan to ruin the colonies and churches of Christ in New England."¹ For this concept of magistracy there was, to be sure, ample warrant in the teachings of John Calvin, pontiff of Puritanism, that "the vengeance of the magistrate is to be considered not as the vengeance of a man, but of God, which, according to the testimony of Paul, he exercises by the ministry of men for our good."² In Calvin's view, the chief object of the state was to protect true religion and, he added, "he would justly be deemed insane who disapproved of such a government."³

In a state modeled on this plan, with magistrates and clergy supreme, they succeeded in sternly superimposing the law of Moses on the law of the land, largely ignoring the king and parliament on the one hand, and denying power to the people on the other.

The classic justification of the theocrats was that the aims of the state would fail, and the state itself would fall if worldly and ungodly men, judged by the Puritan standard, should gain any measure of control. For as the Reverend John Cotton wrote:

In case worldly men should prove the major part, as soon they might do, they would as readily set over us magistrates like themselves, such as might hate us according to the curse, Leviticus XXVI 17, and turn the edge of all authority and laws against the church and the members thereof, the maintenance of whose peace is the chief end which God aimed at in the institution of the magistracy.⁴

¹ John Winthrop, *The History of New England from 1630 to 1649* (Boston, 1853), Vol. II, p. 282.

² John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (Philadelphia, 1921), Vol. II, p. 652.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 656.

⁴ Letter to Lord Say and Seal (1636) in Appendix of Thomas Hutchinson's *History of the Colony of Massachusetts Bay* (London, 1760), Vol. I, pp. 495-496.

It was not enough to limit the franchise to the ecclesiastically elect. Every channel of intellectual approach must be kept uncontaminated. So there was a rigid regimentation of thought, and utterance, and action—severe laws for the extirpation of heresies and cruel and tragic persecutions enacted in executing them.

The self-defense argument as a justification for severe action against religious non-conformists produces a split among historians dealing with the period as to whether the argument was sound. On the one hand we have the conclusion of such authorities as John Fiske and Edward Channing that the system could be well enough justified in the light of the times, and they are echoed by such church historians as Leonard Bacon and Williston Walker.⁵ On the other side, three Adamses—Brooks, Charles Francis, Jr., and James Truslow—insist the self-preservation argument is untenable. It is the stock argument, says C. F. Adams, that has been used to justify religious intolerance in all ages and countries. The "exponents of Massachusetts polity and thought whether religious or historical . . . have wriggled and squirmed in the presence of the record," a record which he insists was not sincerely made even by the Puritan forefathers. There was no form of "sophistry and casuistry" to which they did not have recourse, he says, and the vein of apology and excuse running through their defenses of their course convinces him that the Massachusetts fathers knew better and refused in the new world to see the light they had seen clearly enough in England.⁶

II

At the outset the character of Massachusetts offenses and penalties was left pretty much to magisterial discretion. When the magistrates could not think of a legal precept to fit a case, they turned to the Scrip-

tures for a rule. If they could not find one there, they acted according to their own notions of justice or upon advice of the ministers. Persons were sometimes severely punished for offenses not defined in any law. They were even penalized for petty offenses committed years previously in old England.

Leaving the definition of penalties to caprice of the magistrates meant more power for them, and it was a privilege but reluctantly relinquished. Governor Winthrop recites that when Captain Hathorn, one of the deputies, urged giving certainty and fixity to a judicial code and charged the standpatters with "seeking to have the government arbitrary . . . the matter grew to some heat," and certain magistrates took occasion to "prepare some arguments against the course intended to bringing all punishments to a certainty. The scope of these reasons was to make good this proposition, namely, all punishments, except such as are made certain in the law of God, or are not subject to variation by merit or circumstances, ought to be left arbitrary to the wisdom of the judges."⁷

But the Hathorn faction won. The Reverend John Cotton drew up an "Abstract of Laws" patterned "after the laws of judgment delivered from God to Moses."⁸ Cotton's "Abstract" was rejected, however, in favor of another code framed by the Reverend Nathaniel Ward, which was duly adopted in 1641 and misnamed the "Body of Liberties." Cotton, though his own handiwork had been rejected, was well enough pleased with the code adopted. He wrote of it, to friends in Holland:

The order of the churches and the commonwealth is now so settled in New England by common consent, that it brings to mind the new heaven and the new earth wherein dwells righteousness.⁹

The first and basic criminal code of the

⁵ Leonard Bacon, *A History of American Christianity* (New York, 1900); Williston Walker, *History of the Congregational Churches in the United States* (New York, 1894); John Fiske, *Beginnings of New England* (Boston, 1896).

⁶ Charles Francis Adams, Jr., *Massachusetts, Its Historians and Its History* (Boston, 1893), p. 12.

⁷ Winthrop, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 67.

⁸ Full text in *Hutchinson Papers*, Prince George Society Publications (Albany, 1865), Vol. I, pp. 183-205.

⁹ Quoted in George Bancroft, *History of the United States* (Boston, 1867), Vol. I, p. 368.

colony was enlarged and modified from time to time, with three major subsequent codifications in 1648, 1660 and 1672. The crimes subject to the death penalty as set forth in the Body of Liberties included idolatry, witchcraft, blasphemy, murder, adultery (with qualifications), stealing, perjury in capital cases, and treason. In the code there is an apposite citation of Scriptural justification set forth in connection with each crime, with references either to the Decalogue or to verses in Leviticus or other Old Testament books of the Bible.¹⁰

Governor Thomas Hutchinson, writing his history of Massachusetts in the next century, notes that this was a more sanguinary catalogue of crimes punishable by death than that prescribed in English law. Probably Roman Catholics, he suggests, could have been hanged as idolators; adding that even Indians were to be fined if the "powower (who was their priest) should powow or perform outward worship to their false gods"—a £5 fine for the "powower" and 20 shillings apiece for members of the savage congregations.¹¹

The Body of Liberties incorporated a guarantee of jury trial for all but petty offenses and forbade torture, except to help disclose confederates. The only species of torture at all commonly employed for detection of crime seems to have been imported to America from Matthew Hopkins's arsenal of witch-hunting technique. Just as a watched pot never boils, so it was supposed that a watched witch could never be visited by the devil. Besides being watched, the suspected witch must be kept awake, according to this formula. So old beldams, accused of witchcraft, when they showed signs of sleepiness would be walked up and down the floor. Finally under stress of hours of fatigue and exhaustion they would break down and confess to all sorts of enormities of communion with the evil powers of the "invisible world." Yet this technique hardly goes beyond the highly similar third degree practices of twentieth century police departments.

There is one instance, however, of a victim

being tortured to death. During the Salem witchcraft delusion of 1692, poor old Giles Corey, a man past eighty, refused to put himself on trial before a jury. By this refusal he legally could save his estate from forfeiture to the colony. Resort to the English practice (*peine forte et dure*) of trying to force him to submit to jury trial by pressing him under heavy weights resulted fatally. The old man's tongue was forced out of his mouth by the pressure of the weights, and with singular brutality "the sheriff with his cane forced it in again."¹²

This may suggest speculation as to what may have been the effect of inhumane punishments on officials and on the popular mind generally. The public nature of executions and other punishments was supposed to serve as a deterrent to other evil-doers. But it may be doubted whether the net result was not a brutalizing effect on beholders, rendering them more callous to human sufferings. With complacency they could see Quaker women tied to the cart's-tail half clothed in mid-winter and whipped until their bare backs were raw and bleeding.

A sample of Quaker punishment is recorded in the case of William Brend. After being subjected to a severe lashing, he was put "into irons, neck and heels, and locked so close together that there was no more room between each than for the horse-lock which fastened them on," in which condition he was left without food for sixteen hours. Next day he was whipped again, 117 lashes, with a tarred rope until, according to a contemporary chronicler, "his flesh was beaten black and as into a jelly."¹³ Almost equally harsh was the treatment of Baptists, for whom banishment was prescribed by law of 1644 unless they should refrain from their opposition to infant baptism.¹⁴

There were signs of a sharp popular reaction before the Quaker persecutions, car-

¹² Robert Calef, *More Wonders of the Invisible World* (Salem, 1796), p. 226.

¹³ George Bishop, *New England Judged by the Spirit of the Lord*, pp. 56-57.

¹⁴ Rough phases of Baptist persecution, especially in the whippings and prison experiences of William Witter and Obadiah Holmes, are recounted in John Clark's *Ill Newes from New England*, pp. 29, 50-51 *et passim*.

¹⁰ *The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts* (Boston, 1929), pp. 5 and 6.

¹¹ Hutchinson, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 440.

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ried to the point of hanging three men and a woman, came to an end. The magistrates boarded up the jail windows to prevent sympathizers from talking through the bars to the condemned victims, and as a precaution against interference with the last of the executions, the victims had to be guarded by a hundred soldiers when on their way to the gallows.¹⁵ Though no more Quakers were hanged after 1661, for some years thereafter members of the sect were fined, imprisoned and whipped at the cart's tail from town to town. Some thirty persons thus suffered under sentences of the Massachusetts general court, and an uncertain number were punished in the county courts.¹⁶

The four Quaker executions are the only instances of application of the death penalty for heresy in Massachusetts. The Quakers' offense consisted in coming back to the colony after banishment. Floggings, ear-croppings and tongue-borings with a hot iron were prescribed as means short of death to keep them out, but they persisted in returning. When all minor punishments had been exhausted and Governor Endicott insisted on invoking the extreme penalty, he issued an official defense in a letter to Charles II, saying the Quakers had in effect committed suicide by wilfully rushing upon the point of the law. "The Quakers died," wrote Endicott, "not because of their crimes, how capitoll soever, but upon their superadded presumptuous & incorrigible contempt of authority; breaking in upon us, notwithstanding their sentences of banishment made knowne to them. Had they not binn restrained, so far as appeared, there was too much cause to feare that wee ourselves must quickly have died or worse . . ."¹⁷

This is an extreme statement of the matter. The Quakers, it is true, made nuisances of themselves, but they never threatened serious violence. It was doubtless annoying to the ministers to have the Quakers rush into meetings clad in sackcloth and ashes—or sometimes with no clothing at all—to smash

bottles in front of the pulpit in token of how the Lord would smash the preachers' emptiness. New England clergymen did not enjoy being called "bells of no metal but the tone of a kettle," "moon calves," "banes of reason and beasts of the earth," "gormandizing priests," and "hireling Baals and seeds of the serpent."¹⁸ But the Quakers never were really a threat to the life of individuals or of the state. Although Cotton Mather in his *Magnalia* says they were the "worst of heretics," "devil-driven" and "dangerous villains," he deplors the executions and thinks a suitable penalty would have been to shave their heads.¹⁹

As to public executions in colonial Massachusetts, they were never accompanied by the barbarous English practice of drawing and quartering. Yet there is an instance in 1681 of a Negro woman servant sentenced to be burned to death for having wilfully set fire to a house. A Negro man at about the same time accidentally set fire to another house in the colony; he was pilfering in a pantry at night, and his torch ignited the place. He was sentenced to die by hanging and to have his dead body thrown into the fire in which the Negro woman was burned to death.²⁰ These penalties seem to be the only instances of extreme barbarity in public executions.

The mutilations ordered by the courts were brutalizing enough, however. Breaking on the wheel was a punishment which was seldom if ever inflicted in New England; though it was practiced in Virginia and New York. Boring tongues with a hot iron was a penalty prescribed in the statutes and carried out on rare occasions, as in 1684 in the case of a village atheist who had maintained there was "no God, no devil and no hell."²¹ He was fined £7 besides having his tongue bored. A more common form of muti-

¹⁸ Thomas Wentworth Higginson, "The Puritan Minister," in *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XII (Boston, 1863), p. 275; Palfrey, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 8.

¹⁹ Cotton Mather, *Magnalia Christi Americana* (Hartford, 1853), Vol. II, p. 525.

²⁰ *Records of the Court of Assistants of Massachusetts, 1630-1692* (Boston, 1901-1904), Vol. I, p. 198.

²¹ *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 253-254.

¹⁵ *Records of the Governor and Company of Massachusetts Bay*, Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 383.

¹⁶ John G. Palfrey, *Compendious History of New England* (Boston, 1884), Vol. II, p. 16.

¹⁷ *Massachusetts Records*, Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 451.

lation was to nail an offender's ears to the pillory, and after he had stood thus for an hour or so, to turn him loose by cutting off his ears instead of pulling the nails out. Among numerous offenders who suffered thus was one thrifty fellow, for example, who was caught in 1679 clipping silver coins. The magistrates thought it would be appropriate to penalize his coin-clipping by clipping his ears.²²

Branding was common for thievery, usually on the forehead but sometimes less conspicuously on the hand. A less permanent badge of ignominy was a capital letter sewn to the garment of the convict and worn for a period of weeks or months. It was common for the letter B to be worn in this fashion by blasphemers, or the letter D by chronic drunkards, or as in Hawthorne's *Scarlet Letter* an A for adultery. But the most common penalty for immorality (except in cases of rape, bestiality, etc., punishable by death) was to make the accused stand on the gallows for an hour or so on lecture day with the hangman's rope around their necks, and then to whip them. The Puritan courts recognized no double standard of morality, and the records show repeated instances of both men and women thus standing out their sentences together on the gallows and then being whipped an equal number of lashes; though if there was any disparity the man would be the recipient of the severer whipping. These and all similar expiations in the pillory or on the gallows were carried out on lecture day, Thursday, when the largest crowd would be gathered to receive edification and instruction from the spectacles.

The church supplemented efforts of the courts in penalizing moral derelictions, especially in cases of premarital indiscretions of married couples, with infants born within thirty-two weeks after marriage refused baptism. Fear of infant damnation of the unbaptized could be used to extort public confessions accompanied by humiliating penitential exercises on the part of parents in presence of the congregation. These confessions and punishments, recorded as part of

²² *Ibid.*, p. 146.

the permanent records of the churches, remained a source of embarrassment not only to the parents concerned but to their innocent offspring.²³ Yet "nothing but sharp punishments," believes Zechariah Chafee, "could have wrenched the Massachusetts settlers out of their lax habits of common-law marriages and *de facto* unions consummated in the comfortable belief that a ceremony would follow some day or other."²⁴ The tendency of colonial criminologists to bear down heavily on effects while neglecting causes is illustrated in general tolerance of the practice of bundling, which probably caused a considerable volume of the morals cases of which the courts took stern cognizance.

Though blasphemy was listed in the early codes as a capital crime, whippings and tongue-borings were the most painful punishments ever actually resorted to on this count. Profane tongues also occasionally were punished by being squeezed in a cleft stick while, unable to wag the offending member, culprits stood with neck and arms pinioned in the pillory for as long as an hour at a time. Badges of ignominy also were used to stigmatize blasphemers. In 1656 besides being whipped at Taunton and Plymouth on market day, a woman was sentenced forever after to wear a large red letter B, standing for blasphemy, on her right arm in plain view. The penalties for common or garden varieties of profanity were considerably more moderate with fines on the same scale as for lying. Thus at a February session of the Essex county court in 1648 there is the record of "Quinton Pray and his wife fined 50s. for five oaths" while fines of 20s. "for two lies" were meted out to other defendants at the same session.²⁵

²³ Charles Francis Adams, Jr., sympathetically deplores this consequence; see Adams, "Some Phases of Sexual Morality and Church Discipline in Colonial New England," in *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, Series 2, Vol. VI (1891), pp. 493-494.

²⁴ Chafee, *Introduction to Records of the Suffolk County Court, 1671-1680, Massachusetts Colonial Society Collections*, Vol. 29 (Boston 1933), p. lxxxvi.

²⁵ *Records and Files of the Quarterly Court of Essex County, Mass.* (Salem, 1911), Vol. II, pp. 156-157.

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²⁸ *Ibid.*,

²⁹ *Ibid.*,

A statute of 1645 had made it a misdemeanor, punishable by fine or sentence to the stocks, for anyone "to wittingly and willingly make or publish any lye, which may be pernicious to the public weal, or tending to the damage or injury of any particular person, or with intent to deceive and abuse the people with false newes and reports."²⁶ By "pernicious" lying, slander ordinarily was implied, but there are records of defendants having been presented for lying in an ox trade,²⁷ and of one man who lied to magistrates when his neighbors accused him of doing his bookkeeping on the Sabbath.²⁸

Despite traditional belief that common scolds were ordinarily punished in the ducking stool, this engine of submersion was far less frequently employed than supposed. The Puritans did, however, have their ways of dealing with termagant-tongued disturbers of the peace, by means of fines, or the stocks, or badges of ignominy. Thus in January, 1678:

Bridget, wife of Thomas Oliver, presented for calling her husband many opprobrious names; as old rogue and old devil, on Lord's day, was ordered to stand with her husband, back to back, on a lecture day in the public market place, both gagged for about an hour with a paper fastened to both of their foreheads, upon which their offense should be fairly written.²⁹

Thomas got out of his part of this penalty by his daughter's paying a 20-shilling fine. To cite another example, in 1681 Elizabeth Perkins had used "scandalous words of a high nature" and in order that "due testimony might be borne against such a virulent, reproachful and wicked-tongued woman," she was sentenced to "be severely whipped on the naked body, and to stand or sit the next lecture day in such open place in the public meeting house at Ipswich during the whole time of the exercise with a paper pinned to her head on which is written in capital letters, 'FOR REPROACHING

MINISTERS, PARENTS AND RELATIONS.' " The whipping part of this sentence later was suspended.³⁰

Criticism of the magistrates was made an offense punishable by whipping, fine, imprisonment, disfranchisement or banishment. The speech and conduct of the clergy were rendered similarly sacrosanct and above criticism by an enactment of 1646, which declared contemptuous conduct toward the preacher's word punishable for the first offense by a rebuke from the magistrate, and for the second offense by a 5-shilling fine or being made to stand "on a block four feet high" wearing a placard reading, "An Open and Obstinate Contemner of God's Holy Ordinances."³¹ Thus one Nathaniel Hadlock was sentenced to be whipped for saying he could get nothing profitable out of his pastor's preaching.³²

Fines of 50 shillings apiece were levied in Salem in 1643 against "Wm. Hewes and John his son for deriding such as Sing in the Congregation, tearing them fools; also William Hewes for saying Mr. Whiting preaches confusedly."³³ Ursula Cole of Charlestown was given the choice of a £5-fine or whipping for saying "she had as lief hear a cat mew" as Pastors Shepard and Symmes preach.³⁴ "Uncivil carriage toward the minister's wife" got Samuel Weed into trouble when, in the course of a convivial gathering at the Amesbury parsonage in 1678 he kissed his pastor's consort and the parson had his too demonstrative parishioner haled into court and fined.³⁵ Convictions and punishments for criticism of the magistrates and the governor either in court or out of it were numerous.

The magistrates also exercised broad powers of literary censorship.³⁶ Israel Stough-

²⁶ *Ibid.*, Vol. VIII, p. 89.

²⁷ *Colonial Laws of Massachusetts*, p. 143.

²⁸ Thomas Wentworth Higginson, "The Puritan Minister," *Atlantic Monthly*, Vol. XII (1863), p. 267.

²⁹ Alonzo Lewis and James R. Newhall, *History of Lynn, Mass.* (Boston, 1885), p. 212.

³⁰ Richard Frothingham, *History of Charlestown, Mass.* (Boston, 1845), p. 208.

³¹ *Essex Records*, Vol. VI, p. 428.

³² V. F. Calverton, sharply critical of the motives and results of censorship, holds that the "entire

²⁶ *Colonial Laws of Massachusetts*, p. 171.

²⁷ *Essex County Court Records*, Vol. VIII, p. 146.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 342.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. VI, p. 387.

ton, a prominent leader in the colony, having written a book that displeased the magistrates, was coerced into having it burned.³⁷ In 1642 a tract by Richard Saltonstall, criticizing the standing council, was brought into court, and he escaped penalty only because of his prominence.³⁸ When John Elliott of Roxbury wrote "The Christian Commonwealth" in 1661, it being deemed "justly offensive," all owners were called upon by the general court to "cancel or deface" the book or surrender their copies to the nearest magistrate.³⁹ There were severe penalties specified against owning or importing Quaker literature into the colony, possession of a Quaker book exposing its owner to a fine of from £5 to £10. All Quaker books surrendered to the authorities to escape such fines were burned by the public hangman.

III

Behind the magistrates, nudging and suggesting measures and penalties, were usually the clergy. "No matters of great weight or moment," writes Governor Hutchinson, "whether of a religious or civil nature, were determined without their advice and a formal reference to them."⁴⁰ To them, for example, were referred such questions as "whether a judge be bound to pronounce such sentence as a positive law prescribes in case it be apparently above or below the merit of the offense."⁴¹ The elders replied that the penalty should vary with the gravity of the crime. "So any sin committed with a high hand, as the gathering of sticks on the

Sabbath day, may be punished with death when a lesser punishment may serve for gathering sticks privily or in some need." While this presumably was merely an hypothetical example, there are, as a matter of fact, instances in the Essex records of persons being fined for chopping necessary wood to keep fires going on the Sabbath.

Laws against all secular pursuits on the Lord's day were presently supplemented by an enactment making unexcused non-attendance at church punishable by a fine of 5 shillings.⁴² And this law was enforced. Constables were enjoined to "directly make search throughout the limits of their townes" for absentees, and "all Taverners, Victuallers and Ordinaries" were required to "clear their houses of all persons able to go to meeting."

Having escaped a fine by going to church, a person exposed himself to risk of another if he chanced to doze off in the course of a three-hour sermon. Petty fines and admonitions on this score occur fairly frequently in the court records. Roger Scott of Salem seems to have been a particularly incorrigible church sleeper. In 1643 he was haled into court "for common sleeping at the public exercises upon the Lord's day, and for striking him that waked him." A few months later, not having reformed, he was again presented in court and ordered to be whipped.⁴³

Outside the meeting-house Sabbath supervision of individual conduct was rigorous. The first whipping ever ordered by the Massachusetts general court was of one John Baker who went duck shooting on Sunday.⁴⁴ Captain Kimble of Boston in 1656 was put into the stocks for two hours for his "lewd and unseemly" behavior, in the language of the court, for "publiquely" kissing his wife on the doorstep of his house upon his return, on the Sabbath day, from a three-years' sea voyage.⁴⁵ Some ministers had scruples against baptizing babies born on the Sabbath, even at the risk of infant damnation for those

defense of religion in America during the seventeenth century . . . was at basis political." Because secular and unorthodox religious literature might sow "seeds of opposition to the state . . . literature was watched over as carefully by the theocracy as was moral conduct. So complete was the dictatorship that almost all who dissented from it were immediately muffled. There was no place for their protests to be voiced in print. As a result, literature had but one path to pursue—the religious. To pursue another path was impossible." V. F. Calverton, *The Liberation of American Literature* (New York, 1932), p. 71.

³⁷ *Massachusetts Records*, Vol. I, p. 42.

³⁸ Winthrop, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 77.

³⁹ *Massachusetts Records*, Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 5.

⁴⁰ Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 424.

⁴¹ Winthrop, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 253.

⁴² *Massachusetts Colonial Laws*, p. 28.

⁴³ Lewis and Newhall, *op. cit.*, p. 212.

⁴⁴ *Massachusetts Records*, Vol. I, p. 82.

⁴⁵ Alice Morse Earle, *The Sabbath in Puritan New England* (New York, 1902), p. 247.

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p. 33.

left unbaptized. Among such was the Reverend Mr. Loring of Sudbury, but when twins were born to his wife on Sunday he promptly changed his views on the subject.⁴⁶ The ministers' attitude on this point was based apparently on a superstition to the effect that a child born on the Sabbath also was conceived on the Sabbath.⁴⁷

The fact that the Puritan Sabbath began at sundown on Saturday made regulations of conduct additionally severe. "Whereas by too sad experience," ran an enactment of 1658, "it is observed, the sunn being sett, both every Saturday and on the Lord's day, young people and others take liberty to walke & sporte themselves in the streets or fields . . . itt is ordered . . . that if any person or persons henceforth, either on the Saturday night or Lord's day night after the sunne is sette, shall be found sporting in the streets or fields of any towne in this jurisdiction, drinking or being in any house of entertainment . . . every such person . . . shall pay five shillings for every such transgression or suffer corporal punishment."⁴⁸

Gaming and idleness were proscribed also on other days than the Sabbath. Massachusetts colonial enactments against idleness considerably outran modern vagrancy laws. Gambling was at all times prohibited; also some seemingly innocent games, most notably shuffleboard, because in playing it "much precious time is spent unfruitfully and much waste of wine and beer occasioned."⁴⁹

In the matter of liquor control, rather rigorous regulation of taverns was attempted. It was "ordered that noe pson shall sell either wine or stronge water without leave from the Govnr or Deputy Govnr . . . & that noe man shall sell, or (being in a course of tradeing) give any stronge water to any Indean."⁵⁰ This original piece of liquor li-

censing legislation was followed from time to time by others of the same tenor. Enforcement seems to have been fairly vigorous and vigilant, judging by numerous arraignment of seventeenth century "bootleggers," punished by fines, or other penalties, and having their liquors confiscated. The offense of drunkenness was common, court records show. Penalties for drinking ran in graduated scale: tipping more than a half hour, 2s. 6d. fine; excessive drinking, 3s. fine; drunkenness, 10s. fine. Penalties were multiplied for repeated offenses; doubled fines for second offenders, tripled fines for third offenders, and whipping, the stocks, jail terms, or condemnation to wear a large D on the clothing for continued offenses.⁵¹ While there was no actual prohibition of the use of liquors, laws against use of tobacco were in effect from 1632 until 1647. And as late as 1676 in Salem six men were fined for "taking tobacco near the meeting house,"⁵² while in Salem in 1670 Benjamin Felton was fined 5 shillings for smoking tobacco in the street.⁵³

The concern of Puritan law-makers lest people spend their time idly also extended to the matter of trying to prevent them from spending their money foolishly. The rather minute prohibitions of certain articles of finery for certain classes were also employed as a means of indicating class distinctions. The laboring man and his wife were not supposed to wear fine clothes or ornaments that would befit the gentleman and his lady. There are instances of women haled into court for wearing silks proving their right to wear them by indicating that their husbands had an income of more than £200 a year.⁵⁴ Some of the interferences with personal attire were designed, however, to discourage vanity. For example, in 1682 several girls were presented in the Salem court

⁴⁶ Charles Hudson, *History of the Town of Marlborough* (Boston, 1862), p. 51.

⁴⁷ Charles Francis Adams, Jr., "Some Phases of Sexual Morality and Church Discipline in Colonial New England," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, Series 2, Vol. VI (1891), p. 494.

⁴⁸ *Massachusetts Records*, Vol. IV, pt. 1, p. 347.

⁴⁹ *Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts*, p. 24.

⁵⁰ *Records of the Court of Assistants*, Vol. II, p. 33.

⁵¹ *Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts*, p. 30.

⁵² *Essex County Records*, Vol. VI, p. 142.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, Vol. IV, p. 266.

⁵⁴ While these economic discriminations, as well as penalties for the religiously unorthodox, indicate a lack of the principle of equality before the law, social rank and position was no sure guarantee of exemption from ordinary penalties. Thus the violent-minded Endicott, several times governor of the colony, on more than one occasion was fined for assault and battery. James Ford, in Albert Bushnell

for "folding and frizzling their hair."⁵⁵ A number of men also were haled into court to be told by the magistrates they needed a haircut, long hair for men being considered an objectionable vanity. Lacking a shortcut route to a haircut in the case of John Gatchell, Marblehead magistrates in 1637 accomplished their purpose by indirection. Gatchell was fined 10 shillings for building on town land, but if he should "cut of ye long har off his head into a sevil frame," half the fine would be suspended and his building right granted.⁵⁶

IV

Results of the application of Massachusetts ideas of crime and punishment in this period may be properly considered in two categories: (1) the consequences of attempted regulation of thought and faith to secure religious and political unity; and (2) the results of the system of dealing with offenses outside the first classification, that would more properly today be regarded as crimes.

The impracticability of a theocratic state on American soil, with men of the English tradition as its citizens, was sufficiently well demonstrated by the Massachusetts experiment. The theocracy had in it the germs of its own destruction. Although it was overthrown by external interference, "if it had continued a few years longer it must have fallen of itself," thinks Leonard Bacon, a church historian sympathetic, on the whole, to the Puritan aims, but who feels that a rigorously exclusive selection of likeminded men, while possibly necessary for the first planting of a wilderness colony, could not be justified afterward.⁵⁷

The forces of unstable equilibrium—political, ecclesiastical, theological, and moral—that were evident by the end of the seventeenth century attested not merely an influx of secular-mindedness with the growth of commercialism and a budding

scientific attitude, first most notably expressed by Robert Calef, Boston merchant, in stirring up reaction to the Salem witchcraft delusion; but there were other potent internal centrifugal forces as well. Men who attempt to force dogmatic likemindedness in the matter of religious faith often end by themselves having their disagreements. So it was with the Massachusetts theocrats. They not only failed to compel others to believe as they did but came to disagreement among themselves. Within a few years after the founding of the commonwealth that was to establish Utopian religious unity, eighty-two "pestilential heresies" were discoverable as having sprung up. Each succeeding controversial episode, such as the banishment of Roger Williams and the Antinomian affair that split the colony wide open into rival factions and led to the banishment of Anne Hutchinson, gave impetus to religious diversity instead of soundly encouraging and enforcing desired uniformity. The builders of the Puritan Babel tower that was to rear itself so staunchly heavenward suffered the affliction of a spiritual conflict of tongues. Finally, reaction to the severity of Quaker persecutions and to the part the clergy had in fomenting the reign of terror, suspicion, and martyrdom of innocent persons in the deplorable witchcraft delusion at Salem, with even clerical harangues at the foot of the gallows to prevent interference, had an inevitable and fatal weakening effect on clerical influence in upholding the rigorous regime.⁵⁸

It is more difficult to assay the results of the system in dealing with crimes against the public peace, safety and morals, offenses of the sort that come within secular criminal statutory cognizance in our own day. Comparisons of seventeenth and twentieth

⁵⁵ "From the year 1692 dates the rise of a healthy skepticism on the subject of demonology, and the decline of the prestige of the clergy who habitually denounced those who dared to doubt its reality. Thenceforth men began to indulge less exclusively in the contemplation of the supernatural, and to turn their attention more and more to the practical affairs of life." Abner C. Goodell, "Trials of Witches in Massachusetts," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, Vol. XX, p. 310.

Hart (ed.) *Commonwealth History of Massachusetts* (New York, 1927-1928) Vol. I, p. 277.

⁵⁶ *Essex County Records*, Vol. VIII, p. 291.

⁵⁷ W. B. Weedon, *Economic and Social History of New England* (Boston, 1891), Vol. I, p. 225.

⁵⁸ Leonard W. Bacon, *A History of American Christianity* (New York, 1900), p. 108.

century results in criminology involve irreconcilable bases of ideas and procedure and the vast difference of thought and attitude at opposite ends of a span of 300 years.

Of course, in the first place, there was then greater respect for the force of authority. Identification of man-made law with God-made law kept the Puritan under a livelier sense of the evil of criminal acts than is prevalent now. Fear of punishment—punishment both in this world and in the next—was assuredly a more conjurable force in Puritan times than today.

Nor did the Puritans have to contend with the humanitarian sentiment prevailing today as a brake on severe treatment of criminals. Early Massachusetts juries do not seem to have been reluctant to convict lest the penalties imposed would be too painfully severe—a later developing reluctance which partly led to breakdown of the drastic capital code both in England and in America in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Even if the seventeenth century Massachusetts jury did refuse to convict on the charges preferred against the defendant, he was likely to be punished in some fashion anyhow, on principle, by order of the magistrates who, rather than juries, were the final dispensers of justice under the theocratic system.

Despite severity of penalties, the record of grave crimes such as murder may seem surprisingly well filled, in proportion to population. In the matter of lesser crimes, however, especially those of sexual immorality, which are of such frequent occurrence in early Massachusetts court records, the number of arraignments and convictions is no fair index of relative wrong-doing. This is true because the vigilance with which such sins were ferreted out and prosecuted has no parallel in our times, when the ordinary individual has ceased to be his brother's keeper or the watchful censor of other persons' conduct.

While such censorious watchfulness had the effect of bringing a larger proportion of sinners to justice in the New England of 300 years ago, there is suggestive evidence of a not too admirable effect on the minds

of folk encouraged to practice espionage upon their neighbors and even upon their relatives. It is hard to conceive in the present day the type of mind that would turn over to the magistrates a relative guilty of indulging in agnostic remarks in the family circle, when in reporting this offense to the authorities the accuser knew his action might mean the culprit would have his tongue bored with a hot iron. The frequency with which defendants and accusing witnesses changed places in cases brought before the colonial courts likewise suggests that unneighborly incrimination led to feuds, legal retaliations, and mean-spirited acts of vengeance reflecting the character of the litigants in an unlovely light.

The fact that records show crimes becoming more numerous as the penalties were slightly relaxed opens two lines of possible argument. First, it might seem from such results that the rigorous system, while in force, had been effective in deterring and minimizing crime. From another point of view it is arguable that the very severity of the penalties in the seventeenth century deepened and widened the reaction of looser conduct which followed.

Concerning the deterioration, Cotton Mather, whose life bridged the two centuries, wrote in dismay:

I saw a fearful degeneracy creeping, I cannot say, but rushing in upon these churches . . . I saw a visible shrink in all orders of men among us, from that greatness and that goodness, which was in the first grain that our God brought from three sifted kingdoms. . . . What should be done for the stop, the turn of this degeneracy?⁵⁹

This reflects more than the mere chronic pessimism and censoriousness of the frequently frustrated Boston divine. "An examination of the court records fixes upon the mind an impression that this second state of the settlement was one marked with more coarseness, ignorance and vice, than the one before or after it," concludes the historian of a neighboring Connecticut community.⁶⁰

⁵⁹ Mather, *Magnalia*, Vol. I, p. 249.

⁶⁰ Frances M. Caulkins, *History of New London*, p. 246.

And Charles Francis Adams, Jr., declares: "I think it not unsafe to assert that during the eighteenth century the inhabitants of New England did not enjoy a high reputation for sexual morality," and he quotes, though with some reservation, Lord Dartmouth's remark to Governor Hutchinson as to "the commonness of illegitimate offspring among the young people of New England as a thing of accepted notoriety."⁶¹

The general conclusion of Professor Thomas J. Wertenbaker seems tenable:

The rigid standards set by the ministers eventually proved harmful to morality itself. In all ages waves of asceticism have been followed by periods of moral relaxation, and New England proved no exception to the rule . . . As the licentiousness of the Restoration period was a reaction against the rigid code of Cromwell's

⁶¹ C. F. Adams, "Some Phases of Sexual Morality and Church Discipline in Colonial New England," *Massachusetts Historical Society Proceedings*, Series 2, Vol. VI (1891), pp. 496-497.

time, so the stern censorship of Endicott and Norton was, in part at least, responsible for the general loosening of moral standards in New England during the last three decades of the seventeenth century.⁶²

History assuredly has this pendular motion of action and reaction but also, we like to believe, an ascending spiral tendency in the matter of social progress. Three centuries up on the spiral climb, it is perhaps too easy to look back and misread motives and misjudge measures of folk living under vastly different circumstances of distant time and environment. As from glass houses we view dubious success in the business of crime prevention in our own generation, we may feel less inclined to plump the seventeenth century Puritan policeman into the pillory along with his victims and hurl too many brickbats and dead cats in his direction.

⁶² Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, *The First Americans, 1607-1690* (New York, 1927), pp. 194-195.

THE BIO-SOCIAL BASIS OF THOUGHT IN THE THIRD REICH

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THE DEFEAT and the economic and territorial reduction of Hitler's Germany are only too likely to lessen inquiry into the world conception which accompanied, rationalized, and encouraged the growth and activities of the Third Reich. This would be most unfortunate, because the conception has still so much vitality and because its expressions are receiving such widespread acceptance throughout the world today. The record of Nazi economic, political, and military moves is being carefully examined and will, obviously, continue to draw the attention of students and writers. Nazi ideology and moral philosophy, on the other hand, are too often dismissed as "racism" or "ridiculous self-glorification," though racism was only a part of the outlook, and the unity and logic of the world view

that spurred the Nazis on has been largely disregarded.

The reasons for this are fairly obvious. Most of Hitler's premises were borrowed from the fields of biology and anthropology. But it has been principally historians, political scientists, and newsmen who have thus far felt impelled to write of this period. Understandably, they have dealt with the kind of evidence most familiar to them and with the particulars they can best describe.

Moreover, Hitler lacked the training to organize his ideas neatly and to express them gracefully. Therefore, many have assumed that his utterances are too disjointed to harbor a system of thought, or have dismissed them as the meaningless words of a crude opportunist.

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¹ *Mein* p. 279.

² *Ibid.*

bitious and consistent social theorists in all history. From definite, widely-accepted premises he charted plans for a social system of specific characteristics. The horror of the finished product was due to the thoroughness and persistence with which he pursued his logic rather than to the novelty of his guiding principles. Too many of those who have fancied themselves his enemy accepted his premises and have protested only at the inevitable conclusions. It is particularly important, therefore, that his social philosophy, his bio-sociology, be carefully examined and understood today.

The very root of Hitler's world view was the glorification of "nature" and the joyous acceptance of the notion that "good" and "progress" are attained only by ceaseless and merciless struggle among living creatures. In the spirit of crudest social Darwinism, Hitler wrote:

... the battle goes on less because of any native hostility than from hunger and love. In both cases Nature watches with calm, nay with satisfaction. The struggle for daily bread vanquishes the weak, sickly and undecided, while the contest of the males for the female reserves the right or at least the opportunity of propagation for the healthiest individuals. Always struggle is a means to improve the health and stamina of the species, and thus a cause of its evolution.¹

The endless biological struggle which Hitler described for all other forms of life, he gladly welcomed in the human realm as well. He had only scorn and abuse for anyone who would exempt man from this purifying "natural selection":

That the world will some day be the scene of fierce struggles for the existence of mankind, no one can doubt. In the end, the craving for self-preservation alone can be victorious. Beside it, so-called humanity, the expression of mingled stupidity, cowardice and imagined superior knowledge, melts like snow in the March sun. In eternal battle mankind became great; in eternal peace it will go to destruction.²

From the exaltation of struggle in nature and in human history it is a short step to an insistence upon the dissimilarity and natural isolation of the biological types which are to compete in the gigantic contest. In *Mein Kampf* Hitler phrased this conviction thus:

All men without exception stroll about the garden of Nature, imagining they know they are familiar with almost all of it, yet with few exceptions they pass blindly over one of the most striking principles of Nature's rule: the inner dissociation of the various species of all earth's living creatures.³

Not only, said Hitler, do groups of men differ tremendously in physical type, but they differ in behavior, mentality, and morality according to the biological variety they represent. Organic form, according to this view, determines function; body determines mind, capacity, behavior. "Almost all the people of the world," he claimed, "are composed today of different racial primary elements. These original elements are each characterized by different capacities. Only in the primitive functions of life can men be considered as precisely like each other. Beyond these primitive functions they immediately begin to be differentiated in their characters, their dispositions, and their capacities."⁴ Specific attitudes, artistic forms, economic preferences, and character traits he considered to be inseparably wedded to physical type, to "blood," to race, and to vary only as these are modified. "It is beyond question," he declared, "that certain traits of character, certain virtues and certain vices always recur in peoples so long as their inner nature, their blood-conditioned composition, has not essentially altered."⁵

From such reasoning flowed the conviction that the highest and noblest accomplishments, and even civilization itself, were the result of the differentiation and stratification of physical types and depended on the

¹ P. 277.

² *My New Order*. Edited with Commentary by Raoul de Roussy de Sales. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock, 1941.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 95.

¹ *Mein Kampf*. New York: Stackpole Sons, 1939, p. 279.

² *Ibid.*, p. 139.

persistence of particular biological varieties of the human species.

And, of course, it followed that the opposite was also true. The less desirable traits or behavior patterns were likewise linked to physical type. This explains why Hitler had to declare his scapegoat, the Jews, to be a race. Since mental and moral traits were considered simply the mechanical fulfillment of bodily predispositions, the physically heterogeneous Jews of Germany had to be ruled a unified biological type in order to make reasonable their blanket condemnation. After all, a "criminal race" has first of all to be a "race."

It is notable that, while Hitler and his followers vehemently insisted on the wide gulf separating various physical types, they left no room whatever for variability among individuals within a race. The obvious range of variation which biologists and anthropologists have demonstrated time and again was ignored. If a person fell within the framework of a "race" which they had defined or "created," the characteristics they had allotted to this "race" descended upon the individual like a mantle from above. If the character they ascribed to him was not outwardly demonstrable, they assumed that it was internalized. In this scheme there was no individual destiny, only a racial fate. In Hitler's view it was "beside the point whether the individual Jew is 'decent' or not. In himself he carries those characteristics which Nature has given him, and he cannot ever rid himself of those characteristics. And to us he is harmful."⁶

Hitler did not think for a moment that Nature had distributed the more desirable traits with an even hand among her children. In his opinion Nature had poured her biological treasures almost exclusively into one vessel and filled it to overflowing. And that deserving recipient of her favors was the "Aryan," Nordic, German or Teuton, as he variously and conveniently termed him; the tall, longheaded, fair-haired, blue-eyed individual frequently found in northwestern Europe.

In this system the "Aryans" were un-

failingly represented as conquerors and as instigators of cultural advance. Where they were numerically few in an area, achievement in that locality was proof to Hitler that their stimulating touch must once have been felt there. And by a complete revision of history and anthropology, he made the story of the "Aryans" the tale of the rise of the German people.

Obviously, with this elastic conception of the "Aryan" and his works, there was literally no development or institution that could not be attributed to him should occasion require it. For instance, the creation of the Russian State was claimed as a German contribution. In addition, all complex political forms were listed as the ubiquitous outcroppings of irresistible "Aryan" capacities.

The corollary of the arrogant notion that the "Aryans" or Germans had a monopoly of all the physical and moral virtues could only be supreme contempt for those of varying physical type or contrasting cultural background. Hitler's hatred of the Negro, the physical antithesis in coloring of his beloved "Aryans," was simply corrosive. Had there been a sufficient number of Negroes within the Reich to victimize in 1933, there is a good chance that they, and not the Jews, would have felt the Nazi wrath. Mongoloids were considered a little better than Negroes by Hitler; they, he thought, might "sustain" for a while what the "Aryans" had created.

According to Hitler, Nature strains for race differentiation and race purity by building into life forms the instinct for mating only with their kind. It is only when a physical type respects this "inflexible law of Nature," therefore, and keeps itself aloof from others, that it achieves greatness. This, Hitler, believed, has been true to a considerable degree of the "Aryans." To permit race mixture, consequently, is to fly in the face of Nature and to commit the most heinous of offenses. Hitler wrote in *Mein Kampf*, "*Sin against blood and race is the original sin of this world, and the end of a humanity which surrenders to it.*"⁷ It was with

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 24.

⁷ P. 244.

⁸ *Idem.*

grim satisfaction that he gave his version of Nature's vengeance on those who dared to challenge her pruning methods. "But then Nature begins to resist with all her resources; her plainest protest consists in denying further fertility to the bastards, or in restricting the fecundity of later descendants; but in most cases she deprives them of stamina to resist disease or the attack of enemies."⁸

From the premise that race mixture inevitably weakens the "higher" and "better" variety, Hitler deduced that national decline must always follow careless marriage regulations within a state. He was quick to explain the downfall of the German Empire and the loss of World War I on the grounds of race mixture and the reduction of race purity. He was appalled to find in 1924 that, due to the refusal of the old empire and the Republic to adopt a domestic policy based on race, there were "non-Aryans" as well as "Aryans" within the Reich. However, by a lightning physical-anthropological survey he satisfied himself that Germany was, luckily, not yet racially lost. He uncovered a sufficient number of Nordics to restore the Reich to greatness, and he unhesitatingly advocated the unmitigated pampering of them at the expense of everyone else.

The fanatical belief in the superiority of the "pure" race, in the perfection of "Aryans," and in the disastrous effects of race mixture could lead to but one theory of the ideal state. The ideal state, declared Hitler, would be one in which race and nationality coincided and in which the race represented would be "Aryans." Once this "blood purity" and "Aryan" base were achieved, greatness and triumph must follow as a biological necessity, for it stood to reason that no "inferior breed" would be able to resist the physical (and related intellectual and cultural) superiorities of these "Aryans." Throughout *Mein Kampf* Hitler used the word nationality as a synonym for race. He was obsessed with the idea of bringing all people whom he conceived to have a common biological origin into one

political structure. Of Austria he wrote: "German Austria must come back to the great German mother country, and this not because of any economic considerations. No, not even if economically the union were a matter of indifference, nay even if it were harmful, it must still take place. *Like blood belongs in one common realm.*"⁹ And he made perfectly clear what the prime interest of this type of state should be. "In this field the race-Nationalist state must make good what is being left undone in all directions. *It must make race the central point of public life.* It must take care that it is kept pure."¹⁰ Again, in his speech of September 6, 1938, at Nuremberg, Hitler was very frank about the principle on which his statecraft was founded when he explained, "National Socialism . . . is exclusively a 'folkish' political doctrine based upon racial principles."¹¹

For some time writers and commentators have been repeating that the essence of Hitlerism was the subordination of the individual to the state. This is true and helpful only if it is understood that the state in question was racially or biologically conceived and that it was considered secondary to the physical type (race or nationality, in Hitlerian jargon) which it protected and whose interests it sought to further. To Hitler the state was only the protective outer shell within which a favored "race" might grow and prosper.

Here Hitler was perfectly logical in the light of his undeviating biological premises. If it is true that all aspects of culture, including political forms, are but the expression of racial talent, it is less important to worry about the state form as such than it is to protect the physical type which will inevitably create such a social structure again if it should happen to be temporarily destroyed. His philosophy of "breed above state" Hitler explained in these words:

The basic conclusion, then, is that *the state is not an end, but a means. It is indeed indispensable to the formation of a higher human*

⁸ *Idem.*

⁹ P. 19.

¹⁰ P. 391.

¹¹ *My New Order*, p. 499.

civilization, but it is not the cause. The latter consists exclusively in the existence of a race capable of culture. There might be hundreds of model states on earth, but if the Aryan bearer of civilization were to die out no culture would exist that would correspond with the intellectual level of the most advanced peoples of today.¹²

In another place Hitler has written, "We must make a sharp distinction between the State as a vessel and the race as its contents. This vessel has a purpose only so long as it can preserve and protect the contents; otherwise it is worthless."¹³

These and similar passages contain the clue to the matchless cruelties and mass destruction about which the Nazis felt no compunction. The ruin of cities or even of nations did not move Hitler and those whom he schooled. So far as these men were concerned, nothing permanent was lost. In their view these works of men could be restored and infinitely improved if only precious "Aryan" Germans emerged victorious. At one point in *Mein Kampf* Hitler actually envisaged a modern Armageddon, a "corpse-strewn field covered with water and mud." But, he went on to predict, "... if from this chaos of horror but a few men of a definite race capable of civilization had escaped, the earth would once more show signs of human, creative power, when calm was restored, even though it took a thousand years."¹⁴

It was when he pictured the fulfillment of his race-nationalist aims that Hitler grew fairly ecstatic. This was his conception of complete national unity. "But with us in Germany," he said, "where everyone who is a German at all has the same blood, has the same eyes, and speaks the same language, here there can be no class, here there can be only a single people and beyond that nothing else."¹⁵

And he left no doubt of what was to happen in the "race-nationalist state" to those who did not represent the approved physical type. He considered them abominations, mocking and cheating the real "Aryans" to

whom Germany belonged. Whatever the law, whatever their behavior and contributions, citizens of Jewish, Polish, African, or Asiatic background were to him "citizens" in quotation marks only:

Today the right of citizenship is acquired, as above mentioned, primarily by birth within the boundaries of a state. Race or membership in the nation plays no part whatever. A negro who used to live in the German protectorates, and now has a residence in Germany, thus brings a "German citizen" into the world if he has a child. In the same way any Jewish or Polish, African or Asiatic child can be declared a German citizen without more ado. . . . This conjuring trick is accomplished by a State President. What Heaven could not attempt, one of these Theophrastus Paracelsuses does in the turn of a hand. One scratch of the pen, and a Mongolian ragamuffin is suddenly turned into a real "German."¹⁶

It was inevitable that Hitler, in keeping with his glorification of struggle in nature, should repudiate the quality of thought and reflection that most distinguishes man from other animals. As early as 1923 he told his followers: "Further changes are needed in our system of education. We suffer today from an excess of culture. Only knowledge is valued. But wisecracks are the enemies of action. What we need is instinct and will."¹⁷ Thus knowledge was declared largely independent of the exercise of the intellect. Like every other aspect of culture it was conceived to be the expression of biological excellence to be developed indirectly by the propagation and training of superior organisms. The result of this extension of the biological thesis to the mental sphere was the most devastating anti-intellectualism that the world has ever known. Action was substituted for thought, will and instinct for conscience, inquisition for inquiry.

Hitler not only demanded that the history of man be rigorously trimmed to fit his racial mania, but also that the number of facts presented to students be pruned to the point where the efforts of Nordic minds to master them would not consume time which might be spent in exercising Nordic bodies.

¹² *Mein Kampf*, p. 379.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

¹⁴ P. 379.

¹⁵ *My New Order*, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Mein Kampf*, pp. 424-25.

¹⁷ *My New Order*, p. 60.

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¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

"It will be the task of further cultural and world history," he wrote, "to make its explorations from this (the racial) point of view, and not to smother them in description of outward events, as our present historical learning unfortunately too often does."¹⁸

The creation of the race-nationalist state was by no means the end of Hitler's "struggle." As he saw it, the elimination of opposition and variety within the state only paved the way for more colossal engagements to come. "If, in the world of our present parliamentary corruption, it (the state) concentrates more and more upon the deepest meaning of its battle and feels itself to be the pure embodiment of race and person, and arranges itself accordingly, it is bound, with almost mathematical certainty, to be victorious in its battle when the time comes."¹⁹

Thus the way was opened, in the name of the greater needs of the racial state, for the conquest and absorption of neighbors' territories. About this Hitler taught:

*The duty of the foreign policy of a racial state is to safeguard the existence of the race forming that state on this planet by creating a natural, strong and healthy relationship between number and growth of the people on the one hand, and the size and quality of the soil and the land on the other.*²⁰

Accordingly, since Hitler's state was the hand-maiden of his racial policy, it could be legitimately used in any struggle which conceivably involved "racial" interests.

With such a background of thought, an attempt at foreign conquest was inevitable, for the German Reich was only the central nucleus of the "Aryan Germans," the territorial point of concentration of this godlike breed. It was what Hitler called "a Germanic State of the German nation."²¹ But the German nation (also called nationality or race in Nazi parlance) had spread to the corners of the earth. According to Hitler, few cultures of any consequence had been untouched by its presence. Even where Germans seemed few in number they were

worth "rescuing" and restoring to deserved leadership.

Hitler's preoccupation with biological analogies dictated a policy of uncompromising domination of the vanquished. In a speech to the industrialists at Dusseldorf, delivered shortly before he came into power, he called attention to the fact that his plan of supremacy and domination for one branch of the white race was simply a refinement of the general policy and attitude which the white man as a whole had pursued in respect to the colored races:

If Fate allowed the white race to take a different path (from the Chinese), that is only because this white race was convinced that it had the right to organize the rest of the world. It matters not what superficial disguises in individual cases this right may have assumed, in practice it was the exercise of an extraordinarily brutal right to dominate others, and from this political conception was developed the basis for the economic annexation of that world which was not inhabited by the white race.²²

That no gentler methods would be employed in his new phase of race imperialism was promised by Hitler in the name of the biologically-impelled German people. In fact he wrote that the enslavement of others was a venerable and thoroughly laudable practice of clever "Aryans" who long ago saw the possibilities of using the vanquished as draft animals. "So it is no accident that the first civilizations arose where the Aryan, encountering lower races, subjugated them and made them do his will. They were the first technical tools to serve a dawning civilization."²³ Hitler scorned the notion that this was "meaningless tyranny" and took special pains to point out, in best slave-holder fashion, the substantial benefits which flow to inferior peoples from forced association with those who know so well how to organize their labor.

Sometimes, however, mere enslavement or slow starvation did not entirely solve the problem of what to do with a subject people, especially if they were of a "race" which Hitler hated or feared, or if their lands were

¹⁸ *Mein Kampf*, p. 285.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 669.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 623.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 320.

²² *My New Order*, pp. 103-04.

²³ *Mein Kampf*, p. 288.

coveted for immediate settlement by Germans. For such emergencies Hitler had this answer:

If I can send the flower of the German nation into the hell of war without the smallest pity for the spilling of precious German blood, then surely I have the right to remove millions of an inferior race that breeds like vermin! . . . Natural instincts bid all living beings not merely conquer their enemies, but also destroy them. In former days, it was the victor's prerogative to destroy entire tribes, entire peoples.²⁴

There is no need to debate whether what has been described was really the Nazi world view, nor do the points made have to be deduced solely from Hitler's writings and speeches. The Hitlerian view did not long remain as an abstraction only; it became one of the most shattering realities of our time. In fact, there is not an element in this conceptual system that has not been a guide to action of the most extreme kind. For instance, by precipitating the most gigantic conflict of all time, Hitler underscored his conviction that history is but an extension of ceaseless organic struggle. His belief in vast differences between physical types, in the determination of mind and behavior by physical type, in "Aryan" superiority and the inferiority of other "races," in the baneful effects of race mixture, in the necessity for creating a "pure racial state" in which objective knowledge should be outlawed and in which brawn, will, and instinct take its place, was translated into concrete policies and specific deeds. Thus there arose the Nuremberg laws and the merciless persecution of such Nazi racial creation as Poles, Czechs, and Slavs. In order to concentrate or benefit "German Aryans," whole populations were uprooted, enslaved, or exterminated. Inside Germany and German-controlled territory, obscene breeding experiments, a eugenic shambles of sterilization, of execution of those whom the Nazis considered "unfit," and of the selection of "leaders" by physical criteria went forward under the labels of "German science" and "racial hygiene." Every aspect of life that impinged upon the mind or the conscience,

education, law, religion, was reinterpreted in terms of purely biological values and harnessed to the struggle of the "racial state." The implications of the Hitlerian world view unfolded wherever German arms were victorious.

We are now in a position to see what a gross over-simplification it is to think that on the ideological side Hitler was concerned only with questions of race, or that his followers were attracted to him solely by Versailles and by his rabble-rousing qualities. He gained his immense following because he presented to the German people a system in which status, economy, law, education, and every other aspect of culture was to be organized to their advantage at the expense of conquered or expelled peoples. But more important than anything else, he gave them a satisfying excuse and rationalization for aggression which has outlived him and which will menace mankind until it is eradicated from human thought. *He flattered and convinced them that his plan for the society of the future was inevitable and stable because it was founded on natural law.* This notion is nothing that Hitler invented.²⁵ It is, however, the first time it has been used so boldly and ruthlessly to support the political plans and military ventures of a powerful state.

With the symptoms and outward expressions of the Nazi conception—the scapegoating, the enslavement, the looting, the displacement of people, the book-burning, the extermination camps, the breeding centers, and the schools for "leaders"—we are all familiar. It is the ideological germ from which these abominations grew that has largely escaped attention. *It cannot be repeated too often that the resistant kernel of the view is the assumption of the overwhelming importance of the biological in human affairs, the belief that human progress and human destiny depend, not on social control, but on competition and practices considered to be analogous to the "natural law" and*

²⁴ Herman Rauschning. *The Voice of Destruction*. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1940, pp. 137-38.

²⁵ In another paper I have reviewed the streams and quality of thought which went into the Hitler formula. See "Cultural and Organic Conceptions in Contemporary World History," *American Anthropologist*, Vol. 46, No. 4, 1944, pp. 448-460.

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"natural selection" operative in regard to plants and lower animals.²⁶ This is a misconception that it will be lethal to perpetuate. There is not room on one small planet for the atomic bomb and groups of mankind who fancy they are playing the role of Darwin's barnacles.

All man's endeavors to control his environment, to control the means by which he has sought to control his environment, and to control himself belong to the cultural realm, to those social and ethical systems which he has built up apart from and without regard to his biology. Hitler tried to apply the yardstick of organic thinking to social or cultural problems and it proved to be too short by millions of lives and untold suffering. Yet Hitler has been vanquished rather than repudiated. Most of those who opposed him reacted against the application of his conception to them. They have still to disavow his conception.

Even within our own nation (to say nothing of other lands or the troubled international scene) elements of the organic or biosociological view which Hitler championed are prevalent and casually accepted. To cite only a few familiar examples, our immigration laws, our naturalization laws, the alien land laws of many states, the evacuation of all those of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast and the agitation against American citizens of Japanese ancestry, the Bilbo proposal to remove American Negroes to Africa, are all based on the same premise as Hitler's conception of the race-nationalist state, namely, that the strongest nation is one with a homogeneous physical type of certain characteristics. Segregation, laws against intermarriage, the separation of the blood plasma of those of different races, are some of the practices and penalties which reflect the Nazi-like belief in a physical, mental, and moral gulf between peoples.

It would be instructive and chastening to our complacency to analyze a number of these American episodes in terms of history, motivation and Third Reich parallels. In-

stead, because of the limitations of space, we shall have to allow one of the most recent, ominous and unfortunate eruptions of organic thinking in this country, the evacuation of persons of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast and their forcible detention for an extended period in virtual concentration camps, to serve as a type example.²⁷

Most Americans have dulled their fears and quieted their consciences concerning this event by assuring themselves that these 112,000 evacuees, two-thirds of them American citizens by virtue of birth on our soil, were suspiciously and dangerously concentrated on the West Coast at the time of the outbreak of the war. Yet in 1940 all those of Japanese ancestry constituted .011 of the total population of the West Coast states. In Hawaii, on the other hand, the 160,000 persons of Japanese ancestry lived in an area approximately one-thirtieth as large as the three West Coast states and constituted over one-third of the population. Hawaii was the point of Japan's initial, successful attack and was immediately placed under martial law. The West Coast mainland never became a theater of war in this intimate sense and martial law was never declared there. Certainly numbers, distribution and proximity to the fighting zone will never explain why evacuation occurred on the mainland and not in Hawaii.

Other Americans, in good faith, have condoned this mass banishment of people against whom no formal charges were lodged and no wrong-doing was proved from homes, farms and businesses because they honestly believe that it was *the* precautionary measure dictated by the necessity of the moment. Yet long before evacuation was ordered the Department of Justice had named 117 zones from which Japanese aliens were banned and many more in which their movements were restricted. Japanese aliens had to register, to

²⁷ A full account of evacuation and its implications, and a bibliography on the subject is found in the brief of the Japanese American Citizens League filed in the Korematsu case which was heard by the Supreme Court of the United States in the October Term, 1944. The brief, in reprinted form, can be obtained from the national office of the Japanese American Citizens League in Salt Lake City.

²⁶ The fallacies involved in this belief I sum up in an article entitled "Fact and Fallacy Concerning the Evolution of Man," which will be published in the near future.

list their property, to surrender contraband, to obey a curfew and travel limit order and were forbidden to fish in West Coast waters. All those who had contributed to Japanese war causes or who had fallen under suspicion during a five year investigation carried on by the Federal Bureau of Investigation had already been taken into custody. The Department of Justice had reported that there was no evidence of fifth column activity or sabotage on the part of the remaining Japanese or Americans of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast and had steadfastly opposed evacuation. Clearly, it was not because of acute danger or the lack of intelligent or effective precautions that this entire segment of the population was displaced.

Another rationalization which is often heard is that the persons of Japanese ancestry on the west Coast were a group whose loyalties and characteristics were unknown. Wherever ignorance concerning them prevailed it was willful and deliberate ignorance. Actually the national and international furor over the immigration restrictions imposed on the Japanese by the United States had focused political and scholarly attention upon them for many years, and they were, even before the war, the most investigated and best described minority group of this land. Such scholars as E. K. Strong, Reginald Bell, Harry A. Millis, E. S. Mears, Robert E. Park, Marvin L. Darsie, W. C. Smith, M. R. Stearns, and R. D. McKenzie, among others, had written numerous excellent books, monographs and papers describing their social and economic life and their progress toward assimilation. It may be that ignorance of the law is no legitimate defense, but the penalization of a group because others have failed to avail themselves of information concerning it, is something new in American jurisprudence.

Perhaps the most frequent defense of group evacuation encountered is that the move was made under pressure of time and that the organizing of hearing boards and the release of the loyal and innocent were therefore impossible. A review of dates is all that is necessary to dispell this misapprehension. The first of the 108 civilian exclusion orders which barred all those of Japanese ancestry from the West Coast zone was not

issued until March 24, 1942. Almost four months had elapsed between the beginning of the war and the time when this first order became effective. The last exclusion order allowed the persons to whom it applied to remain until August 11, 1942. Therefore persons of Japanese ancestry were at large in the "threatened" zone for a full eight months after the outbreak of hostilities. Nor were the evacuees removed from the three West Coast states immediately. For many months they were kept in barbed wire compounds within the "prohibited" area pending transfer to inland centers. This eastward movement was not completed until November, 1942. Thus for nearly a year after the beginning of the war we were still transporting these helpless people about the country and building odious "centers" for them at the cost of millions of dollars. Yet at the beginning of the war with Germany, threatened England had created hearing boards and, without any evidences of haste, had examined her 74,000 enemy aliens in six months. What England felt obliged to do for her enemy aliens, the United States, with more time at her disposal, refused to do for her citizens of Japanese descent.

It is obvious, therefore, that the reasons ordinarily assigned to account for evacuation raise more questions than they answer. The unwelcome truth is that the forces that made for evacuation were remarkably like those which started Germany off on an endless spiral of persecution and paranoia. It is to be noted that the elements which brought pressure for evacuation on political figures and roused public apprehension, such organizations as the Sons and Daughters of the Golden West and the California Joint Committee on Immigration, had long advocated their brand of "race-nationalism" for America. And when public hysteria was sufficiently stimulated by calculated and artificial means, the demand for protective custody, a familiar Nazi device, was heard.

What evacuation indicated, above all, was the degree to which Americans readily responded to organic rather than cultural interpretations of man's behavior at a time of crisis. The older Japanese of the West Coast, though they were prohibited from naturaliz-

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ing by our nationality code, were long-term residents of this country whose businesses and whose families were here and whose children, to whom they were devoted, had been born on American soil. The young people of Japanese ancestry were citizens and were products of American schools and playing fields. A democracy confident of the strength and molding influence of its institutions would have assumed that it had earned the loyalty and good will of the overwhelming majority of these people.

The determining factor, however, was not an unbiased inquiry into cultural affiliations, but a consideration of organic elements alone. In his final report and his explanation of evacuation to the Secretary of War, the commanding general who arranged the exodus under the authority of an executive order of the President stated:

In the war in which we are now engaged racial affinities are not severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States citizenship, have become "Americanized," the racial strains are undiluted.

In an appearance before a House Naval Affairs Committee this same man again explained the reasons for the evacuation. The arguments are familiar to us from our review of thought in the Third Reich, that certain "races" are by definition inimical to a state, that character and loyalty are related to physical type and are immutable, and that their good behavior is no excuse for treating those of the wrong "race" fairly:

A Jap's a Jap. It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not. I don't want any of them. We got them out. They were a dangerous element. The West Coast is too vital and too vulnerable to take any chances. They are a dangerous element, *whether loyal or not* (emphasis supplied). It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen. Theoretically, he is still a Japanese and you can't change him. You can't change him by giving him a piece of paper.

While this army officer has been roundly condemned for voicing these "race warfare" sentiments, there is evidence that a large number of Americans, many of them prominent in political life, share his underlying

premises. Before the war, largely on the basis of racist or organic convictions, it was freely prophesied that if hostilities broke out between the United States and Japan, those of Japanese ancestry in Hawaii and on the West Coast mainland would commit acts of sabotage and endeavor in every way to aid the enemy. When the Japanese struck at Pearl Harbor, these alarmists were so sure of their advance diagnosis of sabotage and treason that charges soon circulated on the mainland to the effect that the Pearl Harbor attack had been made possible by the activities of Japanese and Japanese-Americans in Hawaii. The rumor was immediately challenged on the floor of Congress by Delegate King of Hawaii but such spokesmen as Representative Rankin of Mississippi confidently told his colleagues:

These Japs who had been there for generations were making signs, if you please, guiding the Japanese planes to the objects of their iniquity in order that they might destroy our naval vessels, murder our soldiers and sailors, and blow to pieces the helpless women and children of Hawaii.

The degree to which policy makers fell victim to these unfounded rumors can be judged from the statements of the members of the Select Committee Investigating National Defense Migration of the House of Representatives (Tolan Committee) who went to the West Coast in February and early March of 1942 to hold hearings on "Problems of Evacuation of Enemy Aliens and Others from Prohibited Military Zones." This Committee, incidentally, recommended that persons of Japanese ancestry, alone of all elements of the population, be singled out for evacuation. When an American of Japanese ancestry tried to speak for his group, Chairman Tolan silenced him with the following Pearl Harbor gossip:

What about your people at Pearl Harbor? Did they remain loyal Americans? . . . There are authentic pictures during the attack showing hundreds of Japanese old automobiles cluttered on the one street of Honolulu so the Army could not get to the ships. Are you conversant with those things?

Representatives Sparkman and Arnold were ready with similar phantasies with

which to cow witnesses who counselled against panic, undemocratic action and haste.

The Pearl Harbor sabotage rumors have long since been officially pronounced false and fantastic. But it is worth while reminding ourselves that largely because of them, by a peculiar displacement, persons of Japanese ancestry on the West Coast were punished for misdeeds which their counterparts in Hawaii did not commit. And more important, they were penalized because substantial elements of our population, in spite of occasional concessions to democratic terminology, really believe that behavior is determined by physical traits rather than by social training. Apparently Hitler was not the only one who "knew" in advance, on the basis of physical measurements, which elements of the popu-

lation would be "good citizens" and loyal to him, and which would not. The bio-sociological conception which led the German Reich to destruction attacked us from without and also from within. So far we have probably been most successful in repelling the external attack. And we are far from safe, for it is a point of view that can still marshal powerful adherents, both within and outside of this country.

One thing is certain. The development of weapons of war during recent years dictates that the fight against the Hitlerian conception must not be waged on the battlefield again. It will be won in the classroom, the library, the lecture hall, in all places and at all levels where men of good will take stock of their common humanity, or it cannot be won at all.

CULTURAL LAG: WHAT IS IT?

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I

THE INCLUSION of the term cultural lag in the *Dictionary of Sociology*¹ provides a timely opportunity for reappraising its validity. The admission of a term which possesses such a complex methodological genesis without a listing of the variant definitions that result gives to the concept a definitiveness it does not possess, and also ill serves one of the purposes which the editors of the *Dictionary* sought to achieve: to provide definitions which would give any person an adequate idea of the nature of the experience referred to; although that person may never have had, or ever will have, the occasion to be confronted with it.²

It is actually impossible to learn from Ogburn's published works on cultural lag³

whether the phrase is methodologically to be viewed as a partial exposition of the nature of social disorganization derived from an inductive study of the processes of cultural change,⁴ whether it is to be regarded as an expression of individual or class value judgments,⁵ or a more generalized attitude of social progress or reform.⁶ And, what is even more to the point, the empirical data supplied by him as illustrations of the concept do not always withstand critical examination. Some of the examples are not instances of cultural lag at all, however well they may

the Social Implications of New Inventions (U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1937), Section I. "National Policy and Technology," pp. 3-14; with Meyer F. Nimkoff, *Sociology* (New York, 1940), p. 884-803; *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. III, p. 330-334, "Change, Social."

³Ogburn treats social disorganization from two aspects: (a) the maladjustment of the parts of culture; and (b) the maladjustment of original nature to culture. The phrase cultural lag is used to describe the first of these. *Social change*, p. 200.

⁴Value judgments are placed on a par with tastes by Ogburn. Instances of lagging in this context become descriptions of subjective states or feelings. *Sociology*, p. 905, 907.

⁵*Social change*, p. 297.

¹Henry Pratt Fairchild, editor, *Dictionary of Sociology* (New York, 1944). See the entries *lag*, *cultural* (p. 170); *lag*, *moral* (p. 170); and *social lag* (p. 285).

²*Ibid.*, Preface.

³William Fielding Ogburn, *Social Change with Respect to Cultural and Original Nature* (New York, 1922); *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York, 1933), p. xiii-xv and Chap. III; *Technological Trends and National Policy, Including*

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¹⁰*Ibid.*

point up the fact of lagging or delayed response in a system composed of unit parts asserted to be correlated.⁷

This paper will be restricted solely to an examination of the exposition of *cultural lag* developed in the *Sociology*, with only such references to Ogburn's earlier writings on the topic as may be necessary for a clarification of the argument. All previous critical estimates⁸ will also be passed over on the grounds that Ogburn appears to have attempted to accommodate his most recent exposition to the salient strictures contained in them: first, that it is difficult to prove degrees of adjustment between correlated variables,⁹ but, second, that it is, nevertheless, possible to show (a) the time or rate of changes between two variables, and (b) whether or not they are correlated.¹⁰ In this sense the present effort is an attempt to point up the consequences to Ogburn's thinking about *cultural lag* following from his acknowledgment of their relevance. It will show that the lead illustration of *cultural lag* supplied by Ogburn in the *Sociology* does not merit the designation of "cultural," and that the prominence given to value theory is a *non*

sequitur in a treatise which purports to be scientific.

II

Cultural lag is defined in the *Sociology*¹¹ as a condition of strain or maladjustment produced by the lagging of one of two correlated parts of culture behind the other. This definition is immediately followed, for purposes of illustration, by the instance of the differential rate of growth of population in cities and the size of the police force, taken from the same author's monograph the *Social Characteristics of Cities*.¹² Population growth is made the independent variable and the size of the police force the dependent variable.¹³ The occasion for the lagging of police behind population may be viewed as the structural rigidity of city governmental organization which prevents the adding or retiring of policemen rapidly enough to keep pace with population trends, thus compelling taxpayers in the latter situation to pay more for police protection¹⁴ than is necessary.¹⁵ The residents of growing cities do not pay enough for police protection and hence may experience a higher crime rate, it being asserted that (a) large cities require no different ratio of police than metropolises, and (b) that when the ratio of police to population in growing cities is kept constant, the crime rate is not correlated with growth.¹⁶

This illustration, while excellent for the purpose of providing a concrete instance of lagging which any student can easily apprehend, is defective in two respects. First, it is not an example of *cultural lag* at all.¹⁷ Second,

¹¹ P. 886.

¹² W. F. Ogburn, *Social Characteristics of Cities* (Chicago, 1937), p. 66; see also Table 3, p. 64. Growing cities have 285 policemen per 100,000 working population; declining cities 413 policemen per 100,000 working population.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 68.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 66. The cost of police protection is estimated to be 50 per cent greater in cities with a declining population.

¹⁵ *Ibid.* "Is there more crime in cities that are declining? Probably not. It would seem that there is just as much reason to think crime would flourish more in a rapidly growing city. There seems no reason why traffic regulations should be different in the two places."

¹⁶ *Sociology*, p. 887.

¹⁷ *Social change*, p. 264-265. Also see John H. Mueller, as cited, p. 326.

⁷ The correlation of the parts of culture has for the most part been assumed by Ogburn. It appears to have been less difficult to cite instances of lagging than to develop an exposition of the interdependence of the parts of culture as a whole. *Social change*, p. 265-268.

⁸ See, for example, Floyd H. Allport, "Social Changes: an Analysis of Professor Ogburn's Culture Theory," *Social Forces*, September, 1924, 2:671-676; Michael Choukas, "The Concept of Cultural Lag Re-examined," *American Sociological Review*, October, 1936, 1:752-760; Henry H. Frost, Jr., "Functionalism in Anthropology and Sociology," *Sociology and Sociological Research*, March-April, 1939, 23:373-379; Abbott P. Herman, "An Answer to Criticisms of the Lag Concept," *American Journal of Sociology*, November, 1937, 63:440-451; John H. Mueller, "Present Status of the Cultural Lag Hypothesis," *American Sociological Review*, June, 1938, 3:320-327; T. G. Standing, "A Critique of the Concept of Culture Lag," *Social Science*, April, 1939, 14:144-155; James W. Woodard, "Critical Notes on the Culture Lag Concept," *Social Forces*, March, 1933, p. 388-398; "A New Classification of Culture and a Restatement of the Culture Lag Theory," *American Sociological Review*, February, 1936, 1:89-102.

⁹ *Sociology*, p. 887, note 1, James W. Woodard, "A new classification of culture, etc."

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 888, note 3, John H. Mueller, as cited.

what is alleged as a statement of fact about the relationship of the crime rate, population growth, and the size of the police force is not borne out when an analysis is made of the supporting data which are cited.¹⁸

Population growth is not a cultural or superorganic phenomenon; although it is manifestly not unaffected by it. At least, the definition of culture or the superorganic supplied earlier in the *Sociology*¹⁹ does not comprehend population growth. E. B. Tylor's widely quoted definition is reprinted: "Culture is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, custom, and any other capabilities acquired by man as a member of society."²⁰ That portion of Tylor's definition of culture here emphasized is singled out by Ogburn and Nimkoff as the core element in the definition of culture.²¹ There is not anything, as the reader can see for himself, in this definition of culture which comprehends the biological capacities of reproduction or locomotion. There occurs here a confusion of experiences drawn from different, though not totally unrelated, universes.

The illustration of cultural lag presented in the *Sociology* is, in the meaning of that phrase, nonsense. Population data are demographic phenomena at the level of sociological analysis, i.e., aspects of social behavior are inferred from population characteristics. For example, Ogburn found that a low crime rate in cities is associated with, among other things, the percentage of foreign born in the total population, the percentage of offspring of foreign born in the total population, and the sex ratio.²² An increase in the number of persons in a particular area, a city for instance, whether by natural increase or migration, is not a cultural or superorganic phenomenon. Folkways, mores, inventions, and discoveries may affect such events,²³

but they are themselves of another order or level of experience.

The example of population growth in cities and the size of the police force is not, then, an instance of cultural lag, properly understood.²⁴ But it is an example of lagging, for what is involved is a differential rate of changes between events in a time series known to be correlated. It appears to be a statement of fact, at least so far as American experience goes, to say that population changes precede changes in the size of the police force. That is to say, there is an ascertainable time lag between an increase in a city's population and additions to the police force, and the reverse. The cost to the taxpayer for police protection and traffic control is greater in declining cities than in cities which show growth.²⁵ Therefore, unless it is assumed that the crime rate²⁶ is higher in cities with a declining population, which is denied, a condition known as social disorganization may be said to exist in the sense that the per capita cost of obtaining obedience to the law is greater than previous experience would appear to warrant. Similarly, residents of cities with a growing population are not paying enough for police protection.

We now come to the second criticism of the lag illustration employed in the *Sociology*, namely, the implied assertion that a rising crime rate is a function of population

¹⁸ The present status of gambling as defined by law, its definition in the current mores, and gangsterism would be a case of cultural lag. The attempts of municipalities to enforce existing gambling ordinances against a growing laxity in morals concerning wagering would be an example of where the law is "lagging" behind changes in the mores and so causing a form of social disorganization.

¹⁹ Ogburn found a similar condition existing with respect to nearly all municipal services: fire protection, street maintenance and lighting, parks, inspection, education, libraries, and charities. *Social Characteristics of Cities*, as cited, p. 66-67.

²⁰ Crime is made a function of the maladjustment of original man to culture by Ogburn (*Social Change*, p. 332-333; *Sociology*, p. 894, 896-897). He seems to adhere to Herbert Spencer's thesis of the "cave-man-in-civilization" to account for criminal behavior. That also makes crime something other than a strictly cultural manifestation. Some forms of crime may be culturally defined, but the behavior generally is a case of predatory man attempting to live in a social state induced by population growth.

²¹ W. F. Ogburn, "Factors in the Variation of Crime among Cities," *American Statistical Association Journal*, March, 1935, 30:12-34.

²² P. 25-26.

²³ Italics mine.

²⁴ Edward Sapir defined culture as "any socially inherited element in the life of man, material and spiritual."

²⁵ W. F. Ogburn, *Factors in the Variation of Crime among Cities*, as cited, p. 34.

²⁶ *Sociology*, Chapters 16 and 17.

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²⁹ "Facto
Cities," as

³⁰ *Ibid.*

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³¹ *Ibid.*

growth.²⁷ There is current, of course, a belief which gives plausibility to such a view. Law and order are believed to be less secure in a rapidly growing community.²⁸ Then there is also the suggestive stereotype of the western boom town and mining camp. The peace officer is supposed to put in his appearance only after such communities have had a period of rapid growth, accompanied by lawlessness and disorder.²⁹ But whatever may have been the facts pertaining to the boisterous, pioneer mining camp, the conditions of settled growth from 1910 to 1930 to which the data referred to in the *Sociology* apply do not seem to show any such trends.³⁰ The implication of the exposition given of population growth and additions to the police force in the *Sociology* is that under the conditions of moderate growth, which contemporary American cities show, additions to the police force lag so far behind that there is a rise in the crime rate. This illusion is accomplished by making an incomplete and partial reference to the findings in the paper cited. The general conclusion on growth and crime rates is entirely ignored: "The general conclusion on growth is, then, that cities whose rates of growth are increasing have less crime, which is not explained by the number of police, but is probably due to the economic basis of growth."³¹ Reference is only made to the specific conclusion that no correlation is shown between high crime rates and growth when the ratio of police per 10,000 population is held constant for the purpose of substantiating the previously made statement that a metropolis requires no more police per unit of population than a city. What the reader is not told is that this particular correlation was attempted to test the validity of the mining camp stereotype. Instead, having already been told that additions to the police force lag behind popula-

tion growth, the reader is left to draw the erroneous conclusion that such a state of affairs does produce a rising crime rate in the contemporary American city.

It is desirable here to observe that Ogburn does not entirely reject the mining camp stereotype in the research paper cited; although the results of his calculations on growth and crime are all either negative or indifferent. He holds that the "theory that rapid growth attracts the lawless before law and order are installed seems to be partly true in that the more rapidly growing towns have fewer police per 10,000 inhabitants. . . . The interpretation is that population growth precedes law and order, i.e., the necessary additions to the police force." What Ogburn is actually saying here is that, since in the American cities studied there is a tendency for additions to the police force to lag behind population growth, it is permissible to make the inference that there is some validity in the mining camp stereotype. Possibly, but a deduction drawn from an historical present is not proof that similar events actually happened in the historical past. In the instance before the reader the data from which the inference was drawn pertain to conditions producing "a moderate rate of growth for an organized town." And, what is even more to the point, these data "do not indicate any correlation between high crime rates and growth" in situations where it is known that the size of the police force lags behind population growth.

To summarize what has gone before, though it is not false to say that additions to the police force lag behind population increases in time in the American city of today, it is not true to say, as is done in the *Sociology*, that this condition presages a higher crime rate. Specifically, the data on crime rates and population growth supplied do not sustain the thesis that in a growing community life and property are less secure. On the contrary, the conditions of accelerated growth which operate in such places tend to suppress lawlessness and disorder.³²

²⁷ A high crime rate, as is well known, is associated with size, i.e., the larger the city the greater the number of crimes known to the police.

²⁸ *Social Characteristics of Cities*, as cited, p. 61.

²⁹ "Factors in the Variation of Crime among Cities," as cited, p. 31.

³⁰ *Ibid.* "The coefficients of correlation do not indicate any correlation between high crime rates and growth."

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 32. ". . . It thus appears that cities with rates of growth that are slowing up have higher crime rates than cities whose rates of growth are increasing.

III

The attempt to find an illustration of *cultural lag* which would also fulfill the criteria set up by Mueller for "true" lag landed Ogburn in the dilemma which the former adumbrated and might have foretold: "... this lag may not merit the designation 'cultural' for it does not correspond to the original qualifications of that phenomenon. The two elements are not necessarily in different categories of culture, nor is there any necessary suggestion of disorganization which the 'lag' is designed to explain."³³ Again, by paying heed to Woodard's criticisms he becomes entangled in a discussion about values which is irrelevant where "true" lag is under consideration, besides making a mockery of the term *cultural change* which is supposed to convey a scientific connotation.

The criterion of "true" lag³⁴ is that it be "repetitive, amenable to measurement, and useful in prediction."³⁵ In other words, a time lag between two correlated variables and the results which follow are a matter of observation, a fact. The philosophical anarchist may think what he likes about policemen, as may also the person who believes that a high crime rate contributes to an improvement in the racial stock because it permits gangsters to kill off one another instead of policemen,³⁶ but neither can gainsay the facts observed or things as they are. It is simply true to say that additions to the police force lag behind

The interpretation of the conclusion that cities whose growth is slowing up have more crime and those whose growth is increasing have less crime, suggests an economic factor as the cause. . . ."

³³ John H. Mueller, as cited, p. 326.

³⁴ An example of a "true" lag which also happens to be a *cultural lag* would be the lagging of wages behind prices in time and the resulting concomitant changes in the standard of living.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 327.

³⁶ A person does not necessarily need to make a moral judgment concerning a high crime rate who believes that the racial stock is adapted to changed conditions of existence through the elimination of the unfit, i.e., those who have somehow managed to survive from an earlier condition of existence. Such an individual could argue that a high crime rate is just a special case of predatory man trying to live in a changed social state induced by population growth. It would be a case of the unfitness of constitution to changed social conditions—an unpleasant fact, perhaps, but a fact nonetheless.

changes in population, and that the costs of crime control and traffic regulation tend to vary accordingly.³⁷ To admit into the discussion the contention that men are good by nature and made corrupt by policemen, for instance, is a *non sequitur*. The *mores* may or may not be in the final analysis an adaption to the physical conditions of existence. The technological determinist may or may not be correct in insisting that such is the truth. Nevertheless, the number of crimes committed in a given area is a fact of observation, as are also observations on the success of any attempts to suppress violations of the *mores* to a minimum.

If the anarchist, who espouses the cause of natural man, refuses to concede that a low crime rate achieved by an artificial system of restraints represents a nearer approach to his idea of the "good society," then he may rightly refuse to concur with Ogburn, Nimkoff, and the "good people" that "law and order" is equivalent to a given ratio of police to population. But in so doing the anarchist is disputing the theory of social order involved, not the facts observed. The anarchist, no more than the institutionalist, is blind to criminal behavior. He objects to the way "reasonable and informed people" go about reducing crime, that is all. Where the anarchist could be expected to make a case for himself would be in pointing out the futility of trying to abolish crime by repressive devices. He could argue, and with some cogency, that the present organization of life in American cities produces a by-product called criminal behavior.³⁸ Further, he might main-

³⁷ The illustration of workingman's compensation is of the same order. It required a given number of years from the time the Knights of Labor advocated the enactment of compensation laws until they were placed on the statute-books. The enactment of compensation laws also seemed to induce changes in machine design, the eligibility of certain workers to hold given jobs, as well as make payment for injuries sustained while on the job less difficult to obtain and of larger amount. Workingman's compensation is a "social reform," but the student of cultural changes is interested in how long it took to get it accomplished and the results, not whether it is good or bad.

³⁸ This thesis Ogburn himself appears to champion when he makes crime a function of the conflict between original nature (natural man) and culture.

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tain that that by-product can be held to a certain minimum by coercion and fear, but never entirely abolished. That desideratum, he would insist, can only be achieved by completely redefining the relationships of people to one another in groups, i.e., by setting up a completely free society.

Ogburn has always held in his writings on cultural lag that the parts of culture are related to each other in a manner analogous to a machine, an engine, or a clock.³⁹ If the parts of culture are articulated, enchaind, enmeshed, correlated, patterned⁴⁰—even if only loosely—malfunctioning becomes as much a fact of observation as does the loss of tension of a valve spring in an automobile engine.⁴¹ The difficulty of detecting the malfunctioning of a unit part does not provide the occasion for retiring behind affirmations that we are dealing with a state of affairs described as a manifestation of subjective preferences or tastes. Such a withdrawal does not resolve a problem that can only be treated on its own terms. The “indeterminate nature of lag does not mean that lag is any less real.”⁴² The absence of a known measure of articulation by which the correlation coefficient of the different parts of culture can be ascertained may lead to disputes and “quarrels” over the presence of a lag, but such disagreements when they arise, and as is, indeed, pointed out in the *Sociology*⁴³ are a function of the amount of knowledge possessed about the nature of culture and how it changes by the persons making the judgment, and not a function of what may be called a moral evaluation.

A mechanistic exposition of how culture

³⁹ “. . . civilization is highly articulated like a piece of machinery, so that a change in one part tends to effect changes in other parts—but only after a delay.” *Recent Social Trends*, textbook edition (New York, 1933), p. 166. See also the paper by Abbott P. Herman, as cited.

⁴⁰ *Sociology*, p. 745.

⁴¹ The effect of valve-spring-tension on engine efficiency is difficult to detect; yet no mechanic would for that reason confuse lack of skill or the absence of suitable testing equipment with an ethical judgment.

⁴² *Social change*, p. 256.

⁴³ P. 886.

changes does not admit values anywhere as a substitute for facts. The social scientist *qua* scientist makes no moral judgments. Values are for him only data, to be studied like any other phenomena.⁴⁴ If the man in the street has a penchant for describing in terms of subjective or class preferences what to the sociologist appears as a differential rate of changes between correlated parts of culture, it then becomes the task of the latter to describe the psycho-sociological conditions of that interpretation. The upper classes may stipulate any values they please about social life in general and the crime rate in particular, but the sociologist *qua* scientist no more prefers their values than he does those of the meanest and most benighted members of the community.

Values are data for the sociologist. Therefore, *cultural lag* is either (a) a learned illusion born of the way a certain ethnocentric group in the western world has come to “feel” about cultural changes, say, since the fifteenth century; (b) a projection into the present, but in a different dress, of an historical and traditional interpretation of the processes of change, i.e., the idea of progress; or (c) a fact of observation. In any event, the lag illustration in the *Sociology* is not an example of *cultural lag* at all. The question “What is *cultural lag*?” is still meaningful, and fraught with grave pedagogical implications. The Olympian disdain so often shown textbook writers and their handiwork by research workers and theorists in the physical and biological sciences is not permitted the sociologist. American sociology is still largely a textbook science—just what Sorokin found it to be nearly two decades ago when he came to write his *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. The more recent adoption of the “operational device,” i.e., to show what sociologists are really doing, has produced bulky, encyclopaedia compendia, not improved instructional devices. As a result the student is being subjected to controversies that he is neither equipped to apprehend nor capable of resolving.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 910.

THE FIRST GENERATION AND A HALF

NOTES ON THE DELINQUENCY OF THE NATIVE WHITE OF MIXED PARENTAGE

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I

THE NATIVE white population falls into two groups: those with native parents and others who come from foreign parents or who have one foreign parent. This category, called native white of foreign or mixed parentage,¹ is treated mostly as a unit. It is uniformly called "second generation" and has been given much study.

It is obvious, however, that groups so dissimilar in structure must differ in function. We are wont to see conflicts arising from the clashing worlds of the native child and the foreign parents. We are satisfied with the label "foreign born" although term and notion put a British couple on par with an Armenian who married a Finnish girl. A different cultural element is carelessly believed to enter each marriage of a native with a foreigner. These easy generalizations would not do much harm if the phenomena were insignificant in magnitude. The fact is that more than one third of the 23,000,000 Americans classified as native white of foreign or mixed parentage in 1940 had parents, one a native American and the other a foreign-born. The war has created a new type of mixed marriage in allied and occupied countries.

The problem is therefore weighty enough to call for examination and the official denomination is too cumbersome to discourage the quest for a briefer term.² There have been prior attempts to discuss the delinquency,³ the insanity⁴ and the suicide⁵ rates

of the native of mixed parentage. But that is all. The group itself has not been carefully studied nor split up in its component parts. The relative control of father or mother has not been weighed. Which of the countless nativities preponderantly come into play? Are there different age conditions which would affect delinquent tendencies? What is the economic status of both categories? May it be that the census figures are not quite reliable because the enumerator did not always receive a correct statement?

The 1933 prison statistics supply data on male prisoners admitted in Federal institu-

TABLE I. NUMBER OF MALE PRISONERS ADMITTED TO STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS PER 100,000 POPULATION 15 YEARS OLD AND OVER OF SAME NATIVITY: 1933*

Nativity	Rate
Native white of:	
native parentage	110
foreign parentage	105
mixed parentage	76

* Source: *Prisoners, 1933*, p. 26.

tions and prisons of 44 States, but not all of them give complete reports. Table I shows, in contrast to some unqualified assertions,⁶ that natives of native parentage head the list of serious crime. Those of foreign parentage follow, and natives of mixed parentage present the lowest figures (Table I).

view, 1936, Vol. I, pp. 726-728 where opinions of W. R. Tylor, Eleanor Glueck and Thorsten Sellin are mentioned.

⁴ *Patients in Hospitals for Mental Disease, 1923*, Washington 1926, p. 120.

⁵ Ruth Shonle Cavan: *Suicide* (Chicago, 1928), p. 121.

⁶ For instance: "the native-born sons of foreign or mixed parentage have higher criminality rates than either native-born sons of native parents or foreign-born children of foreign parents." Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck: *Five Hundred Criminal Careers*. (New York 1930), p. 118.

¹ Some statistics use the rather loose term "natives of mixed parents."

² The parents in this case present only half an immigrant generation. Their children are not a full second generation, but something less foreign and less abruptly transformative.

³ *Prisoners in State and Federal Prisons 1933* (Washington 1935), p. 26 and Donald R. Taft: "Nationality and Crime" *American Sociological Re-*

TABLE II. NUMBER OF NATIVE WHITE PRISONERS IN MASSACHUSETTS PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SAME NATIVITY AND SEX, 4-YEAR AVERAGE, 1937-1940*

Nativity	State Prison (Males only)	Reformatory for Women	Jails and Houses of Correction	
			Males	Females
Native white of:				
native parentage	9.6	10.7	351.9	22.6
foreign parentage	23.7	15.8	1006.5	43.1
mixed parentage	21.6	20.0	738.5	38.7

* Source: Population figures: *Population, Nativity, General Characteristics 1940*, p. 21. Prison figures: Computed from *Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Correction, 1937-1940*, pp. 86, 87; 88, 89; 74, 75; 72, 73 and *Ibidem* p. 111, 114, 99 and 97.

There are vast diversities by States. The delinquency rates of persons of mixed parentage are conspicuously lower in Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Iowa, Ohio, Nebraska, Texas and other southern States; slightly higher in Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey and Pennsylvania. The value of the figures is considerably reduced by a percentage of 21.7 in the "not reported" category.

The computation of recent figures creates the greatest difficulty. The prison statistics from 1934 to 1943 include only native white and foreign-born without subdivision. The population statistics, on the other hand, no longer count parentages by age groups. The only age figures given refer to the combined group of foreign and mixed parentage. It is therefore impossible to compute population data of the adults of mixed parentage.⁸

We have therefore computed figures for two states, Massachusetts and Michigan. The reduced figures apply, not very correctly, to the total male or female population of the corresponding parentage (Table II). Since only single institutions are examined only the comparative aspects of the figures should be considered.⁹ The persons of mixed parentage show in general¹⁰ delinquency rates lower

TABLE III. NUMBER OF MALE PRISONERS APPEARING BEFORE THE CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE OF THE MICHIGAN REFORMATORY PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SAME NATIVITY*

Native White of:	Rate
native parentage	81.0
foreign parentage	85.9
mixed parentage	65.0
father foreign	69.9
mother foreign	58.8

* Source: *Annual Report of the Classification Committee*. Ionia, Michigan 1938, p. 15. Population figures: *General Characteristics 1940*, p. 24.

than those of the second generation.

There is little conformity of our Massachusetts computations to the figures of 1933 or to the Massachusetts data of the prison statistics.¹¹ It is safe to assume that there are considerable local variations. We present another computation¹² for another state, Michigan (Table III). The group of mixed parentage again shows lower delinquency rates than the two other categories. The proportions recall somewhat the figures of 1933¹³ although there is a disparity in the group of native parentage. Michigan carries us a step further and gives us a welcome insight in

women; the admissions here are dominated by robbery, breaking and larceny.

¹¹ The Massachusetts figures for 1933 were (males per 100,000 population 15 years old and over):

Native white of native parentage	45
Native white of foreign parentage	95
Native white of mixed parentage	64

¹² One year is not very reliable statistically, but the prison statistics present only one year, too.

¹³ With exception of the lower native parentage figures which appeared to be higher for the United States and the States of Michigan. *Prisoners 1933*, p. 26.

⁷ Computed from *Prisoners, 1933*, p. 24.

⁸ Of all persons of foreign and mixed parentage 23.0% were 1 to 14 years old in Massachusetts and 21.1% in Michigan (males). *Population Nativity and parentage of the white population. General Characteristics 16th Census 1940*. Washington 1943, pp. 66 and 72.

⁹ The jail figures, of course, cover a plurality of places.

¹⁰ The one exception is the reformatory for

TABLE IV. PARENTAL NATIVITY OF NATIVE MALE PRISONERS OF MIXED PARENTAGE IN SELECTED AREAS AND FOR SELECTED PERIODS, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

	Population U. S. 1940 ^a	Male prisoners U. S. 1933 ^b	Male prisoners Massachusetts 1937-40 ^c	Male prisoners Michigan 1938 ^d
Foreign father	65.9	61.3	50.6	67.3
Foreign mother	34.1	38.7	49.4	32.7

^a Computed from figures in *General Characteristics*, p. 15.

^b Computed from figures in *Prisoners 1933*, p. 24.

^c Computed from figures in *Report 1937-40*, pp. 84, 86, 72, 70.

^d Computed from figures in *Annual Report 1938*, p. 15.

the operation of the group of mixed parentage, by breaking it down by foreign father and foreign mother. We are fortunate to meet the same distinction in the last population data.

II

The notion of mixed parentage starts on a geographical supposition. People born in the United States are native, persons born outside of her boundaries are foreign. No one will doubt that the distinction is crude. The native group consists of former immigrants who, if newcomers, have not yet completely lost their characteristics as Irish, German, Poles or Italians. They may intermarry or get married with old American stock. All eventual conflicts are shelved and set aside because the only thing we want to know is where this person has been born.

TABLE V. PARENTAL NATIVITY OF A SAMPLE OF NATIVE-WHITE PROSTITUTES IN NEW YORK CITY AND OF MICHIGAN PRISONERS IN 1938, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION

Nativity	Parental Nativity of 558 Native White Prostitutes in New York City ^a Per Cent	Parental Nativity of Native White Prisoners Classi- fied in Mich- igan 1938 ^b Per Cent
Native parentage	21.5	69.93
Foreign parentage	58.6	19.99
Mixed parentage	11.1	9.14
Foreign father	6.1	6.14
Foreign mother	5.0	3.00
Not determined	8.8	.94

^a Figures of Katharine Bement Davis: in *Commercialized Prostitution in New York City*, New York 1913, p. 203.

^b *Annual Report*, p. 15.

The foreigner, on the other side, who marries a native may join a native of his own stock and thus restrain forces of conflict and disintegration. He may have other values in common, religion, social philosophy, views on education, and so forth. Most important would be the same linguistic background which is likely to convey similar cultural standards.

These are briefest indications of the diverse meanings that hide behind the term "mixed." Yet there is still the notion of parentage; it may signify two things: differing biologically and sociologically, or a foreign father or foreign mother. By entering resolutely this *terra incognita* we meet first a fundamental rule: by breaking down the mixed parentage by father and mother we find that two thirds are made up by a foreign husband and a native wife¹⁴ (Table IV). Yet although the father is mostly an immigrant, the mother native, these proportions are subject to variation according to urban and rural areas, the nationality of the immigrant and even the sex of the descendant. Table V gives an idea of such deviations. The high rate of foreign born parents in New York City is a specific phenomenon of the great port of entry. Startling is the large number of foreign born mothers in mixed marriages among the prostitutes. We must refrain from drawing conclusions as long as the "unknown" rate can not be reduced.

The contrast of New York (females) and Michigan (males) leads us to a further

¹⁴ The fact would justify the aversion of many native males against the foreign-born male, scarcely against the foreign female.

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TABLE VI. PARTNERSHIP DISPOSITION

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distinction. The question must be asked: As the Census and prison statistics enumerate dozens of nativities, which nationalities are found among the foreigners who marry a native partner. Thus playing a role in bringing about a "mixed" parentage, would specific nativities affect the crime rate?

Some categories among the immigrants are of foreign origin, but not "alien" in language. Language is a powerful bond among men and an equally potent obstacle to personal or social adjustment. It is not surprising therefore that a large part of mixed marriages are concluded among people who are unmixed, identical as far as sameness of language goes. Adding England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland, Irish Free State, Canada-French¹⁵ and Canada-Other and New Foundland we see that a very large part of these mixed marriages occurs in the iso-linguistic group (Table VI). The proportion of English speaking persons is quite out of relation to the immigrant rate (19 per cent). The German figures are slightly higher (immigrant population 15.9 per cent). It is the other way with Russians, Poles and Italians.¹⁶ They are only very moderately represented as husbands of native wives. Russian, Polish and Italian women marry few native men, least of all Italians. It is possible, even likely that a mere numerical condition, the large surplus of Italian males, is the reason for this unwillingness.

TABLE VI. LINGUISTIC ORIGINS OF THE PARENTS OF PARTNERS IN MIXED MARRIAGES, PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION, UNITED STATES 1940^a

Linguistic Origins	Fathers Per Cent	Mothers Per Cent
English speaking group	32.0	47.9
Germany	21.0	17.7
Italy	10.1	3.3
Poland-Russia	8.8	6.5

^a *Population. Nativity and Parentage. Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock*, p. 9.

¹⁵ The prison statistics speak mostly of "Canadians." The French Canadians know, in general, a good deal of English.

¹⁶ The proportions in the foreign-born population are: 15.5, Italy; 10.4, Poland; and 8.3, Russia.

TABLE VII. PERCENTAGE OF ENGLISH SPEAKING FATHERS AND MOTHERS AMONG PERSONS OF MIXED PARENTAGE, 1940.

	Massachusetts ^a	Michigan ^b
Fathers	62.7	48.0
Mothers	81.9	85.6

^a *Population. Nativity and Parentage. Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock*, p. 9.

^b *Ibidem*, p. 60.

The English speaking group surpasses the United States average by far in specific states; this is true, for instance, in the states of Massachusetts and Michigan (Table VII).

The English, the Irish and the Canadian speak the same language as the native. They are relieved of much friction and conflict in the assimilative processes that go with immigration. The parent-child relation is saved from heavy encumbrance. The economic status of the iso-linguistic group is higher than that of immigrants who are newcomers.¹⁷ Their age structure alone involves a lower crime rate.¹⁸ In the case of the Irish and the Canadian other factors are in operation which tend to reduce their visible criminality,¹⁹ or to render their crime figures, based on population data, problematical.²⁰

¹⁷ See the median value of owned or rented houses by nationality *Census, 1940. Population. Nativity and parentage: Country of Origin of the Foreign Stock*, Washington 1943, p. 6.

¹⁸ The percentages of the age group 20-29 are for instance (1940): Native White of foreign or mixed parentage: England, 13.7; Ireland, 12.3; Canada, 16.2; Italy, 30.9; Poland, 36.9; Computed from figures *Ibidem*; p. 90.

¹⁹ The fighting qualities of the Irish have been in part sublimated and enlisted as law-enforcing pugnacity.

²⁰ The crime rate of the male Canadian appears to be rather high in Taft's study (*ibidem* p. 732). Yet there are reasons to assume that the Census figures should be accepted with great reserve. We read of "Millions of aliens and citizens who have entered across the borders during the year" (*Annual Report of the Commissioner General of Immigration 1932*. Washington 1932, p. 18). The Report goes on to say: "It is a vast movement and it would be impossible, even if necessary, to make a record of these entries, many for a very temporary purpose and to points adjacent to the borders."

This means that there are continually many more Canadians on United States soil than we know,

TABLE VIII. ADMISSIONS TO MASSACHUSETTS STATE PRISON BY FOUR SELECTED NATIVITIES PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SAME NATIVITY, 1937-1940*

	Total for all Four Groups	Nativity			
		Great Britain	Ireland	Canada	Italy
Father foreign	46.6	18.2	54.1	40.7	92.0
Mother foreign	51.8	28.6	50.3	34.6	421.7

* The father data are taken from *Annual Reports* 1937-1940, pp. 82, 84, 70 and 68. The mother data, *Ibidem*, p. 84, 86, 72, 70. Population figures computed from *Population: Country of Origin. Ibidem*, p. 59.

TABLE IX. ADMISSIONS TO THE MASSACHUSETTS REFORMATORY FOR WOMEN BY FOUR SELECTED NATIVITIES PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SAME NATIVITY, 1937-1940*

	Total for all Four Groups	Nativity			
		Great Britain	Ireland	Canada	Italy
Father foreign	38.6	25.0	83.5	38.6	17.2
Mother foreign	45.0	25.3	71.4	40.2	79.2

* Same sources as used for Table VIII.

Persons who have a foreign-born father or mother are likely to reflect some human and social characteristics of this group. They must, in addition, reflect the specific traits that caused their native mother or native father to marry a foreigner. It is true there are degrees of foreign-ness. Political borderlines are no safe expressions of diversity in language, manners of thinking and ways of life. Natives of large territories may be strange to one another, foreigners near to our heart. The term "motherland" points at such affinities between natives and specific foreigners.

Although our computations retain an inevitable crudity²¹ it is most instructive to compare groups of a different nationality, by foreign father or mother, thus making an

or the occasional enumerator is told. The arrested and convicted Canadian is a fact; the Canadian population we use for our computations is a fiction. Since it is an understatement the crime rate must be reduced. It must be furthermore assumed that the age structure is more youthful than census figures would indicate since the trespassers will certainly be younger than the persons who submit to the admission routine.

²¹ There is no distinction by sex in the 1940 census figures as far as parentage by country of origin and geographical section goes.

inroad in that ill-defined generality of mixed parentage (Table VIII).

Looking at the delinquency of the female we notice some disparities (Table IX).

Michigan figures cover only one year as do the Prison statistics of 1933, but it may not be useless to quote them (Table X). These figures are somewhat lower than that of natives of male sex and foreign parentage. The rate for the English speaking group is 34.9 per 100,000 population and that for the Polish-Lithuanian group is 83.3 per 100,000 population. The crime rate of the second generation is higher among Poles; mixed

TABLE X. NATIVE WHITE MALE PRISONERS OF MIXED PARENTAGE APPEARING BEFORE THE CLASSIFICATION COMMITTEE OF THE MICHIGAN REFORMATORY PER 100,000 POPULATION OF SAME NATIVITY 1938*

	English speaking Nationalities ^b	Polish-Lithuanian Nationality ^c
Father foreign	30.0	57.0
Mother foreign	19.0	42.1

* Computed from figures in *Annual Report*, pp. 16-17.

^b England, Scotland, Ireland, Canada (both) and New Foundland.

^c The classification committee does not give the Polish figures separately.

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parentage affords a better chance to both the English speaking and the Polish-Lithuanian section. Essentially the same dynamics come to light when the external shell has been pierced.

We can say that the persons of mixed parentage are a highly selective set of people. There is probably something to Taft's idea that "the more successful immigrant may be better able to marry the more exacting American girl,"²² although we would not limit the "success" to money matters. It may be equally true that the American man who marries a foreign woman in a country of female surplus must be strongly attracted by certain traits.²³ Our Massachusetts figures seem to indicate that the foreign mother is slightly more directly related to male and female delinquency than is the father of foreign nativity. However, before arriving at conclusions we must raise a technical issue of major significance.

III

It was still possible in 1930 to follow the native whites of mixed parentage, male and female, age group by age group. The Census has re-combined the persons of foreign and mixed parentage, as far as the age structure goes. The age factor, therefore, so vital in the genesis of crime, escapes us. The only thing that will still be correct is the greater similarity of native and mixed parentage, as compared with the group of foreign parentage.²⁴ But even if these proportions should

not have changed considerably there are indications that the Census data have suffered deductions by the enumerated themselves. It is striking, for instance, to find that the more foreign the population of a state is and the more urban, the lower are the figures of native whites of mixed parentage (Table XI).

TABLE XI. PERCENTAGE OF NATIVE WHITES OF MIXED PARENTAGE AMONG ALL NATIVE WHITES FOR SELECTED STATES, 1940*

North Dakota	15.7	New Jersey	9.0
Minnesota	12.7	Illinois	8.1
South Dakota	12.5	Pennsylvania	6.5
New Hampshire	12.0	Louisiana	2.5
New York	9.0	Virginia	1.2

* Computed from *General Characteristics*, pp. 16 ff.

TABLE XII. PERCENTAGE OF NATIVE WHITES OF MIXED PARENTAGE AMONG ALL NATIVE WHITES FOR SIX SELECTED CITIES OF 500,000 INHABITANTS AND OVER, 1940*

St. Louis	36.1
Boston	27.0
Chicago	26.1
Philadelphia	26.0
Cleveland	23.8
New York	23.1

* Computed from figures in *General Characteristics*, pp. 36, 37.

The great urban communities present diversities which are hard to explain. We adduce first the urban rate of persons of mixed parentage (Table XII).

There is still a greater variety, when foreign father and foreign mother are examined (Table XIII).

The conclusion is inescapable that striking discrepancies have²⁵ something to do with the type of immigration which reached these

33.9 for native parentage, 31.1 for mixed parentage, and 27.9 for foreign parentage. *Age distribution. 1930 Washington 1933*, p. 567.

²⁵ Boston is a special case with its large Irish and Canadian population and the surplus of females in both groups. When there are more foreign females there will be more foreign mothers. On the anomalous sex ratio of the Irish and the Canadian see *Population 1940 Country of Origin*, p. 4.

²² Taft *op. cit.* p. 727. The remark of W. R. Taylor that "mixed marriage may itself be an indication that culture conflict has largely ceased between the parents and that, therefore, the conflict is less serious for the children of such marriages" (quoted by Taft, p. 726, 727) does doubtless apply to isolinguistic marriages and to some of the cases where a foreigner marries a native of the same foreign stock.

²³ Our factual knowledge is too poor to justify any hypothesis. It could as well be that sometimes a native man has disqualified himself for homemade connubial bliss but might still be regarded as a good match by some stranded foreign girl. The mixed marriages of overseas wars are a special problem and a new object of sociological research when the children have grown up.

²⁴ The percentage for the age group 1 to 14 is

TABLE XIII. PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGN FATHERS AND FOREIGN MOTHERS OF PARTNERS IN MIXED MARRIAGES FOR SIX SELECTED CITIES OF 500,000 INHABITANTS AND OVER, 1940*

	Father foreign	Mother foreign
St. Louis	74.3	25.7
Chicago	68.0	32.0
New York	66.2	33.8
Cleveland	66.0	34.0
Philadelphia	64.6	35.4
Boston	55.0	45.0

* Same source as that used for Table XII.

cities, their yet precarious status, their unsettled economic conditions, and their quest for protective conformity. The immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe are reluctant to state their nativity correctly. They register a grade higher as natives of native parentage when urban anonymity, mobility and easy command of English, taught by an iso-linguistic father or mother render the switch unsuspected. It is probable that not a few foreign-born promote themselves to natives of foreign-parentage. We are acquainted with these tendencies when it comes to race²⁶ or other discriminations.²⁷

²⁶ We hear of the Chippewa Indians of Minnesota: "The Census of 1920 gave the Indian population of these reservations as 8,761 while the last report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs gave the total population of Minnesota Chippewas as 12,560. The difference is accounted for by the presence of a large number of mixed bloods, many of whom were classed by the census as white." G. E. E. Lindquist: *The Red Man in the United States* (New York, 1923), p. 140.

²⁷ In discussing the criminal tribes of India, Sir Edmund C. Cox *Police and Crime in India* (London n.d.), p. 234, writes: "According to the Census of 1901, Bhamptas numbered only about twelve hundred, a mere handful of their real total. The majority probably returned themselves as Mahrattas or Hindoos of other reputable castes.

A look at the sex ratio of our group betrays further disparities (Table XIV).

Since there is no reason to assume that descent of the parents affects the sex proportion of their children it must be supposed

TABLE XIV. SEX RATIO OF NATIVE WHITE POPULATION BY PARENTAGE, 1940*

Natives of native parentage	100.2
of foreign parentage	100.6
of mixed parentage	97.9
father foreign	97.5
mother foreign	98.6

* *General Characteristics*, p. 2.

that females tend to acknowledge mixed parentage rather than males. There are other symptoms of such a trend. Urban surroundings insist on conformity and make it pay. The man of mixed parentage anticipates the slow operation of the melting pot by a statement of native parentage which the enumerator can but accept. Table XV has but one

TABLE XV. PERCENTAGE OF NATIVES OF MIXED PARENTAGE AMONG ALL NATIVES OF FOREIGN OR MIXED PARENTAGE BY URBAN AND RURAL AREAS 1940*

	Urban	Rural-farm
Male	31.6	41.0
Female	32.3	43.0

* *General Characteristics*, p. 15.

meaning: The male, especially the urban male, tends to conceal the foreign father or mother.

In conclusion, it appears that the selective structure of the group, statistical shortcomings and probably specific age conditions account for the lighter delinquency, suicide, and insanity rate of the white of mixed parentage. The weight of other contributory factors remains to be studied.

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OFFICIAL REPORTS *and* PROCEEDINGS



ANNOUNCEMENT OF ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society will be held at The Hollenden Hotel in Cleveland, March 1-3, 1946. Further details and cards for room reservations will be sent to members later.

Attention is called to the Section on Con-

tributed Papers. Papers to be submitted for this session must be sent to the Committee before January 1. Miss Katharine Jocher, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, N.C., is Chairman of this Committee.

CURRENT ITEMS



NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

Bolivia. Sociologists interested in political and ideological under-currents in Bolivia will be interested in the recently launched *Revista de la Federacion de Estudiantes de Chuquisaca*, published under the imprint of the University San Francisco Xavier, Sucre, Bolivia. Persons interested in subscriptions or in an exchange of ideas should communicate with Sr. Julio Garrett, Secretary of the Student Federation.

Brigham Young University. Dr. Harold T. Christensen, Head of the Department of Sociology, has returned to the campus after a year's leave of absence, during which time he was employed by the War Food Administration in the Office of Labor, Washington, D.C., and by the Bureau of Agricultural Economics as Regional Leader for the northeastern area of the Division of Farm Population and Rural Welfare. Ariel S. Ballif, who is at present Relocation Adjustment Advisor for the inter-mountain area of the War Relocation Authority, will resume his position at Brigham Young University on January 1, 1946. John C. Swenson, Professor Emeritus, is assisting with special courses for upper division and graduate students.

The British Information Services have announced a series of 16mm sound films on a variety of topics, a number of which may be of interest to American sociologists and other social scientists. These films are available to individuals or institutions on a rental basis meant to cover costs of handling. Some recent titles are: "Psychiatry in Action"; "Children of the City," dealing with juvenile delinquency; "Housing in Scotland" and "A City Reborn," dealing with city planning and the

rebuilding of Coventry. Persons interested in rates, detailed catalogues, or other aspects of this service should write: Film Officer, British Information Services, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York City, or any of the branch offices in the major cities of the United States.

Dr. Stanley H. Chapman, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, has recently joined the staff of the Department of Sociology at **Bucknell University** as assistant professor.

The University of Connecticut. Dr. Nathan L. Whetten returned to the University in October to resume his duties as Dean of the Graduate School and Professor of Sociology after more than three years of absence. While on leave, he served as a foreign-service officer for the Department of State and was stationed at the American Embassy in Mexico City. He travelled throughout Mexico, spent several months in Guatemala, and visited the other Central American Republics. In July he attended the Third Inter-American Conference on Agriculture at Caracas, Venezuela, as a member of the United States Delegation. For the last year, he has been serving as coordinating secretary of a joint Mexican-American Committee on "the improvement of the rural economy in disadvantaged rural areas." He is now placing the finishing touches on a manuscript for a book on rural Mexico.

Ecuador. A new periodical *El Trimestre Estadístico del Ecuador* has been launched by the government of Ecuador. As suggested by the title, it is a quarterly publication of current census materials for that country. Volume 1, Number 1 is dated May 28, 1945. Persons interested in being

placed on the mailing list should address: Direccion General de Estadistica y Censos, Ministerio de Economia, Quito, Ecuador.

Harvard University. Editora Universitaria of Sao Paulo, Brazil, announce publication of Sorokin's *A Crise do nostro tempo* and *Rusia e Estados Unidos*, Portuguese editions of Sorokin's *Crisis of Our Age* and *Russia and the United States*. *Crisis of Our Age* has been translated also into German and French and is waiting normal conditions to be printed. Associated Organization of Italian Publishers announces a forthcoming publication of an Italian translation of Sorokin's *Contemporary Sociological Theories*. This will be the ninth language into which this work has been translated. Professor Sorokin was recently elected one of forty members of the newly established *Institute of World Policy*, Washington, D.C.

Wayne C. Neely, Professor of Sociology at *Hood College*, Frederick, Maryland, was the Society's representative at the 75th Anniversary celebration of Wilson College, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, on October 13, 1945.

Indiana University. Mrs. Annabelle B. Motz is an Instructor in Sociology during the first semester of the current year while Mr. Paul Campisi is on leave of absence for the purpose of teaching sociology in the Army University in Italy. Alfred R. Lindesmith and A. B. Hollingshead have been released by the Army to resume their duties in the Department of Sociology in Indiana University.

Michigan State College. Solon Kimball has joined the staff of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Michigan State College Experiment Station, September 15, as Associate Professor. He is the first Anthropologist to be employed by a Land-Grant College under this arrangement. Kimball came to Michigan State College from the War Relocation Authority where he was Head of the section of Community Organization and Activities. Previously he worked on the Navajo Reservation as joint employee of the Soil Conservation and Indian Services. He is joint author of *The Family and Community in Ireland*. Frederick Thaden has been granted nine months leave from teaching and research beginning October 1. He plans to spend his leave travelling and studying, principally in the Southwest. The map resulting from his Purnell project, *The Delineation of Ethnic and Religious Groups in Michigan*, is now in the publication stage. Walter Firey's doctor's dissertation, *The Role of Social Values in Land Use Patterns of Central Boston*, is being published by the Harvard University Press. Richard Myers, formerly instructor in sociology at the University of Michigan, joined the staff as of September 1. Chas. Loomis, Head of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, has returned from a War Department assignment in the American, French and British zones of occupation in Germany.

Judson T. Landis, formerly Acting Head of the Department of Sociology of Southern Illinois Normal University, has been appointed associate professor; and Norman Kinzie, formerly Director, Social Service Department, the Detroit Council of Churches, has been appointed assistant professor in the Department of Effective Living in the Basic College. Hugo Engelmann has been appointed instructor and Orden Smucker has joined the staff as assistant professor in the Department of Social Sciences. Austin Vander Slice will return to the Department of Social Science from which he has been on leave working with the International Labor Office.

Michigan College of Mining and Technology. A new department of Engineering Administration, embracing courses in economics, psychology, sociology, and American government and politics, has been created this fall. To head the new department the Board of Control has named Associate Professor E. J. Townsend, who has taught economics at Michigan College of Mining and Technology, Houghton, Michigan, since 1931. Professor Townsend has served as field representative of the Michigan State Planning Commission and as the college's postwar planning consultant to four hundred governmental units in the Upper Peninsula of Michigan.

University of Missouri. Dr. Harold Kaufman, Assistant Professor, has resigned from the Department of Rural Sociology and Mr. Gerard Schultz, formerly Research Assistant, has been appointed Instructor to take his place during the fall semester. Mr. Herbert F. Lionberger, now with the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, will join the staff as Assistant Professor for the second semester to assume teaching and research duties. Mr. Marion E. St. John has been appointed Research Assistant in Rural Sociology. An experiment station bulletin, "Illness in Rural Missouri" by Harold F. Kaufman and Warren W. Morse is now available for distribution. This is the first in a series of bulletins to be issued relating to the illness and health facilities of the people of rural Missouri. Professor Maurice A. Mook, formerly Associate Professor of Sociology at the American University in Washington, D.C., has been appointed Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology. Associate Professor Noel P. Gist has returned to the University after a year's absence. Professor Gist served as Visiting Professor at the University of Wisconsin during the academic year 1944-45.

University of Pennsylvania. Professor Thorsten Sellin has assumed the chairmanship of the department. Professor Donald Young has been elected to the post of Executive Director of the Social Science Research Council and has entered upon his new duties. Professor William Rex Crawford, who has for the last two years been cultural attache in the American Embassy, Rio de Janeiro will return this fall. Dr. Edward P. Hutchinson, formerly of Har-

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ward University and most recently Supervisor of General Research in the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the United States Department of Justice has been appointed associate professor. He will teach courses in population problems and, for the time being, will retain his connection with the Immigration Service on a part-time basis. Dr. Otto Pollak has been appointed instructor of Sociology.

Pennsylvania College for Women. C. Hess Haagen, formerly with the Voice Communications Laboratory, Army Air Field, Waco, Texas has joined the staff of the Department of Psychology.

Pennsylvania State College. After an absence of four years, Dr. Seth W. Russell, Assistant Professor of Sociology, has returned to his teaching position at the College. At the time of his discharge, Professor Russell was a lieutenant commander in the Chaplains' Corps of the U.S.N.R. Professor Russell's service included one year at the Naval Operating Base, Norfolk, two years aboard the light cruiser *Santa Fe*, and one year at Marine Corps Base, San Diego, California.

Princeton University. A program of instruction in sociology has been introduced, with the first courses being given in the Winter Term that started November 1. Kingsley Davis, formerly Associate Professor of Public Affairs, has been made Associate Professor of Anthropology and Sociology. Dudley Kirk and Wilbert E. Moore have been appointed Assistant Professors of Sociology. All of these three retain their research affiliation with the University's Office of Population Research, whose director, Professor Frank W. Notestein, will continue to teach demography. In addition, Mr. Edward C. Devereux, instructor at the University of Toronto before serving with the United States Navy, has been appointed Lecturer in Sociology.

Rhode Island State College. Dr. Brewton Berry has assumed his new duties as Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology. He was formerly an Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Missouri.

Selective Service System. Lieutenant Raymond V. Bowers, USNR, and Lieutenant (jg) Wm. H. Sewell, USNR, who have been Navy Liaison Officers of Selective Service for the past year are being temporarily detached to join the Morale Section of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey of Japan. They expect to return to this country some time in January and take up their former duties with Selective Service.

Social Science Research Council. Announcements have been circulated in academic circles of the continuation for another year of the established program of pre-doctoral and post-doctoral fellowships and of grants-in-aid for support of specific research projects of mature scholars. The closing date for fellowship applications is February 1,

1946; for grants-in-aid January 15, 1946. The plan for demobilization awards is being continued for the benefit of "social scientists of exceptional promise whose careers have been seriously disrupted by their service in the armed forces or by other war service." Communications regarding demobilization awards or grants-in-aid should be addressed to Mr. Elbridge Sibley, 726 Jackson Place, N.W., Washington 6, D.C.; regarding other fellowships and grants to Miss Laura Barrett, Secretary to the Committees, 230 Park Avenue, New York 17, New York.

Smith College. Professor F. H. Hankins left in July for a period of service as an instructor in one of the Army units in France. He expects to return for his final semester of teaching before retirement in June, 1946. Dr. Gladys Bryson is at present acting chairman of the department of sociology. Professor H. P. Fairchild, just retired from New York University, will be a visiting professor this year. Mrs. Adelaide Cromwell Hill, Smith '40 and a recent Rosenwald fellow at Radcliffe, joins the staff as an instructor—the first negro to receive an appointment at Smith.

Sweet Briar College. Dr. Colloredo Krassovsky has been appointed Associate Professor of Sociology at Sweet Briar College for the academic year, 1945-46, to replace Dr. B. B. Beard, who is on leave during this year. Dr. Krassovsky came to Sweet Briar from Wayne University, Detroit, Michigan, where she taught the past year.

Union College (Kentucky) has appointed Dr. Philip M. Smith as Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Social Studies. Dr. Smith has been teaching the sociology courses at Whitman College and also serving as supply pastor at the College Place Presbyterian Church, Walla Walla, Washington. He assumed his new duties in September.

War Production Board. F. Howard Forsyth is leaving the staff of the Program Vice Chairman to work for a few months as consultant with the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee in Germany, under the joint auspices of the War Department and the Department of Commerce.

State College of Washington. Dr. R. W. Roskelley of the Colorado State College has accepted a position as Associate Professor of Rural Sociology. Dr. Roskelley will give three-fourths of his time to research in the Division of Rural Sociology and one-fourth time to teaching Sociology in the Department of Sociology.

Mr. Milton Maxwell of the University of Texas has accepted an instructorship in the Department of Sociology.

University of Washington. Dr. Donald R. Taft of the University of Illinois taught courses in Crim-

inology, and the Sociology of War during the first summer session.

Dr. George A. Lundberg gave the 1945 Charles Coolidge Parlin Memorial Lecture on "Marketing and Social Organization," at Franklin Institute, Philadelphia. The lecture is published as a pamphlet. Dr. Norman S. Hayner spent the summer in Mexico studying the Mexican family and urban problems. Dr. Robert W. O'Brien who was assistant to the Dean of the College of Science and Arts for the past five years has been promoted to assistant professor, and will have charge of the introductory course. Dr. Ch'eng-k'un Cheng has been promoted from instructor to assistant professor. Dr. Gwynne Nettler, who was instructor at Reed College during the past year, has been appointed assistant professor of sociology. Mr. Frank Miyamoto has received an appointment as assistant professor. For the past three years Mr. Miyamoto held a pre-doctoral Social Science Research Council Fellowship. Dr. Calvin F. Schmid has been elected chairman of the Washington State Census Board. The Census Board was created by the last session of the Legislature for the purpose of deriving post-censal estimates of population for the 223 chartered and incorporated towns and cities of the state. Approximately \$30,000,000 will be allocated on the basis of the Census Board's estimates.

Dr. Edward C. Jandy, Associate Professor of Sociology at *Wayne University*, has been given leave of absence to accept the position as Director

of Welfare of Ethiopia for the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Association (UNRRA). Dr. Melvin Marvin Tumin, Instructor in Sociology and Anthropology, has published *The Indians of San Luis Jilotepeque* as No. 2 in the University of Chicago Microfilm Collection of Manuscripts on Middle American Cultural Anthropology. Dr. Norman Raymond Humphrey, Assistant Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, has returned to Wayne from Tecolotlan, Jalisco, Mexico, where he is making a community study of a town typical of those from which American urban Mexicans have migrated. The Wayne Department of Sociology has moved into new and larger quarters at 5103 Cass Avenue, a remodeled residence given over to the department's seminar rooms and offices. Eleanor Papierno Wolfe has been appointed Instructor in Sociology to teach courses in the College of Nursing. Other Sociology staff members in the College of Nursing are Maude L. Fiero and Dr. Elizabeth B. Lee.

Professor Howard Becker has returned to the *University of Wisconsin* from overseas, where he was attached to the Office of Strategic Services. Before working in capacities which imposed security restrictions on him, he finished a book entitled *German Youth, Bound or Free* which is to be published by Kegan Paul in Great Britain, Oxford University Press in the United States, and the Europa Publishers in Switzerland. It will probably appear this winter.

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BOOK REVIEWS



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England in the Eighteen-Eighties: Toward a Social Basis for Freedom. By HELEN MERRELL LYND. New York: Oxford University Press, 1945, 516 pp. \$4.50.

In *England in the Eighteen-Eighties* Mrs. Lynd, widely known co-author of *Middletown* and *Middletown in Transition*, has pioneered in turning fully the searchlights of historical analysis upon a subject of profound importance today. The period here dealt with was largely the one in which the intellectual fashions of England changed from the liberalistic and anti-liberalistic modes of preceding decades to the collectivist and anti-collectivist forms which still prevail in that country. The author with a vast expenditure of effort has sifted the voluminous writings of the time and traced this change through a variety of channels. The text is enlivened and the argument fortified with a large and representative selection of apt quotations. An example (p. 309): "The State Church is one

of aristocratic and venerable institutions that must not be meddled with. To maintain it intact is one of the articles of the Tory creed. The parson stands on the same hallowed ground as the partridge and the pheasant."

But Mrs. Lynd is concerned to do more for her period and subject than describe and illustrate. She is anxious especially to explain and interpret the changes she is discussing. Her method is evidenced by the division of the subject-matter. The "Introduction" states the problem and indicates how it will be handled. Part I portrays the "Material Environment," the "Environment of Ideas," "Intruding Events," and "Signs of Change." Part II examines under the "Role of Social Institutions in Change" the contributions of "Political Parties," "Organized Labour," "Religion," "Education," and "Organization for Change." A "Conclusion," "Toward Positive Freedom," sums up and evaluates the fruits.

There are few if any traces of bias in the volume. In both method and achievement the work compares favorably with the best of its genre. Like most of those, too, it is seriously marred in form and half-thwarted in purpose by a lack of exact definition of such key terms as "social," "economic," "freedom," "religious" and "political," and by the absence of a clear explanation of the relations among the things to which these words refer.

The topic dealt with is particularly timely in this country, because industrial North America has been passing recently through a period similar to that which England experienced in the eighteen-eighties.

Social scientists and others interested in contemporary American civilization will find Mrs. Lynd's *England in the Eighteen-Eighties* well worth careful study.

JOHN PERRY PRITCHETT

Queens College of the
City of New York

The Midnight Cry. By FRANCIS D. NICHOL.
Takoma Park, Washington, D.C.: Review and
Herald Publishing Association, 1944. 560 pp.
\$3.50.

At the beginning the author tells us his book is written in defense of Millerism, the historical source of his religious faith—Seventh Day Adventism. Specifically repudiating historic objectivity on the ground that it is unattainable in controversial fields, he declares that he is offering an apology for the Adventist movement. His motive is to refute prejudiced accounts put out by its enemies and historians ever since the beginning. He asserts, moreover, that one whose spiritual antecedents and sympathies are favorable is far better prepared to present the movement in its true light than is any so-called disinterested historian.

With this announcement of attitude in mind the reader will be prepared for the kind of special pleading that characterizes the book.

In thirty uniform, well written chapters the story of Millerism is fully expounded and its critics answered. From its inception in the mind of William Miller, a middle-aged, uneducated farmer of Washington county, New York, the belief in the approaching second coming of Christ, as Miller interpreted the Scriptures, through the propagation of the doctrine among Protestant denominations to its culmination in 1844, subsequent decline and reorganization as a separate sect, the movement is traced. Miller first proclaimed the end of the world as being

near to his local Baptist brethren; then with newly won disciples spread abroad the doctrine in New England, the Middle Atlantic States and farther west, winning several thousand adherents. A number of preachers, mostly visionary men easily enamoured of reforms and new dogmas, espoused the cause to become its leaders. The propaganda took the form of revivalism, which in turn aroused widespread ridicule and opposition among the more stable elements of church and society. No wonder, for out of a clear sky sounded this great alarm of the approaching end of the world. From Daniel and Revelation Millerism argued that Christ would appear in 1843 or 1844 to bring the day of doom to all sinners.

When the fateful years came and went with no Christ or world ending, Millerism should have died out because of its false claims, but it did not. The faithful simply abandoned the idea of a definite date for the Advent on the ground of miscalculations, drew themselves together out of the various denominations and organized the Adventist sect to prepare for the coming sometime in the near future.

The author recognizes that Millerism originated at a time and in a region seething with religious, moral, political, and social ferment and that it shared the emotional patterns of the period with the Anti-Masonic craze, Abolitionism, Spiritualism, Mormonism and religious revivalism. What he fails to recognize is that its Achilles' heel was not so much the emotional manifestations as the inherent irrationality of its creed as viewed by men generally. Therefore, to give so much space to disproving charges of fanaticism, ordering ascension robes, etc., that were leveled against Millerites, does not suffice to validate Adventism.

Notwithstanding its propaganda purpose, the book probably gives a fairly accurate account of the movement.

NEWELL L. SIMS

Oberlin College

The Unknown Murderer. By THEODOR REIK.
New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945. 260 pp. \$3.00.

Dr. Reik is a former Viennese analyst and a pupil of Freud. The present book evidently is a translation of one published earlier in German. The main effort is directed toward a psycho-analytical examination of clues which reveal the culprit. Reik uses folklore citations and summaries from famous murder cases, mainly in central Europe, to develop his theme. Clues have a connection with the murdered man and the

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murderer. In primitive times and in folk society, this nexus is magical. In modern times, the clue is subject to scientific police investigation. But the clue never has lost its psychological import. In the unconscious, the clue still has a sort of animism about it. The unconscious, of course, is our primitive being.

There is a hidden psychology of the unconscious in self betrayal. There is a struggle between two opposing forces: to cover up and to betray. And the unconscious usually must leave a clue. One of the most interesting of the clues left behind by the murderer is the *grumus merdae*, the "visiting card," caused by the urge to defecate at the scene of crime. The culprit is driven by the unconscious to return to the scene of the crime, not only to re-experience the pleasure of it but also to wait for punishment which is unconsciously needed. Ordeals were means by which clues could be obtained. But unconsciously they gave the opportunity craved by the unconscious to relive the crime, which is after all akin to eating the totem. Expiation is the purge of the unconscious. The omnipotence of the unconscious causes many errors in the evidence of culprits, witnesses, jurors, and judges, in their judgments and thinking about crimes committed and under review.

Murder or crime in general are not explained in this treatise. Neither are any facts presented about murderers. The treatise is merely an interpretation of clues and evidence of murder. The book is not a fanciful psychoanalytic superstructure as would be ordinarily expected. The reading is interesting but much faith is placed in dubious ethnological reports as data. The cases of the reported murders, the material from folklore, the reports from primitive tribes are all fitted into the dominant theme of the book, namely, the workings of the unconscious. But in spite of all this, one receives the impression that the unconscious does play an important role in some murder cases, both before and after the scene. How important this factor is we shall never know. How common the factor is in various kinds of murder we shall probably never know. All that can be said is that sometimes it seems as if there is an important factor of the unconscious at work in such and such case.

WALTER C. RECKLESS

Ohio State University

Patients Have Families. By HENRY B. RICHARDSON. New York: The Commonwealth Fund, 1945. 408 pp. \$3.00.

This publication is the latest in a series sponsored by the Commonwealth Fund, dealing

with collaborative studies of inter-professional co-operation between practitioners in medicine and related fields. (See C. Canby Robinson, *The Patient as a Person*, and F. Jensen and others, *Medical Care of the Discharged Hospital Patient*.) The study, whose results are summarized and interpreted in this volume, was conducted in the New York Hospital with the aid of a grant from the Josiah Macy Foundation and involved an effort by a team representing the professions of medicine (internal medicine and psychiatry), public health nursing, social work, and social anthropology, to explore the inter-relationships between health and family situations, and the possibilities of inter- and intra-professional co-operation in the treatment of cases where such inter-relationship clearly exists.

The author, who served as director of the study, is a distinguished practitioner in internal medicine, with particular interest in psychosomatic medicine.

The central thesis of the book is that so-called "scientific medicine" is deficient not only in that it fails to take into account the patient's total personality and the effect of that personality's changes and conflicts upon so-called physical health, but also in that it fails to take into account the patient as a member of a family group. Further, the breaking up of medical practice into specialties, and the development of such professions as social case work and public health nursing, make it almost impossible for any one physician to cope with the treatment of situations involving significantly correlated health-personality-family problems. The best approach to this dilemma is the building up, through the proper use of hospital and social work records, and through intra- and inter-professional consultation of means by which the patient's familial involvements and also by which the skills and resources of the several professions and specialties can be brought to bear upon family-related illness. The entire book presupposes interpretations of behavior along lines generally associated with Freudian thinking, and leans heavily towards a psychogenic explanation of a wide range of illnesses. Social work, moreover, is interpreted as that type of practice which is generally characterized as intensive case work.

Inasmuch as the patient's family is held in focus during most of the book, there is a good deal of discussion of the family both as a social institution and as a field of inter-personal reaction. The sociologist will find the author's concept of family equilibrium of considerable interest. "The family is . . . in a state of dynamic equilibrium internally and with respect to the

environment,"—equilibrium does not imply normality: equilibrium may be 'aberrant' and still permit the family "to function in a relatively satisfactory manner." Some equilibria, indeed, may represent various stages or pauses in a steady progress towards family disintegration. Such psycho-social concepts as imitation, identification, dominance-submission, orientation of purpose, and "attunement with culture," are worked into the over-all concept of equilibrium.

It is the author's belief that disturbance of family equilibrium often results in illness, and moreover, that treatment of illness can seldom safely be undertaken without reference to family equilibrium.

The social scientist will also be interested in the extent to which the author gives recognition to social case work as a professional discipline, and especially his high regard for the case worker's "skill in the use of interpersonal relationships which is the backbone of her technical training."

The discussion's principal defect is its almost exclusive focus on hospital practice, and upon that segment of such practice as is seen in the wards and out-patient clinics. It is taken for granted that the patients generally come from marginal economic groups, that they are registered in the social service exchange, and that voluminous records on them are available in the several clinical departments of the hospital and the social service division. Moreover the technique of medical practice through the conference group, towards which the entire discussion is pointed, is feasible only in a hospital setting. There is a hint that the medical student destined to see private patients in his office or in their own homes may gain valuable insights by participating in this type of practice, but it is only a hint. It may be too much to expect consideration of all types of medical practice in a pioneering study, but unless the author is prepared to make the unlikely assertion that the great majority of Americans will in the near future be forced to accept medical care under conditions approximating the wards and out-patient clinics of large metropolitan hospitals, then he would probably be the first to acknowledge that the results achieved at this stage of his studies can have only limited application.

The book is clearly and interestingly written. The text is studded with excellently presented case narratives—and there is a welcome appendix note telling how most of the cases "turned out."

The student of sociological methodology will

be particularly pleased with the 70 pages of full and carefully worked out methodological notes in the appendix.

NILES CARPENTER

The University of Buffalo

The School of Social Work

Social Trends in Seattle. By CALVIN F. SCHMID. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1944. Pp. xi + 336.

With his usual vigor and skill, the author has prepared another valuable monograph on the spatial pattern and growth of an American city. Seattle affords an unusually interesting subject for study, especially with respect to urban change, because it is so new that most of the changes from frontier village to metropolis have occurred within the memory span of its older inhabitants. Seattle's extremely irregular topography and the adaptation of this urban agglomeration to its physical base illustrates another interesting facet of urban study.

In his preface Schmid lists three purposes of his monograph: "First, to provide the professional social scientist with certain basic data and generalizations concerning the processes of city growth and the patterns and characteristics of modern urban life. . . . Second, to serve as a systematic source-book of information which can be used in social science classes in the local high schools and in institutions of higher learning. . . . Third, to assist social agencies and governmental offices in research and planning." To carry out these different purposes, Schmid has conceived his task primarily as one of compiling, organizing, and presenting in graphic form such data as might be useful. Consequently, the monograph is primarily factual and descriptive rather than theoretical. Except in Chapter II on the Process of City Expansion and in a short methodological note, the author presents little theory.

Schmid gives the reader a graphic picture of changes in Seattle, especially by means of numerous charts and contrasting pairs of photographs which show scenes from various spatial locations at intervals of 40 to 50 years. He has also portrayed the contemporary spatial pattern of the metropolis in more than 75 excellently drawn cross-hatch and spot maps, mainly full-page in size.

The main body of the text has been organized into five major divisions as follows: (1) growth and expansion of Seattle; (2) population trends and distribution by density, sex, race and nativity, educational status, occupation, and em-

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ployment status; (3) morality, including a special study of suicides; (4) housing, by value, rent, age, occupancy, condition, and equipment; and (5) political trends and characteristics. These data were compiled from the usual sources, federal and local, supplemented by field studies.

The volume is entirely free from the long, detailed statistical tables that commonly characterize publications relative to census tract cities. The omission of detailed numerical data constitutes both a strength and a weakness of the volume. It adds strength in that it affords a bold, vivid picture of the city as a whole; but, at the same time, it makes for weakness in that planners and research workers find it too general for use in many detailed quantitative studies.

Three appendices form an interesting and valuable part of the monograph. The first gives a description of "Hooverville," a homeless-man shanty town in Seattle. The second is a short methodological note on the homogeneity of census tracts. The author properly points out the importance of knowledge about the homogeneity of areas in making comparisons, and recommends that tract boundaries be delimited so as to obtain the greatest degree of homogeneity; but he does not explain how, in a rapidly growing city where areas are shifting, tract boundaries can remain permanent and yet retain the desired homogeneity. The third appendix describes and evaluates the impact of the war on various communities in the State of Washington up to November 1, 1943. It throws light on several types of problems caused by the migration of thousands of war workers into the shipyards and other industries of the state.

JAMES A. QUINN

University of Cincinnati

Conscience and Society: A Study of the Psychological Prerequisites of Law and Order. By RAYNARD WEST. New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1945. 269 pp. \$3.00.

What is man's "fundamental" nature and does it allow for the possibility of world peace? This is the problem toward a solution of which this work is directed. As a practicing psychoanalyst and a student of law, West brings the philosophies of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and the various revisions of Freudian psychology to bear upon this question. He concludes that there are two "primary" human instincts: (1) the social, expressive of the need for love and security, and (2) the aggressive, a function of the need for

self-assertion. While these drives are equally "fundamental," in that "they appear in the infant's responses to the first situations where character can show itself," the clinically verified phenomena of repression, identification, and projection indicate that in many conflicts "the social instinct nearly always wins." It follows, then, that it is not the aggressive individual who menaces world order since, with exceptions, he is fairly well controlled from within by his social instinct and from without by law. But it is collective aggressiveness that constitutes the impediment to peace, and it is the sovereign state which makes it possible for individual aggressiveness to be vented safely, that is, with an easy conscience.

The control of collective aggression is not to be achieved by present "International Law," farcical in its lack of power, but in a new social contract involving the abrogation of sovereignty and the institution of supernational law and world community. "Communities are started by the surrender of self-government."

Despite certain of his moot assumptions, West has written a provocative work in the theory of social control.

GWYNNE NETTLER

University of Washington

Normal Lives for the Disabled. By EDNA YOST and LILLIAN M. GILBRETH. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1944. Pp. x + 298. \$2.50.

With casualties exceeding the one million mark there is naturally considerable interest today in the rehabilitation of the thousands of veterans who will be returning shortly to this country. During the war our industries had successfully employed large numbers of vocationally handicapped workers, including many veterans of World War I. With reconversion however, these are among the first laid off, thus temporarily at least, increasing the difficulties of those responsible for the emotional readjustment and re-employment of the recently wounded.

The joint authors approach this problem against a wide background of experience from the period of the First World War. Miss Yost is a prominent free-lance writer and her collaborator, Mrs. Gilbreth, a well-known engineer, personnel consultant and author, is Professor of Management at Purdue University.

Normal Lives for the Disabled is neither a technical treatise nor a practical manual on rehabilitation. Instead, as Dr. Gilbreth points out

in her Introduction, it was written primarily for the wounded, disabled and disfigured veteran himself as a member of a much larger group of handicapped persons. The style, which is reminiscent of that of "David Grayson," is untechnical, stimulating, and even inspirational and the text is interlarded with numerous "success stories."

The authors' aims specifically are to urge the "unembittered acceptance of help" on the part of the injured man, to suggest how hidden capacities and resources may be discovered within himself, and describe how Federal and State services may be obtained and utilized. But they go even further. Pointing to the actual superiorities which handicapped persons quite generally develop, and to the experience, maturity and stability of the rehabilitated veteran they emphasize the possibility of leadership on his part in the democracy of tomorrow.

The book is composed of four parts dealing respectively with the attitudes of the injured man, vocational rehabilitation programs, finding a job, and postwar problems. Several fundamental principles of rehabilitation are stressed. Axiom 1, according to the authors is: "Never train around a handicap if the handicap can be removed." They insist too that the injured man's original vocation should not be changed if it can be carried on effectively unless of course it constitutes a threat of further disablement. Finally whether a physical or mental injury actually constitutes a severe handicap or not is in the great majority of instances dependent upon the man himself as the case of Franklin D. Roosevelt strikingly revealed.

This book will be of considerable interest to relatives and friends of wounded men as well as to social workers and other professional persons. For the sociologist, too, who is concerned with the effect of physical and mental handicaps on social participation and adjustment it should prove suggestive and stimulating.

ERNEST B. HARPER

Michigan State College

The Baconian Lectures on Aims and Progress of Research in the State University of Iowa, 1944. Series on Aims and Progress of Research No. 77, Study Series No. 410. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1945. 134 pp. No price indicated.

This booklet is a collection of popular radio addresses dealing with the achievements in research in all the major fields in the University of Iowa during the decade 1931-1941. As a

matter of information to the citizens of the state and others regarding the research activities of their state University, this series will be of interest. The title, *Baconian Lectures*, may give the erroneous impression that the book is of more general or deeper scientific interest. It is an informative and readable report.

GEORGE A. LUNDBERG

University of Washington

Kentucky: Designs For Her Future. Edited by Howard W. Beers. Lexington. University of Kentucky Press, 1945. 321 pp. \$1.35.

In 1942 Kentucky celebrated its sesquicentennial by reviewing its past history. Like all states, Kentucky has much prideful history. Also, like all states, she realizes that she has not made the most of her resources and opportunities. Therefore, "Kentucky in retrospect" was followed by "Kentucky in prospect," a series of thirty-two radio addresses by University authorities from several fields of interest. In order to give the vast amount of assembled information wider publicity it was decided to follow up with a volume attempting to chart a course for Kentucky in the world of tomorrow, edited by Doctor Beers, with the assistance of faculty members and prominent citizens of Kentucky.

This book is presented in thirteen chapters, plus selected readings, and an index. Three chapters are by Doctor Beers; the others, judging by their quality, are by carefully selected persons, assisted by many citizens, agencies, and state departments. These chapters tell about Kentucky history, people, agriculture and forestry, rocks and streams, wild life, industrial resources, commerce, government, education, health and welfare, and goals for Kentucky. Each chapter presents in a concise and readable manner the subject at hand. It reviews the situation as it now exists, and offers many constructive suggestions. Each chapter is an inventory and a chart for the future. While there are supporting data throughout the book, statistics are kept to a minimum. It is good reading, even to an outsider.

State planning is going on in almost every state. Kentucky was busy with it before it became the vogue. This volume is the product of several years of stock-taking and should be read not only by Kentuckians, but by those in other states who are interested in charting their own future. This book will rank high among similar volumes to come from other states. It could well be adopted as a pattern for state planning elsewhere, and certainly Kentuckians

should read it and profit by adopting it as a guide for the future. The pictures alone are worth the price of the book.

S. H. HOBBS, JR.

University of North Carolina

War and Its Causes. By L. L. Bernard. New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1944. 479 pp. \$4.25.

In this book a mature and able sociologist brings his massive erudition and logical power to bear upon a great social problem. The result is a readable and significant volume which will bear examination in the post-war years better than most of the literature of the period.

War and Its Causes is primarily an analysis of war as a social institution and of the roots of war in society. Like other writers on the subject, Bernard has some difficulty in defining war, but finally arrives at the following all-purpose definition: "War is organized continuous conflict of a transient character between or among collectivities of any sort capable of arming and organizing themselves for violent struggle carried on by armies in the field (or naval units on water) and supported by civil or incompletely militarized populations back of the battle areas constituted for the pursuit of some fairly well-defined public or quasi-public objective."

In following chapters Bernard analyzes the various aspects of war as a social institution, discussing types of wars, the evolution of warfare, the cult of militarism, the time and space distribution of wars, the prediction of war, the ideologies of war and our changing attitudes toward the war. In Part II he deals with the multitude of theories concerning the causes of war. He criticizes these theories acutely and competently, with a slight tendency to split hairs. More than most other sociologists, Bernard understands the frightful dynamic of war which inheres in rival class systems. He leans heavily upon other economic interpretations, particularly that which traces war to the system of empires. However, he has not explained to the satisfaction of the reviewer the fact that the United States continually fights wars to preserve the empires of other nations. The reviewer believes that if Bernard sought to frame such an explanation he might be inclined to emphasize economic factors less and social psychological factors somewhat more.

The final chapter of the book discusses the question, What Can Be Done About War? Here Bernard goes beyond his sociological

analysis to point some morals. Certain passages have brought bitter criticism upon his head. Typical of these is the following:

The security (which England and France) could have had for themselves at much less cost if they had stood firm when first they began their appeasement policies, could not now be obtained with war itself. Sir Galahad and the good sword Excalibur had to be called in, and of course we went. The war has not yet been won, nor has the British empire yet been saved, nor France restored, but all of this will be done in good time. And we shall again stand as we stood in 1918-1919, facing the task of making a peace that will end war and make the world safe for democracy. The question of transcendent importance that will then confront us is, Shall we allow the European imperialists to make that peace as we did in 1919 and thus lose it, or shall we attend to this matter ourselves and thus rule out the war makers and appeasers?

The reviewer yields to no one in his admiration of this bold and honest speech. Here is one sociologist, at any rate, who has the courage to think his own thoughts in time of war.

WILLARD WALLER

Barnard College

New Perspectives of Peace. By George B. DeHuszer and others. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1944. Pp. vi + 261. \$2.00. *Military Occupation and the Rule of Law.* By Ernest Fraenkel. New York: Oxford University Press, 1944. Pp. vi + 267. \$3.50. *Peace through Law.* By Hans Kelsen. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1944. Pp. ix + 155. \$2.00. *The United Nations of the World.* By Haridas T. Muzumdar. New York: Universal Publishing Company, Second Edition, 1944. Pp. xvi + 288. \$2.50. *War, Peace, and Nonresistance.* By Guy Franklin Herschberger. Scottsdale, Pennsylvania: The Herald Press, 1944. Pp. x + 415. \$2.50.

The five books covered in this review are a varied assortment of the many books brought forth by World War II that have been coming from the presses during the last few years. The five books represent as many different approaches and points of view on war and peace.

New Perspectives on Peace is a brief and excellent symposium by eleven professors of the social science departments, colleges, and schools at the University of Chicago, offered first as a series of lectures and now printed in book form. The present war and the ensuing peace are approached from a number of points of view, including the geographical, the historical, the

ethnological, the economic, the sociological, the legal, the educational, the psychological, the philosophical, and the religious. Nowhere has the reviewer seen as sane and realistic a treatment of the problems of war and peace as found in this book by the distinguished scholars of the University of Chicago faculty.

Fraenkel's Military Occupation and the Rule of Law is the best account we have had of the Allied occupation of the German Rhineland following World War I. As a second occupation of German territory begins, the appearance of this book is most timely and should be widely read by responsible officials and persons in the occupying armies, and by those who will lead public opinion in this country in regard to a prolonged occupation of Germany. Fraenkel shows in this book how difficult is the problem of occupying a country like Germany according to "the rule of law" following a military defeat. We may expect in the new occupation a long siege of all the same difficult problems of occupation carefully and judiciously analyzed by Fraenkel in this book: prosecution of war criminals; commercial regulations; administration of public utilities; working with local government, police, and courts; and these greatly aggravated by the determination of the occupying powers, this time to prevent Germany from rearming. Undoubtedly, this book is being widely distributed among English speaking occupying officers and accompanying personnel.

Peace through Law is a closely reasoned monograph by Dr. Hans Kelsen, the Austrian legal sociologist, whose writings on the sociology of law we have come to regard highly. Dr. Kelsen holds that compulsory adjudication of international disputes is the key to peace. He believes that there is already in existence a body of law and legal principles that can be used in the control of international conduct and relations. He particularly stresses the idea that peace can be guaranteed by holding individuals responsible for violations of international law. Although the reviewer believes Dr. Kelsen has more faith in the law as a means of international peace adjustment than history justifies he wishes to commend Dr. Kelsen's views to all students of international affairs.

Dr. Muzumdar's *The United Nations of the World* is a sincere but thin brief for the establishment of an enduring peace following the present war by turning to "spiritual" forces. Throughout the book, "brute force," "unlimited sovereignty," and "power" are held responsible for the present plight of the world. British im-

perialism in India comes in time and again for castigation. Gandhi-like ideas, a mystical "soul force," are to be the "designs for living" in a new international order. The reviewer does not believe that the United Nations will make much progress towards enduring peace along this line.

In Professor Hershberger's *War, Peace, and Nonresistance* we have one of the best accounts that has been written of the attitudes, teachings, and stands taken by the various nonresistance denominations on war. In this well documented, carefully sifted, and rather lengthy book, we are shown the historical development of the beliefs and teachings of the peace denominations, with considerably more attention given to the Mennonites than any of the other groups. Though the reviewer believes that the nonresistance philosophy is entirely unworkable in a shrinking world that soon feels keenly international aggression, he wishes to commend this book to those who desire a better understanding of the anti-war stand taken by our present nonresistance denominations. The book has an excellent bibliography. Professor Hershberger has done a splendid job in presenting the point of view of the nonresistance churches, and shows no bitterness against the many who oppose the position these churches have taken in the present and preceding wars.

FRED R. YODER

State College of Washington

The German Record: A Political Portrait. By William Ebenstein. New York: Farrar & Rinehart, 1945. 334 pp. \$3.00.

Upon the basis of an interpretation of German and world history, which he sets forth, Ebenstein seeks to indicate what we can now expect of the German people, who is guilty of war crimes, and what should be done with Germany as a political and economic state.

From Ebenstein's historical digest and analysis, it appears that "Western Europe ends at the German border"; that Germans have fought two world wars "for the dream—of being not themselves, but as the English"; that they are "the only great people in Europe that have not achieved the status of a nation"; that Germany's "arms have always exceeded the boundaries of her ideas," of her cultural influence. In this highly mystical development of a highly mystical German national and individual character, Ebenstein makes such sweeping statements as that the "Prussianization of Germany found its spiritual expression in the blind adoration of success regardless of the

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means employed, in the veneration of bigness for its own sake, in the blunting of those qualities of sensitivity and diversity which might obstruct the intellectual regimentation of Germany."

Just what Ebenstein means by such terms as science is not clear. He says that Germany "entered the field of science on an extensive scale in the Second Reich," at a period when "the age of individual scientific work . . . was over"! Nowhere does he mention such scientific individualists as Wilhelm Wundt and Karl Marx, and sociology, as well as psychology and economics, is apparently outside of what he calls science.

After all this and more, what does he think we can expect from the German people as a whole? Nothing. "*Germany is the only country in the world in which Nazism was voted into power.*" We must not "forgive the Germans in a spirit of generous magnanimity the crimes they have committed—against other peoples."

What should be done with the German state? "After 1918 the uncompromisingly small antimilitarist minority of radical Socialists had about five per cent of the German vote. . . . It is in the interest of all United Nations that this minority, small as it may be, rule Germany."

From the foregoing, the biases of Ebenstein are rather clear. He ignores the role of life conditions in nurturing the Hohenzollern-Hitler type of national madness. He emphasizes, rather, mystical cultural causes. He does not go to the extremes of the individual scapegoatists in Paris who think to exorcize the French state by executing Pétain. He realizes our share in the rise of Nazism in preserving the Prussian bureaucracy and Prussian militarism as "bulwarks against Bolshevism." But he cannot face the terrifying impersonality of multiple natural causation, the shocking need for coping with a vast complex of social structures and practices extending into all the principal nations of the world. He needs a simplification of all this, a more respectable scapegoat, intellectually, than a Hitler or a Goebbels, and he produces it: A caricature that he calls German culture.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE

Wayne University

The Exploitation of Foreign Labour by Germany. By International Labour Office.* Montreal, Canada: Inland Press Limited, 1945. Pp. v + 286. \$2.00.

The International Labour Office's report on the exploitation of foreign labor by Germany is an interim report, based primarily on an analysis of laws, administrative decrees, and the speeches of the German leaders. The extent of the correspondence between official provisions and the factual situation could not be determined during the war. It is doubtful whether it can ever be determined with any degree of precision. No objective studies of social relationships or changing attitudes were possible while the laborers were under the control of the Germans. Later historical studies can scarcely represent an adequate sample of a universe which is unknown, and they will be subject to retrospective falsification and rationalization to an unknown degree. These difficulties do not detract from but rather enhance the value of the International Labour Office's continuing attempts to compile and systematize information while the war was in progress.

It is difficult even to estimate the number of foreign workers who were utilized by Germany. Eight million is accepted as the number at work in early 1944, but the number probably increased considerably during the year. If both foreign workers under non-German employers in German-dominated countries and workers who died or for other reasons were eliminated from the labor force are included, the number of persons employed by the Germans during the last stages of the war can be estimated conservatively at 30 to 35 million workers.

The detailed report includes discussions of administrative machinery and problems, means of recruitment and transportation, the transfer of foreign plants to Germany, the transportation of foreign workers to industry, agriculture, and other occupations, the labor contracts, the Todt Organization, living conditions, the regulation of wages, conditions of work, provision for dependents, measures to counteract foreign resistance, social insurance for foreign workers, and the industrial experience gained by such workers. The contradiction between economic necessity and National Socialist theory was apparent throughout the history of German war labor policy. Improvised solutions to the problem of labor scarcity produced a system of incredible labor waste. The state which was to be made ethnically pure imported aliens until Germany became a polyglot nation.

Nazi racial ideology dictated the segregation

*Preface states: "The study has been prepared by Mr. John H. E. Fried, a member of the Staff of the International Labour Office."

and treatment of foreigners, with gradations of discrimination reflecting the Nazi hierarchy of hatred. Even the ashes of Eastern workers had to be buried in plots "sufficiently separated from those destined for Germans." The general operation of the system for the economic exploitation and social isolation of aliens is difficult to determine. The framework of the regulations and the manner in which they were drawn indicate that the exploitation of labor was carried on to a large extent within the ordinary forms of labor recruitment and management. There were provisions for contracts with individual workers, regulation of wages, limitation of hours of work, overtime pay, home furloughs, the return of the bodies of the dead, payments to dependents, and unemployment, sickness and other insurance benefits. These may have been designed primarily to give a veneer of normality and respectability to this gigantic experiment in the use of slave labor, but they are also coupled with ingenious devices for the financial exploitation of the foreign worker and his home country. The legal statements of the system leave many loop holes for exploitation, and the record is replete with instances in which even the meager provisions that would have ameliorated the lot of the workers were denied. Insurance funds were built up in Germany, but persons requiring assistance were transported to their home countries and became charges there. Wage taxation amounted to 66 per cent of the base pay in the case of some of the Eastern workers.

The systematic use of propaganda and inducements to foster national and social antagonisms produced mixed effects. There were collaborators, but throughout Europe the conscription of labor produced passive and later active resistance. As the war developed, the choice for increasing numbers became that between forced labor away from home and active participation in the resistance movement. It is entirely possible that the system of labor exploitation which was so pivotal in the development of the German war machine was a major factor in the final defeat of that machine.

CONRAD TAEUBER
IRENE B. TAEUBER

Washington, D.C.

From Democracy to Nazism. A Regional Case Study on Political Parties in Germany. By Rudolf Heberle. Baton Rouge Louisiana State University Press, 1945. Pp. vii + 130. \$2.50.

There are few sociological studies of political movements which compare in intensity and clarity with the study under review. There are even fewer which are conducted on an ecological basis, the classical work in the field being André Siegfried's *Tableau Politique de la France de l'Ouest sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1919). Dr. Heberle's study appears all the more significant at this time as it elucidates an important chapter in the sociology of the National-Socialist party in Germany and thus contributes to the understanding of the causes which underlie Fascist movements in many lands.

The study is based on close observation in the field and on a careful tabulation and interpretation of election results in the German province of Schleswig-Holstein prior to the rise of the Nazi party to power in 1933. Chapters III and IV ("The Political movements among the Rural People in Schleswig-Holstein 1918-1932" and "The Ecology of Political Parties in Schleswig-Holstein") have been previously published in the *Review of Politics* (1943) and in the *American Sociological Review* (1944). Chapters I and II ("Origin and Nature of the National Socialist Party" and "Political Parties and Elections in Schleswig-Holstein before the First World War") completes the case history; and chapter V ("Conclusions and Interpretations") summarizes the findings. There is a selected bibliography on Schleswig-Holstein, but one misses a more general bibliography on political movements in Germany although the elements are scattered in copious footnotes over the pages of the book.

Students of human ecology and of social stratification will find this book highly stimulating. Both fields interpenetrate, and Schleswig-Holstein offers an observation post of the first order for the study of the processes involved. We have there the fertile North Sea marshes in the West, the rolling hill country in the East, and the sandy *Geest* in the center. (See map on p. 35.) Social stratification among the rural population has been more pronounced both in the West, with its rich independent farm-owners and their poor working-class neighbors, and in the East, with its large estates, interspersed villages, and estate-laborers, than it has been on the *Geest* where the differentiations of wealth and status are levelled down by the poor quality of the soil. As a result, political class and party differentiations have always been more pronounced in the West and in the East than in the center of the province.

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Both the Conservatives and the right-wing (commercial) Liberals and the Socialists and the Communists found more adherents in the West and in the East than on the central *Geest*. (Compare Whigs and Democrats in the old South.) The *Geest* turned out large majorities for the progressive Liberals and the democratic agrarians of the *Landespartei* prior to the 1930's and similarly large majorities for the National Socialists afterward.

This result is as amazing to the average sociologist as it is revealing. Why should Liberalism and Progressivism be so easily turned into Nazism? Dr. Heberle suggests various reasons. First, closely-knit "communities" (of the Toennies type), with little pronounced class cleavages, have strong social controls. The Nazis used these controls to the point of intimidation. Second, rural and small-town Liberalism was opposed to bureaucratic centralization and, in the period under review, such centralization was represented by the republican government in Berlin. How was it possible, then, to pervert the ideas of the free folk-community into the hyper-bureaucratic practice of Nazi totalitarianism? Dr. Heberle's answer is that the impact of capitalistic society in general and of the crisis on the world markets in particular convinced the rural (as well as the urban) middle classes that they were facing disaster in a system of free competition. Finding themselves between the millstones of trusts and combines on the one hand and the labor unions on the other, they decided to resort to the famous device of "flight by advance" and to capture the state. Sociologically speaking, then—and this is the conclusion of the reviewer—liberal nationalism appears as the political movement of an advancing middle class while fascist nationalism appears as the political movement of a decaying middle class. There are wide perspectives in such a thesis for the study of the post-war American scene.

WERNER J. CAHNMAN

Atlanta University

Personality and the Behavior Disorders: A Handbook Based on Experimental and Clinical Research. Edited by J. McV. Hunt. The Ronald Press Co., New York, 1944. Pp. xii + 618.

The term "personality" is proving as fruitful for science as for popular use. The scientific advantages are many. For all who are trained in biology the term can be interpreted in reference to the interaction of an organism with its simi-

lars. Psychologists who begin with the study of what members of the species have in common move on to explain wherein they diverge from one another. Social scientists who start from institutions in the large discern variations in detail that must be attributed to the structure of behavior that persons develop through co-behavior. "Personality" is a unifying frame of reference for scientists who occupy many distinctive standpoints of observation and who speak many special dialects.

This is an opportune moment to take stock of the present state of theory and fact-accumulation. It is too early for the results of the war to be assimilated into the handbooks, though it is not too late to expedite the ultimate process by providing a convenient panorama of the state of science as of the outbreak.

The editor is to be congratulated on the excellently conceived framework of the book. It is reasonable to begin by scanning the "theoretical approaches" (Part I). It is also reasonable to pass on to consider how the term "personality" is used in describing the structure of behavior at any cross-section of the individual career-line (Part II). Next it is appropriate to examine the dynamic laws of human behavior (Part III), and to evaluate the determining rôle of two sets of factors: "Biological and organic" (Part IV), "experiential and sociological" (Part V). The way is open to focus upon "Some Outstanding Patterns of Behavior Disorder" (Part VI) and "Some Investigated Correlates of Behavior Disorder" (Part VII). Part VIII deals with therapy and prevention.

Furthermore, the author-editor is to be congratulated on the choice of key words. It is a definite improvement to speak of "behavior disorders" instead of "mental disorders." In a work of this kind it would have been too daring to drop "personality" and substitute a neologism for the science of studying persons like "personology" (Parallel with sociology). Perhaps that can happen soon. The concept of "Psychological Deficit" is introduced by Hunt in place of "dementia," "deterioration," and "regression"—an admirable innovation. "When any person performs in some situation at a level of efficiency below that expected from comparison with typical individuals or some indicator in his own present or past behavior, that person manifests a deficit" (p. 971).

The handbook is integrative and not devisive; partisan, sectarian, and polemical asides are at a minimum. The tone is set by the theoretical papers, which are well-balanced between psy-

chologists (MacKinnon and Guthrie) and sociologists (Mowrer and Kluckhohn). To be integrative and judicious does not imply any absence of clear judgments. Scattered through the two volumes are such remarks as: "the psychological study of drawing and painting suffers from no lack of ingenuity or stimulating ideas. The crying need is for validation" (Robert W. White, p. 246). "Have we not paid too little attention in this country to the judgment of capacity on the basis of numerous behaviors and attitudes or dispositions in critical situations?" (Edward S. Jones, p. 166).

Although it is not the function of a handbook to publish new research, there are some good examples here and there, notably Margaret A. Ribble's excellent report on "Infantile Experience" (Chapter 20). Experimental studies of conflict are creatively summarized by Neal E. Miller, H. S. Liddell, and Frank W. Finger. Leon J. Saul's review of "Physiological Effects of Emotional Tension" is a valuable addition to Dunbar (1938). Fresh material is brought together in the report on "Level of Aspiration" by Kurt Lewin and collaborators.

The papers of biological and organic factors maintain a very high level of achievement (L. S. Penrose, William H. Sheldon, Stanley Cobb, Nathan W. Shock). The anthropological and sociological literature is summarized by Gregory Bateson and Robert E. L. Faris. In general, the weakest section is Part VI, where most of the papers by psychiatrists are found. Most of them are routine performances, notably "Unfit Personalities in the Military Services" and "The Psychoneuroses."

Editorial judgment (or luck) is probably at fault in the concluding section, where no competent social scientist reviews the existing state of knowledge about the conditions facilitating and restricting the prevention of behavior disorders in society. The volume stops short with a paper by George S. Stevenson that is written with the limited perspective of a public health physician. What is missing could have been supplied by L. K. Frank, Louis Wirth . . . to stop short with two names.

HAROLD D. LASSWELL

Washington, D.C.

Configurations of Culture Growth. By A. L. Kroeber. Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1944. Pp. x + 882. \$7.50.

The problem of this book is the investigation of "the frequent habit of societies to develop

their cultures to their highest levels spasmodically: especially in their intellectual and aesthetic aspects, but also in more material and practical aspects. The cultures grow, prosper, and decline, in the opinion of the world" (p. 5).

Professor Kroeber's work is a healthful, if temporary, antidote to the hectic preoccupation of the present with acute local problems of economic and ethical behavior that follow from two world wars and revolutions. It comes with a breath of cool detachment given by an overall perspective and with the grand sweep of history. The book is a thoughtful treatise in which the author has made a conscientious and honest attempt to be impersonal and objective (pp. 21-26) despite certain surprising omissions of reference to objective studies by sociologists and geographers (Huntington).

In structure the work falls into three main divisions: first, a one-chapter statement of the problem and procedure; second, a nine-chapter division presenting the data of configurations of culture growth with respect to such culture forms as philosophy, science, philology, sculpture, painting, drama, literature, music and the growth of nations; and third, an 86-page review with conclusions in Chapter XI. There is a bibliography of 10 pages arranged by the subjects cited above, and a 22-page index for authors and subjects.

Specialists in philosophy, philology, sculpture, etc. will no doubt appraise the author's treatment of their data and his interpretations; the present review will deal with the author's concepts and procedures which are of interest to sociological students of culture change, since the author lays claim to a sociological point of view (pp. 12, 762).

The florescence of cultures is described for the periods of their greatest achievement and subsequent decline, and the author claims to refrain deliberately from an examination of the content of cultural growths and their possible causes (p. 6). The study is therefore essentially descriptive, comparative and in a certain sense evaluative. The evaluative element consists of criteria used to judge the periods of high florescence. The criteria consist of the productions and size of clusterings of men of genius in different places and times (pp. 7, 12, 14, 834). Genius, its numbers, incidence and quality, are thus taken as indicators of cultural achievement (p. 839). The rating of genius is derived from books, encyclopedias and from textbooks (p. 23, secondary sources?).

But interest is not in the personal qualities of superior individuals (pp. 8-10, 15), as for example, psychologists and psychoanalysts attempt to appraise these historic personages; it is rather *what* the men of genius express, and *how*, that concerns Professor Kroeber. The occurrence of genius in clusterings and constellations, departs from probability and hence an explanation in biological terms is inadequate (p. 10). This fact, together with the frequency of simultaneous but independent discoveries and inventions makes a cultural explanation the logical one (p. 12). Biologically it is assumed that genius would appear over history in an even flow (p. 14) except for culture, hence, "probably a majority of eminently superior individuals never get into the reckoning of history." The argument thus seems to be: fluctuations in culture are facts that can be described in terms of nine major aspects of culture (philosophy, science, sculpture, etc.) drawn from historical sources; these fluctuations of florescences may be evaluated in terms of constellations (number, quality and incidence in time and place) of men of genius which depart from probability of occurrence of genius by chance; and since biologically the occurrence of genius follows a chance distribution, any departures from probability are not due to biological reasons, but are due rather to cultural factors.

There appear to be three difficulties with this method of analysis and interpretation. First, florescence in a civilization is indicated by clusterings of genius as departures from probability due to cultural factors. Do cultural configurations then explain culture florescence? If so, then why rule out of consideration the examination of culture content? (p. 6). Second, since the point of emphasis is not *who* are the geniuses (their individual psychological traits) but *what* and *how* they express their genius in achievements and inventions, again one wonders why the content of cultures is not made more of. This method of treatment may explain why the author ignores (except for scant references without further comment on pages 12, 834, 849) such definitive work on culture growth, often based on primary sources, as that of sociologists like Ogburn, Thomas, Sorokin, and others. In all fairness, however, it should be noted that the author also omits all use of his own definitive studies which measure fluctuations of fashion in women's dress ("On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion,"

American Anthropologist, vol. 21, no. 3, July-September, 1919, pp. 235-263; "Three Centuries of Women's Dress Fashions: A Quantitative Analysis," *Anthropological Records*, vol. 5, no. 2, October, 1940, pp. 111-151; and Analysis no. 22, "The Prediction of Cultural Change: A Problem Illustrated by the Studies of F. Stuart Chapin and A. L. Kroeber," by F. H. Allport and D. A. Hartman, in *Methods in Social Science*, edited by Stuart A. Rice, Social Science Research Council, 1931, pp. 307-352). Third, although he disclaims any attention to casual factors (p. 6), it would seem that he inadvertently resorts to casual explanation of culture florescence in terms of genius. All of which, in the opinion of the reviewer, goes to show how difficult it is to achieve scientific explanation of large-scale social phenomena when the student forsakes specific and narrowly limited subject matter.

At this point, when one begins to seek the conceptual rather than the factual basis of Kroeber's explanations of the rise, elaboration, and decline of culture patterns, such terms are encountered as "pulses," "growth," "florescence," "saturation," "exhaustion," etc. without any systematic effort to define these terms. Growth, for example, has often been defined for culture as including or based upon such sub-processes as accretion of culture traits or as the selective accumulation of culture traits, but no such interpretation appears in this work. The author does, however, recognize the complex nature of the different processes often grouped under the term "diffusion" (p. 27). The reader may obtain a taste of the flavor of Kroeber's conceptual approach by noting the points developed in his 86-page review with conclusions presented in 14 different sections in Chapter X. These may be sampled as follows:

Universals in history are doubtful; but there are cultural patterns and growths (which "have a conceptual validity" and "with a usually continuous rise and fall of value," p. 762); there are pulses and lulls in growth; there are different types of growth configurations (in which attention is directed to philosophy-religion as "a basic idea-system for a great culture," but probably "no normal form of time-quality curve in florescences," p. 777); on the question of growth curves ("I can only conclude that either there is no normal form of time-quality curve in florescences, or that the difficulties of quality estimation at a distance from the peak render curve representation too uncertain for deter-

mination at present," p. 777); the interrelations of cultural activities often occur in sequences (sculpture usually precedes painting, p. 781, philosophy-religion usually precedes science, p. 783, 786-788, and "More significant seems the historical fact that coherent and developable systems of philosophy grew up seemingly independently, and so far as we can see *de novo*, three times in history; but an important system of science only once, and that in close linkage with one of the three philosophies"); there are special problems of interrelations with respect to the growth of nations; the relation of culture content and climax (is expressed in the observation that great civilizations are "necessarily slow-growing" p. 796. but "we simply have no right criterion by which we can say that this cultural phenomenon is form and that is content," p. 799); of religion ("it seems normally to be religion which first reaches its chief climax, and then the aesthetic and intellectual activities as they free themselves from religion," p. 804); of durations of growths (he says, "a greater pattern takes longer to fill and to exhaust," p. 805; "national culture-wholes, of course, are normally longer in growing than their constituent parts," p. 807; and "not only are great growths long, generally, but they show a tendency to recurrence," "so far as high-quality growths are concerned, they seem to take about as long now as they did one or two thousand years ago," p. 808; "there is nothing positive to show that they are growing faster now than they did in the past," p. 809); consideration then follows of retarded and insular growths, and of growth at the peripheries; on the question of cultural death he says, "Cultures can evidently deteriorate, in the sense that their total content as well as their highest values may shrink; but there is nothing to show that the process can go on to the point of destruction" (p. 818); dying "must mean a replacement" until "the transformation is so great that it is descriptively more useful to speak of the end product as a new culture" (p. 820); Spengler's theory is accepted only as it posits, "first, the existence of certain fundamental patterns characteristic of each major culture; and second, that these occur in limited growths," but is rejected as it posits, "a single master or key pattern which controls the culture," and rejected also as it sets up a parallel stage development and the theory that cultures die of themselves (p. 828); the existence of isolated genius suggests that "all human beings are the product of their cultures

to a much greater degree than we ordinarily imagine, and that cultures appear to grow as patterns and to fulfill or exhaust these" (p. 838).

One approaches this work with the hope for a more adequate schematic treatment than has hitherto existed of the important phenomena of growth, maturing and decline of cultures, in which hypotheses were exactly stated and concepts precisely defined. Since this expectation is not realized because of the magnitude of the units studied and the caution of the author, one is left with the feeling that the chief contribution of this work, instead of any original explanation, is the negative conclusion of raising more questions than are asked and of serving as a caution against easy generalization from historical data. The reader feels satisfied, however, that the materials dealt with have been sifted carefully through the mind of a scholar who is well qualified by learning and integrity to perform the task of critical analysis, even if there is not much contributed by way of positive synthesis.

F. STUART CHAPIN

University of Minnesota

The Governing of Men. By Alexander H. Leighton. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1945. 404 pp. \$3.75.

The sub-title of this book "General Principles and Recommendations Based on Experience at a Japanese Relocation Camp" expresses most of its tone and content better than the resonant and extravagant title. The "Japanese Relocation Camp" (a less invidious locution might be preferable) is the Colorado River War Relocation Center at Poston, Arizona, and, more specifically, Unit I at Poston. The period covered is from December 7, 1941, through mid-1943 with the focus on the early growth of the camp and the events leading up to the strike in November 1942.

Part I, "The Story of Poston," is largely a descriptive history. It tends to use impressionistic devices but rather gracefully and effectively. It strives for and in large part achieves objectivity and a temporal perspective. The discussion is in terms of group formation and cleavages in the center population and of attitude formation and the development of tensions among the population and its administrative staff. The latter are characterized as "people-minded" and "stereotype-minded."

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least on the Pacific Coast. Therefore the peculiarities of the book become important. It would be unfortunate indeed if this book were taken as the story of the relocation and surely that would be farthest from the author's mind. The story depicts less than half the history of one of three camp units of one of ten relocation centers. Furthermore Poston was unique in that the Office of Indian Affairs functioned as an administrative instrument by arrangement with the WRA.

It is unfortunate that the generally beneficial effects on public opinion will be impaired by a tendency to present undocumented generalizations about "average set(s) of attitudes" (p. 72). The Isseis are referred to as being fervently pro-Japan" (p. 156). But is it fervour? "... in most cases, sympathy for Japan did not mean an uncooperative attitude ... or an unwillingness to live up to the obligations of a 'friendly enemy-alien.' Many Isseis who were fathers and mothers with American children were more concerned with their family's welfare than anything else" (p. 203).

The proportion of Kibeis, defined as "persons whose formative years have been spent in Japan" (p. 79), is set at 9.2 per cent (p. 81) which seems much too large. The use of population data is rudimentary. The separation of Chapter 7, "Social Organization," from Chapter 8, "Social Disorganization," may be justified on the basis of format but not of method. The preface contains two errors which are interesting because they have become part of the folk-belief of this tragic incident: that it is the first large-scale evacuation in U. S. history (the Indian Removals certainly qualify); that "all of the Japanese" were removed (there were several hundred exceptions).

Part II, "Principles and Recommendations," is something over one hundred pages in length and embodies the findings that Leighton set out to secure. They are formulated on a "fundamental postulate," that mankind has basic inherent similarities and cultural differences, and are elaborated in three chapters "Individuals Under Stress," "Systems of Belief under Stress" and "Social Organization under Stress." In a short review it is impossible to present or criticize these in any detail. In the abstract they seem unduly fragmented. On the other hand they are pithy and often well considered judgments which might be helpful to practical administrators in similar situations. Leighton is a writer with insight and his insights here are testable if not tested. The recommendations are

far above the rigid mentality that produces a table of organization and nothing more.

There are a number of unanswered questions which needed treatment in the book: (1) Under the severe stress which characterized the whole evacuation and early relocation experience, why was organized resistance and violence so rare? (2) Why did the strike not spread to units II and III? (3) Why were these not used as controls? (4) Why was the Manzanar strike which occurred shortly afterward and which involved violence not used as a control? Because such questions as these are left unanswered, this reviewer feels that the study is too narrowly based to have much value "... in the government of occupied areas, in relief and rehabilitation and in the reestablishment of millions of displaced persons after the war" (p. vii).

A short appendix by Leighton and Edward H. Spicer describes the research project which was fostered by John Collier, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, the WRA and the Navy (Leighton was in uniform). Subsequently the WRA set up its Community Analysis section which was reported on by John Embree in the *American Anthropologist*, 1944, vol. 46, no. 3.

LEONARD BLOOM

University of California, Los Angeles

Wartime Racketeers. By Harry Lever and Joseph Young. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1945. 226 pp. \$2.75.

This is a description in colorful manner of special wartime crimes, such as violation of price regulations, fraud in war contracts, impersonating an officer of the Army or Navy, theft of government checks from mailboxes. The book gives an impression, without presenting much statistical data, that such crimes are very numerous and very pervasive; they are committed by many ordinary citizens in their capacities as consumers, landlords, or merchants, but extend upward into the ranks of the most respected and powerful citizens and downward into the underworld of organized criminals. The data are taken principally from the records of the Federal Bureau of Identification, the Office of Price Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and other federal agencies and may be regarded as generally reliable. The only error of fact noted by the reviewer is on pages 206-07 in reference to collusive bidding on Navy cable by the Rockbestos Products Corporation and nine other corporations which

are said to be "smaller" than Rockbestos. Among the nine others are the following corporations or subsidiaries of the following corporations: U. S. Steel, General Electric, Anaconda, American Smelting and Refining, and Phelps Dodge, all of which are very much larger than Rockbestos.

The authors, who are newspaper men, make no effort to interpret the large number and wide diffusion of such special war crimes. Their purpose was to make the public acquainted with the facts so that the public could protect itself more adequately against such crimes. The criminologist who is interested in bringing these data within the frame of reference of a theory of criminal behavior will need to consider two hypotheses: First, any new regulation which is in conflict with prevalent practices of the population will be violated extensively unless machinery for enforcement is in operation from the time the regulation goes into effect. The trend in violations of price regulations, as in violations of the earlier prohibition amendment, was from casual violations by ordinary citizens toward organization of black markets by gangsters. Second, the explanation of the prevalence of a particular crime must include "opportunity." The great increase in thefts of government checks from the mail boxes is explained, at least in part, by the great increase in the number of such checks and hence by "opportunity." Similarly, impersonating an officer, fraud in war contracts, fake training schools for veterans, and the sale of worthless or dangerous gadgets for soldiers (such as steel-coated Bibles to be worn over the heart) have increased because opportunities have increased. The data presented in this book may be useful for testing such hypotheses but must be supplemented by other data.

EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND

Indiana University

Problems of the Postwar World. Edited by Thomas T. C. McCormick. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1945. 526 pp. \$3.75.

At the time of World War I, several faculty members of the University of Wisconsin put out a little brown book which various people have probably tried to hide. The role of the academic in war has changed. This time he has turned over the whole plant for "war service"; but on the whole, he has kept his head much better than last time. If his enthusiasm has been rather dulled, still he has *worked* very

hard. The current "war book" is a sober and scholarly judgment of what the U.S.A. is "in for" during the coming peaceful era.

It does not contain much direct discussion of the causes of war or what the late European war was all about. But the effects of war are seen as a major problem: war is something to be gotten over. No vilification of the people of any nation is indulged in. The academic has become the humane technician who patches things up after "they" have gone and done it again.

Although there are exceptions, the book as a whole is New Dealish in tone. It tends to center hopes around a sort of welfare capitalist state. There is so little political daring in it that one wonders whether, during and after the giant upheavals of war, the tameness of the academic reaction does not confirm the stereotypes held of the academic.

The authors of the volume seem soberly to agree with one another on most of the great banal truths. But many of their points turn around the phrases which blunt the sharp edge of what men are up against. One is, to be sure, informed. But one's political imagination is not shaped to alert focus. Thus, many a loaded or softened definition works to bypass the problems at hand. For example, "Planning means to me the deliberate effort to provide better for the future . . ." etc.; "It is scarcely necessary to add that national interest does not mean mere narrow selfishness but that it implies the pursuit of those policies . . . which will most effectively promote our enduring economic strength and prosperity."

Space in the book is about evenly divided between the affairs of the United States and conditions in other countries. Seven economists, eight political scientists, one historian, one educationalist, and three sociologists contribute. This count, however, is not really accurate, as Selig Perlman is included among the economists, and he more properly belongs to us!

The three essays which seem to me to stand out as most aware of what is going on outside the libraries are by Selig Perlman, H. H. Gerth and W. A. Morton. These essays will be of special interest to political sociologists. Doctor McCormick is to be congratulated on his organization of the volume and also for factual portrait of the position of the U. S. Negro.

C. WRIGHT MILLS

Bureau of Applied Social Research
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The Dynamics of Culture Change. By Bronislaw Malinowski. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1945. 171 pp. \$2.50.

Professor Bronislaw Malinowski's interest in the application of anthropology to problems of colonial government was expressed as early as 1922, and received explicit formulation in his article on "Practical Anthropology" published in the journal, *Africa*, some sixteen years ago. The present work, published posthumously under the devoted editorship of Dr. Phyllis M. Kaberry, one of Malinowski's students, carries somewhat farther, with the aid of additional data and refined techniques of presentation, most of the conceptual trends developed at that time.

The book is in two parts. Part One outlines Malinowski's theory of Culture, with particular reference to culture change. The argument, in brief, runs as follows: Cultures are systems which satisfy basic human needs—needs which are the same for all of humanity. The satisfaction of these needs, through the operation of cultural institutions, however, creates new needs which vary from society to society as the specific institutions satisfying the basic needs vary. These derived needs are, in turn, satisfied by additional specific institutions, the process creating more derived needs, and so on. Cultures in contact will clash with more or less violence, since the institutions necessary to satisfy any given need are almost bound to be different in any two societies. The practical anthropologist can, however, minimize the violence of this clash by systematic analysis of the institutions of two cultures in contact, his analysis enabling him through the resultant perception of "common factors" (i.e., aims, attitudes, and perhaps institutionalized behavior patterns which operate similarly in both cultures) to point out agreements between the two cultures and to suggest compromise methods of avoiding unnecessary change in either.

As outlined, and in view of the fact that cultures *do* sometimes clash, the Malinowskian system is almost beyond cavil. Malinowski has failed, however, to show how the plan can be carried out under conditions where one of the two cultures is not, under threat of force, obliged to do all the compromising. Hence his theoretical contributions in the present work fall somewhat short of his and Doctor Kaberry's claims.

Part Two deals more specifically with the "African Problem." It is copiously illustrated by charts, following in the main Malinowski's synoptic "Three-column" scheme, with auxiliary

columns added when circumstances demand, the whole designed to alleviate conditions of unnecessary conflict between European and African cultures by helping those concerned to put a finger on both the sore spots and the "common factors." The "Three-column" approach, it should be said, is one which balances synopses of European trends with native ones, across a fulcrum called "Processes of Culture Contact and Change," a column which sums up the "*tertium quid*," the "new reality" arising, according to Malinowski's formulation, "from the interaction of European impact on indigenous cultures" (p. 31). In connection with these charts, which illustrate, specifically, problems of African warfare, witchcraft, diet, segregation and reserves, land tenure, and chieftainship, it may be noted as symptomatic of the trend of Malinowski's thinking that while the column listing European aspirations is headed "White Influences, Interests, and Intentions," that listing those of the African tribesmen bears the title "Surviving Forms of Tradition."

RICHARD A. WATERMAN

Northwestern University

Youth in Trouble. By Ernest Manheim. Kansas City, Missouri: The Community Service Division, Department of Welfare, 1945. 108 pp. No price indicated.

Considerable research of local importance, if not always of great scientific value, is being produced today by councils of social agencies and other welfare organizations. These studies are of a practical and administrative nature and have a direct bearing on the program of the agencies in question. The present investigation, which was made by Professor Manheim of the University of Kansas City, is an excellent example of such fact finding as a basis for planning by the sponsoring agency, and illustrates the values as well as some of the short-coming of this type of research.

Community organization workers will be interested in the fact that in this instance the study was initiated not by the Council of Social Agencies but by the city department of welfare. In its efforts to improve public understanding and cooperation in controlling juvenile delinquency the department through its Community Service Division placed ten "co-ordinators," or area community organization workers, in the ten school districts of the city. In most of the communities and neighborhoods local councils were also established as the program developed as well as a Central Coordinating Council on

delinquency with representatives from all the major civic and public bodies, including the Council of Social Agencies. The immediate practical purpose of the study was to collect and interpret data on the extent and nature of juvenile delinquency for the use of the coordinators in planning a youth guidance and delinquency prevention program.

Data were collected from various official sources including complaints made to the police and the juvenile court and information from the health department and census division of the schools. This material was analyzed statistically, both for the city as a whole and for the ten school districts. These districts are termed "communities" or "sub-communities" but would seem to be primarily administrative rather than natural areas. Of the ten, nine are white school districts while the tenth is an artificial "community" composed of 11 negro elementary school neighborhoods.

The author found that delinquency in Kansas City began to increase in 1939 and that this trend continued until 1944. Three districts or sub-communities which were most affected by prewar and war conditions, namely Manual, West Junior, and Lincoln-Coles, the composite Negro "community," had the highest rates in 1939 and continued to exceed the average for the city in 1941. After 1941 however the rate of increase fell below that for the city except in the West Junior district. Using a number of indices, the author then attempts to determine the degree of disorganization and the variations in sex, age, recidivism, time cycles and distance from home at which the delinquency was committed, which characterized the 10 communities. The specific findings and recommendations should be of interest not only to social workers but to students of criminology as well.

ERNEST B. HARPER

Michigan State College

Higher Education in the Postwar Period. Edited By John Dale Russell. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1944. Pp. vi. + 169. \$2.00.

This is the sixteenth annual volume of proceedings of the Institute for Administrative Officers of Higher Institutions. It includes the thirteen papers presented at the twenty-second annual meeting held in Chicago July 6 and 7, 1944.

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Social Setting of Postwar Higher Education." Then follow discussions of the problems which must be solved in such areas as teacher education, professional education, terminal education, and liberal education; in such institutions as the junior college, the liberal arts college, and the large university; and for such services as are provided by the student personnel office, the administration, the registrar's office, and the business office. There is also an excellent presentation of "The Characteristics of the Discharged Veterans Who Will Be Seeking Higher Education."

The papers are, for the most part, of excellent quality and, though brief, present the crucial issues in the areas under consideration. Furthermore, they do not duplicate but are an excellent addition to a symposium on the same subject which constitutes the major portion (pp. 53-162) of the January 1944 issue of *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*.

The material is challenging as is indicated by the following selected excerpts: "There is a real need for the extension of the idea of competition within universities and among universities." "Let universities evolve a plan whereby individuals can finance their own education completely, soundly, and easily." "The way to the solution of all postwar problems is the problem of the reorganization of university administration." "Our colleges and universities may not reflect all the human qualities that distinguish the American people, but they seem to share the national indifference to planning." "The colleges of liberal arts have not greatly modified their views as to sound and well-balanced education for this country." "The very life of American democracy calls for the universal extension of free public education through the junior-college period." "Unless there is a decided reduction in the cost of living, the postwar wage and salary bill for the non-academic staff is likely to be from 20 to 40 per cent higher than previously." "It has been truly said that specialism is totalitarian in its implications."

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